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Over millennia, the presence of naval forces with global reach correlates to peace 
and international prosperity. Encompassed by the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) 
enterprise, the Thousand Ship Navy (TSN) is a concept envisioned by CNO Admiral 
Mullen, USN in 2005 to provide overwhelming maritime power by forming an alliance of 
multinational security forces and navies. With no single national power currently 
positioned, economically or politically, to unilaterally provision a TSN, its capability 
includes voluntary participation of international signatories, nations’ navies, commercial, 
humanitarian and constabulary stakeholders. The TSN Command, Control, 
Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) capability established by this study 
addresses unprecedented requirements. In order to coordinate existing, albeit disparate 
systems, a top-level C4I system/software architecture is identified to support the TSN 
operational architecture and missions. Through the application of structured systems 
engineering methods, domain patterns, and analysis tools, the study developed 
requirements, defined functions, and synthesized architecture alternatives. 
A distinction is made in the study between GMP and TSN where GMP represents 
the international enterprise construct and TSN represents the force level of this construct 
needed to achieve the objectives of GMP. The effect of improved technology has limited 
battlespace volume where fewer ships are required to dominate any ocean. Subsequently, 
the capability of a TSN in the modern era can be achieved with a fewer number of ships. 
Regardless of TSN size, TSN is an alliance of international partners who volunteer naval 
and constabulary assets that provide global maritime security, delivery humanitarian aid, 
and respond to disasters and environment events. A paradigm shift from the Global Fleet 
Station (GFS), the framework of TSN is based on an international vice a U.S. framework. 
The TSN C4I system is multi-tiered to achieve trust, confidentiality, and performance 
among participating stakeholders. These stakeholders operate, thus TSN operates, across 
legally defined jurisdictions of high seas, economic zones, and territorial waters. 
Legacy systems which address maritime security fall into two categories. The first 
category is an adaptation of military systems, such as the U.S. Combined Enterprise 
 xviii
Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) and NATO’s Multilateral 
Interoperability Program (MIP) Land Command and Control (C2) system. The second 
category includes commercial ventures and international organization systems, such as 
Collectè Localization Satellite’s ShipLoc, Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and 
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) systems. Due to military concerns, the 
first category is not viable for TSN. However, the second category is compatible with 
TSN as these systems are able to develop situation awareness to enable C2. Presently the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) 
Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) is the only multinational effort to alert law enforcement, 
ship masters, and owners of imminent transnational threats. Its capability does not 
include humanitarian aid, disaster relief or environment governance scope. 
The TSN C4I system intends to provide C2 capability for all TSN missions by 
applying a committee organizational model to its stakeholders. Supported by an Analysis 
of Alternatives (AoA), the committee approach is favored over the traditional team or 
candidate group approaches impart due to international political feasibility. The AoA is a 
weighted normalized matrix that transforms team assessments and data from nine Arena 
models. Random occurrences stimulate the models according to each mission type: 60 
hours for a transnational threat, 98 hours for a humanitarian aid event, and 101 hours for 
disaster relief/protect environment event. Results from these models, resource usage and 
mission duration, are used by the AoA with other evaluation factors. 
Employing the committee organizational model, three C4I system tiers are used to 
involve stakeholders utilizing backbone, edge, and broadcast capabilities. Backbone 
capability includes nations’ navies, constabulary, and intelligence units that possess the 
highest access to TSN information and operations. Edge capability includes commercial 
shipping industry and humanitarian organizations that possess moderate access to TSN 
information and limited operations. Broadcast capability includes all other stakeholders, 
e.g., private stakeholders, with lowest level of access to basic TSN situation awareness 
information. 
TSN C4I is organized into three critical operational functions: provide 
intelligence, perform command and control, and operate unit. Traditional operational 
 xix
capability patterns are used for the first two functions. The operational capability pattern 
for provide intelligence is task, process, post, and use. The operational capability pattern 
for perform command and control is sense, assess, generate, select, plan, and direct. From 
functional analysis sub-functions are derived and allocated to the following operational 
nodes: C2, intelligence, and unit. The latter node is further instantiated to navy, 
constabulary, humanitarian, commercial, and private. Between these nodes, needlines and 
operational information describe the dependencies between these nodes. 
From the arrangement of operational nodes an operational architecture is 
developed and assessed with mission success and structural analysis. The following 
operational scenarios have a mission success likelihood of: 75 percent for disaster 
relief/protect environment, 64 percent for humanitarian aid, and 63 percent for 
transnational threat. The difference of functional arrangements associated with each 
operational scenario drive separate results. Structural assessment of the operational 
architecture results in the following acceptable scores: a cluster factor of 1.8, where 1.0 is 
ideal, and a system stability of 72 percent, where 100 percent is ideal. Additionally, an 
operational test and evaluation plan is provided for the TSN C4I system as a validation 
approach, when the TSN C4I system undergoes operational testing. 
A software system architecture is derived from the operational architecture that is 
portable across heterogeneous environments. Derived system functions are mapped to 
operational functions using a Department of Defense Architecture Framework version 1.5 
(DoDAF) System View Five (SV-5). System sub-functions are derived and allocated to 
the following system architecture components: Asset Management Computer Software 
Configuration Item (CSCI), Situation Awareness CSCI, Fusion CSCI, Intelligence CSCI, 
Mission Planning CSCI, Mission Operations CSCI, Mission Analysis CSCI, Information 
Release CSCI, and Communications, and Network Management Service. Structural 
assessment of the system architecture also results in acceptable scores: a cluster factor of 
1.5, where 1.0 is ideal, and a system stability of 80 percent, where 100 percent is ideal. 
Determined from the operational architecture, needlines and operational 
information, system data items, and their interfaces are developed. On this foundation an 
 xx
information exchange standard is provided for the TSN C4I system. This exchange 
standard represents essential information elements which pass among TSN stakeholders. 
As the final achievement of this study, the TSN C4I architectures are evaluated to 
determine an estimate cost of development. An estimated total for developing the CSCIs 
hosted by the TSN C4I system is the combination of both systems and software 
engineering costs. With a confidence level of 50 percent for the systems engineering 
estimate, and 80 percent for the software engineering estimate, the total cost is $9.68 




Chapter I briefly introduces the 1000 Ship Navy (TSN) Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) concept. A description of the TSN 
problem forms the basis of the subsequent thesis description, analysis and conclusion. 
Chapters II through V contain research results, study methodology, and present results of 
the study. Results include: an operational architecture, software system architecture, an 
information exchange standard, an estimate of mission application development cost and 
corroborating analysis all of which address the problem statement of Chapter I. 
Appendixes VIII to X11 contain supporting details referenced from the body of the 
thesis. 
A. CAPSTONE STUDY DISCUSSION 
1. Study Scope 
Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), an enterprise, relies upon TSN which is 
composed nations’ navies, constabulary forces, commercial shipping, and other 
international partners that have mutual concerns but limited information exchange 
capabilities. The ability of these partners to conduct coordinated maritime security and 
humanitarian assistance operations is hampered when participants of the enterprise are 
not supported by an integrated command and control process. This study seeks to define a 
systems of system architecture and information exchange standard for a C4I capability to 
enable collaboration within TSN. 
2. Study Description 
In 2005 former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mullen, USN 
advocated the TSN concept, which in combination with the maritime mission of North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) fashioned the GMP enterprise. As 
promoted,  
“The 1,000-ship Navy is not a thousand gray hulls flying the American 
flag, but rather a voluntarily global maritime network that ties together the 
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collective capabilities of free nations to establish and maintain a 
dramatically increased level of international security in the maritime 
domain” (Martoglio and Morgan 2005). 
In 2006 Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Collins, USCG, and CNO 
Admiral Clark, USN, put forward the Maritime NORAD concept. This concept renewed 
Coast Guard-Navy team commitment and highlighted the need for international maritime 
cooperation. At the root of this vision, system capabilities supplement USN, USCG, and 
international partner naval platforms to enable global security. These concepts came 
together to support the GMP enterprise which the U.S. State Department adopted by 
implementing the Pacific Partnership and Partnership of the Americas. In 2008, the U.S. 
National Security Council sanctioned GMP as an interagency strategy (Swartz and 
Duggan 2008). 
Concerns shared within the international community include maritime security 
acts against humanity, e.g., persecution, exploitation, and forcible recruitment. Global 
maritime security is a fundamental naval mission, i.e., protecting the Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOC). The world’s commercial fleet carries ninety percent of global 
exports and comprises approximately 46,000 commercial ships (Morgan 2006). 
Dependent on secure SLOC, maritime commerce abhors explicit or implicit risks from 
criminal elements and political extremists. Protection of humanitarian aid ships and the 
use of global reach capabilities in distraught areas are examples of unconventional 
operations supporting the U.S. State Department 2007-2012 strategy, which aims to 
stabilize legitimate nations and thwart terrorism (U.S. Department of State 2007). In this 
strategy the U.S. Navy projects power to save lives and support humanitarian objectives. 
Recently, the international community has undertaken forceful humanitarian 
interventions that merge security and humanitarian efforts. For example, the failed 
Somali state requires armed protection of humanitarian aid providers. 
3. Problem Statement 
The global maritime community faces a serious dilemma concerning the inability 
to provide an international coordinated response, either to transnational criminal threats, 
events compelling humanitarian assistance, or response to environment events. The 
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complex nature of the dilemma is confounded by: the lack of a common information 
exchange standard, lack of an international C4I system, legal prosecution procedures, 
languages, cultural issues, national interests, and political willingness to participate. 
Defining what constitutes a transnational criminal threat impacts the actions of the 
international community specifically their legal, naval, constabulary, political, 
commercial, and charitable systems. The White House provides guidance that 
transnational criminal threats are 
“Modern-day pirates and other criminals [who] are well organized and 
equipped, often possessing advanced communications, weapons, and high 
speed craft to conduct smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and other 
contraband [e.g. counterfeiting, illegal fishing, etc.], as well as piracy” 
(U.S. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer 2009). 
In addition, the United Nations Conventions on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
Article 101, provides an international legal framework that constrains hot pursuit, 
interdiction, and jurisdictional incursion into a nation’s territorial waters (Scudder 2005). 
Events defined as necessitating humanitarian assistance include: “conflict, disaster, and 
displacement from physical harm, persecution, exploitation, abuse, malnutrition and 
disease, family separation, gender-based violence, forcible recruitment, and other threats 
[to humanity]” (U.S. Department of State 2007). 
Today, the international maritime community employs independent systems that 
respond to transnational criminal threats, events requiring humanitarian assistance and 
environment governance. Although a broad study of these systems and their interactions 
is warranted, the objective of this study focuses on the underlying need of a common 
maritime C4I system of systems encompassing naval systems, constabulary systems, 
commercial shipping, and other international partners of the maritime community. GMP 
necessitates an agile approach where any single participant may join or leave the 
Command and Control (C2) framework without degrading performance. 
The GMP enterprise is reliant on the “cooperation among maritime nations, who 
share a stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas” 
(Woodson 2007). In Figure 1, the C2 pattern is employed at the enterprise level, as well 
as the platform level. To participate in the enterprise the platform must exercise its C2 
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and contribute towards one or more enterprise C2 activities. The C4I system of systems is 
composed of the watch chain activities bounded by the red dotted box to include only a 
subset of these activities that occur after an external threat or event. These activities are 
shared between the naval, constabulary, and commercial maritime industrial systems. The 
last two activities outside the dotted red box are incorporated into the TSN kill chain 
which is not explicitly addressed in this thesis. 
 
Figure 1. Functional Problem Sequence Process Flow. 
Author generated traditional command and control operational capability pattern. 
The GMP enterprise consists of sovereign nations, business corporations, and 
other international partners whom have confidentiality and privacy concerns yet common 
maritime interests. As an example, maritime business operations which are vulnerable to 
criminal acts prefer to conduct business with a degree of privacy to preserve competitive 
advantage. Additionally, law enforcement agencies protect their intelligence methods to 
preserve collection techniques and information sources. In this setting, the C4I system of 
systems must balance confidentiality, privacy, and information exchange to support 
nation, business, and partner participation in the voluntary TSN. 
In summary a distinction is made in the study between GMP and TSN where 
GMP represents the international enterprise level and TSN represents the force level 
needed to achieve the objectives of the GMP. Regardless of TSN force size, TSN is an 
alliance of international partners who volunteer naval and constabulary assets to provide 
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maritime security, delivery humanitarian aid, and respond to disasters and environment 
events. A segment of TSN is C4I, the ability to provide coordinated response of the TSN 
missions. At the USN and USCG flag level a vision has formed for maritime forces to 
combine resources to protect the SLOC from threats affecting international communities 
consistent with restrictions of law. In Chapter IV inclusion of the USMC and alignment 
with national policy via the U.S. Department of State is discussed. 
The problem addressed by this study is the need of a C4I system for international 
coordinated transnational threat enforcement, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief/protect 
environment response. Development of this capability is confounded by the nature of 
internationalism: diverse information standards, disparate communication systems, 
different navigation systems, dissimilar operating procedures, and lack of overarching C2 
organizational construct. In this international setting, C4I must balance trust, 
confidentiality, and performance with information exchange to support nation, business, 
and partner participation in the voluntary TSN. 
The report is composed of 5 chapters. Chapter I describes the introduction of 
TSN. Chapter II describes background regarding the TSN concept and disparate systems. 
Chapter III describes methodologies employed to study TSN and develop both 
operational and system architectures. Chapter IV describes the results of applying the 
methodologies. Chapter V provides a thesis conclusion. In addition, appendixes are 
provided which contain the results of analysis, of interest, e.g., TSN C4I operational test 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Chapter II describes research findings relevant to TSN. In addressing the 
question, “Why the phrase ‘one thousand ship navy’?”, Chapter II summarizes the 
historical use of the phrase by establishing a correlation between naval presence and 
economy prosperity. Tenets of TSN are discussed in the context of policy and directives 
established by: U.S. Department of State, U.S. DoD, USN, USMC, and USCG. TSN 
stakeholders are described with respect to their interests and viewpoints influencing TSN 
mission complexity. In support of U.S. national outreach policy, aspects of the “Soft 
Navy” and related Global Fleet Station (GFS) concepts are compared to TSN objectives. 
A survey of legacy systems compares their maritime security capability to TSN goals 
with an assessment of their limitations. 
A. CHAPTER TSN HISTORY AND VISION 
1. 1000 Ship Navy Antiquity to Present 
From Persian sea dominance in antiquity through recent times, the 1000 ship navy 
is a standard of sea power. The Persians employed a 1000 ship fleet in combination with 
its army to subdue the Greeks to the west. In the Bronze Age, threatened by the Persian 
menace, the independent Greek city-states volunteered vessels and men to combat the 
Persian force. As recorded by Homer in the Iliad, the Greeks raised a fleet of 1000 ships 
to attack the city of Troy for the rescue of Helen; however, most historians believe 600 
vessels were provisioned. Over three millennia the 1000 ship naval force has been the 
historical measure of dominant naval presence. 
With the ending of the Dark Ages, 750 B.C., on the island of Delos the Greek 
states formulated a naval force capable of combating the Persian might. The Delian 
League remained in effect until the second Persian invasion in 480 B.C. when a fleet of 
310 vessels half manned by Athenians encountered the Persians at the island of Salamis. 
With demonstrated Athenian prowess, the league was all but renamed the Athenian 
League (Connolly 2006). The league continued its growth and dominance throughout the 
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Mediterranean until subsumed by the Roman Navy. The Athenian League’s existence 
created a period of commercial success for the entire Eastern Mediterranean with 
peacekeeping and protection of commerce (Cline 1975). 
The Greek civilization remained a dominant sea power which influenced the rise 
of the Roman Navy although Rome subjugated its navy under the control of the Roman 
Armies. The early design of the Roman vessel was based on the Greek trireme until the 
First Punic War when a captured Carthaginian vessel, a quinquireme, became the new 
blueprint for Rome’s navy which reached 200 vessels during the Second Punic War. 
Towards the end of this war and in the Eastern Roman area of influence, the Roman 
Navy combined with Pergamon and Rhodes to defeat Macedon. The functioning Roman-
Greek alliance then battled and defeated the Hellenistic Seleucid Empire which assured 
Roman dominion over the Mediterranean. Reducing its navy over time, Rome exercised 
control of the Mediterranean by means of the Roman-Greek Alliance relying on its 
subject’s navies. Essentially, Rome extended its vicarious authority on Greek city-states 
during the successful execution of various sea campaigns (Connolly 2006). Of interest, 
the period when Rome dominated the Mediterranean was associated with peace and 
prosperity, Pax Romana. 
Similar to Persia’s supremacy in the Bronze Age, the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
established the Pax Britannica period (1815 - 1914) with a fleet size of about 950 ships. 
During this period the Royal Navy was effectively unchallenged and British influence 
flourished (Royal Navy 2009). The U.K. wielded its naval might as a hegemonic 
industrial power responsible for two-thirds of Europe’s industrial growth and output. 
During this period one-third of merchant marine flew under the British flag sustaining the 
U.K. portion of two-fifths of the world’s commerce. Although the Royal Navy size 
steadily decreased, by comparison to other navies, it remained as powerful as the next 
combined three to four largest navies, Russian, French, and U.S. (Kennedy 1987). 
Modeled on the Athenian League Alliance (Cline 1975) or Roman-Greek Alliance 
(Sakhuja 2007), during the Cold War, the US calculated the concept of an association of 
seagoing trading states. Known as the Ocean Alliance, it would join nations together to 
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provide mutual security capability. The Open Alliance refers to the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans linking the North American geopolitical community which was conceived as the 
core group. With common political and social process, its membership included: the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, West Germany [FRG], France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Israel, Japan, China/Taiwan [ROC], Australia, and New Zealand. Even with 
an implemented Open Alliance, other U.S. alliance commitments would have continued 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their combination would 
provide an overlapping security capability (Cline 1975). 
In some manner the Open Alliance may have formed the conceptual foundation of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched in 2003. The PSI alliance is comprised 
of 101 countries with notably absent countries of China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, 
Pakistan, and Malaysia (U.S. Department of State 2009). The prime objective is 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which critics view as 
targeting North Korea and Iran. At present U.S. bilateral agreements are in place between 
flag states to allow for the legal boarding of ships under their flag. There exists the 
expectation that the cooperative alliance can be improved with a wider mandate of 
interdiction through multilateral agreements (British American Security Information 
Council). The ability to arrive at such agreements is challenging diplomacy when the PSI 
is viewed as a hallmark of NATO and ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, U.S.] Mutual 
Defense Pact with the U.S. (Kapila 2004). 
In the context of alliances of past and present, TSN was discussed at various 
levels in seminars and conferences the world over. In fact, senior officers of the U.S. 
Department of the Navy took the opportunity to exemplify the CNO's concept during the 
AFCEA Western Conference Exposition in January 2007. Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, 
Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy and Rear 
Admiral Michael C. Bachman, Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command gave further details on the TSN concept that aims to build a network of navies 
who would work together to create a force capable of “standing watch over all the seas" 
(Sakhuja 2007). Critics conjecture the motivation of the U.S. proposed TSN is driven by 
current and foreseeable low numbers of U.S. Navy ships. 
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The U.S. Navy ship count varied throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, as shown 
in Figure 2, adjusting to wars and conflicts (Naval Historical Center 2008). While 
preparations for World War One (WWI) saw a dramatic increase of ship count, for the 
U.S. the war lasted two years and was followed by a reduction of ships. With the 
escalation of tensions and conflict in Europe, the USN built a force which peaked at 6768 
ships during World War Two (WWII). This force was rapidly reduced and then rebuilt 
for the Korean conflict. Following this conflict the cold war provided the justification to 
sustain the USN at a high count until following the end of the Vietnam conflict when the 





































































Figure 2. United States Navy Ship Count, 1917 to 2008 (Navy Historical Center 
2008). 
The USN ship count varies with the occurrence of wars and conflicts peaking during 
WWII at 6768 ships. The reduced ship count is offset by the increased combat 
capability of modern USN ships. 
The slight build preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall is attributed to the Ronald 
Reagan administration’s ambition to build towards a 1000 ship USN. Likely, budget 
 11
pressures and high profile acquisition programs compelled an easing of the ambition to a 
600 ship objective. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the USN ship count was halved 
to 283 ships in 2008. Budget pressures and advancements in naval technology are likely 
to maintain the USN ship count at current levels. 
Deduction indicates that a sovereign state or an alliance with approximately 1000 
ships or more is a dominant maritime force. In the case of Pax Britannica, this naval force 
contributed to the first era of globalization which was characterized by a rapid growth in 
international trade and investment (Bordo and Meissner 2007). Modern globalization 
began during the Pax Americana period following the end of WWII with a migration of 
interconnected and competing global businesses throughout the world (Rowan 2006). As 
shown in Figure 2, during the Pax Americana period the U.S. naval ship count was 
approximately half of the historic number of ships due to improvements in naval 
technology. 
In general, naval technology has improved combat power by means of weapon 
range, speed, and endurance. Between the 13th and 17th centuries, ships had a weapon 
range of 100 yards, a speed of 5 knots, and an unreplenished ship range of 400 nautical 
miles. Whereas, modern warships possess a weapon range of 1000 nautical miles, speeds 
near 40 knots, and unlimited ship range. The effect of improved technology has limited 
battlespace volume where fewer ships are required to dominate any ocean (Douglas 
2009). Subsequently, the capability of a TSN in the modern era can be achieved with a 
fewer number of ships. One of the effects of modern globalization is the recognized value 
of multilateral political and commercial partnerships. Increased awareness of complex 
global dependencies has cultivated the notion of the TSN concept. 
2. TSN Tenets per CNO ADM Mullen and ADM Morgan 
The nature of the international security environment substantially changed on 11 
September 2001. This event set in motion a dialogue resulting in the International 
Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, 
signed by the U.S. Secretary of State in November 2005 (U.S. Department of State 2005). 
At this point in time, former CNO Admiral Mullen, USN advocated GMP to encapsulate 
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the enhanced outreach concept discussed by the U.S. Department of State strategy. 
Specifically, the expression “one thousand ship navy” achieved prominence based on the 
need to conduct major naval operations having more complex contingencies and a 
broader range of maritime missions. The accord, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, 
and Commandant of the Coast Guard in October 2007 provided a community of forces 
for balancing warfare and peacetime activities to foster a “peaceful global system 
comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and 
governance” (U.S. Department of Navy 2007). The GFS concept for U.S. global 
maritime operations developed from this combined vision (Adkins 2008). 
Principles of TSN are found in the International Outreach and Coordination 
Strategy for the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security, which is an extension of an 
earlier form of a U.S. Department of State policy. Notably, the strategy includes eight 
supporting plans to promote global economic stability and prevent hostile or illegal acts 
within the Maritime domain. These plans include trade routes, communication links and 
natural resources vital to the global economy. Possibly in awareness of the magnitude of 
effort needed to achieve global maritime security, the strategy emphasizes that a 
collaborative effort is required of agencies, nations, and private sector. Where the first of 
two strategic goals addresses coordinated policy, the second strategic goal addresses 
outreach, as follows (U.S. Department of State 2005): 
• Strategic Goal: Enhanced outreach to foreign governments, international and 
regional organizations, private sector partners, and the public abroad to solicit 
support for improved global maritime security. 
• Strategic Objective #1: Build partnerships with other countries and the maritime 
community to identify and reach out to regional and international organizations in 
order to advance global maritime security. 
• Strategic Objective #2: Coordinate U.S. and international technical assistance to 
promote effective maritime security in developing nations and critical regions. 
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• Strategic Objective #3: Coordinate a unified message on maritime security for 
public diplomacy. 
• Strategic Objective #4: Provide U.S missions abroad with guidance to enable 
them to build support for U.S. maritime security initiatives with host 
governments, key private-sector partners, and the general public abroad. 
On the basis of these goals, the tenets of TSN are formed. TSN requires 
international cooperation in order to achieve global maritime security. Furthermore, this 
cooperation must be mutual where the participants are bound by the universal interest of 
security, stability, and economic prosperity. This mutual interest allows for partnerships 
to be formed voluntarily, with the intent of building trust and reciprocal actions of 
support. To foster trust, TSN employs a common and transparent method to react to 
transnational criminals and humanitarian need and environment governance. For 
example, potential best practices developed for a particular region are broadcast to TSN 
to enhance the effectiveness of any course of action. TSN is expected to provide situation 
awareness and foster C2 in order to enhance TSN effectiveness. As emphasized in the 
strategy, the sea is shared by nation-states, international and regional organizations, in 
addition to the private sector, each having commercial and non-commercial concerns 
(Woodson 2007). To be effective, TSN must be knowledgeable of these concerns and 
operate within these confines. 
Mutual interest is envisioned to compel a new kind of global alliance for which 
objectives and tenets appear to be unprecedented. Both the U.S. Department of State and 
USMC/USN/USCG community strategies are expected to assure economic prosperity of 
the global economy. From the U.S. point of view, 95 percent of trade is transported by 
sea. This comprises 20 percent of the Gross [Domestic] National Product (GNP) in 2000. 
Although parameters differ, other nation-states have sea trade components with 
significant percentage of their GNP. The study by Looney, Schrady and Porch D (2001) 
on globalization illustrates how enhanced security of the maritime domain provides 
economic benefits for the global economy. Figure 3, from the study, illustrates the 
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expected benefit of naval presence and globalization hypothesized for the U.S., yet it 
seems equally applicable for all nation-states vested in the global market place. 
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Figure 3. Naval Presence and Globalization (Looney, Schrady and Porch 
2001). 
Study of four specific instances of naval presence / crisis response suggests that both 
globalization and naval forward presence strongly correlate. 
With the prospect of a stable and secure free trade, economic benefits provide 
strong motivation to participate in an alliance, TSN (Looney, Schrady and Porch D 
2001). Maritime security is essential to U.S. economic interests during the projected shift 
of economic dominance to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and China, (Cronin 2009). 
3. Global Fleet Station and TSN 
GFS is an implementation concept embracing the U.S. Department of State and 
USMC/USN/USCG community strategies. Essentially, the concept employs USN ships 
and other U.S. government assets as a self sustaining base from which to conduct 
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maritime operations. Training, humanitarian assistance, maritime interdiction and combat 
span the range of possible options. The GFS unit is a dedicated combat command asset 
with a primary mission to support security objectives by working directly with other 
services and interagency components to develop and sustain regional partnerships 
(Adkins 2008). Validation of GFS is found in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 
3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations (U.S. Department of Defense 2005). This directive outlines policy objectives 
which support the broader goals of the U.S. Department of State International Outreach 
and Coordination Strategy for the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
Regardless of the eventual GFS-TSN association, the policy objectives are useful for 
guiding the development of supporting TSN C4I systems. 
The following DoD 3000.05 stability operations policy objectives are selected 
based on their C4I system implications and compatibility with the U.S. Department of 
State International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the U.S. National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, and CNO Admiral Mullen, USN advocated TSN concept. A concept 
that thwarts transnational threats, provides humanitarian assistance, responds to disaster 
relief events, and provides environment governance. 
[4.4] “Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability 
operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the 
Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant 
U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, 
global and regional international organizations (hereafter referred to as 
“International Organizations”), U.S. and foreign nongovernmental 
organizations (hereafter referred to as “NGOs”), and private sector 
individuals and for-profit companies (hereafter referred to as “Private 
Sector”)” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005). 
[4.12] “Information shall be shared with U.S. Departments and Agencies, 
foreign governments and forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and 
the members of the Private Sector supporting stability operations, 




4. Piracy and Humanitarian Aid Concerns 
The 21st Century Maritime Strategy (U.S. Department of Navy 2007), 
USMC/USN/USCG community, consists of not only the reactive approach to fighting 
wars and terrorism, but also a proactive approach to preventing them. “Today regional 
conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence 
spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all 
possible when regional crises erupt” (U.S. Department of Navy 2007). The coordinated, 
forced delivery of humanitarian aid is a proactive approach to prevent human suffering 
that which otherwise would escalate to dysfunctional societal behavior. 
Human suffering cannot be completely prevented since it can be created “through 
catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal flooding [which] could lead to loss 
of life, involuntary migrations, social instability, and regional crises” (U.S. Department of 
Navy 2007). The USMC/USN/USCG community strategy intends to minimize instability 
and regional crises. If no country provides assistance, 
“mass communications will highlight the drama of human suffering, and 
disadvantaged populations will be ever more painfully aware and less 
tolerant of their conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly 
attractive to those in despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements 
will also exploit this social instability” (U.S. Department of Navy 2007). 
Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in 2007 affected 2.4 million people. The 
food, water, and medical supply needs for Myanmar were more than any single nation 
could provide. Although international humanitarian assistance was initially rejected by 
the Burmese government, after relief efforts began the ASEAN Emergency Rapid 
Assessment Team noted that a coordinating platform was required to effectively help the 
victims (The Association of South East Asian Nations 2008). 
Somalia is a country in chaos and a failed state. The lack of sustained, effective 
humanitarian assistance has fostered the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Pirating has 
turned into a multi-million dollar industry that provides income to the country. In 2008, 
Somali pirates received over 150 million US dollars in ransoms. Sugule Dahir, a clothing 
shop owner from Eyl, Somalia noted that shops and businesses are booming due to 
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supplemental income provided by piracy further stating that people are happier than 
before (Kennedy and Mohamad 2008). 
Pirates do not discriminate nor differentiate between, illegal fishers, commercial 
transports, or aid delivering ships. One such event transpired in April of 2009 involving 
the MV Liberty Sun, a U.S. food aid ship. Pirates attacked the unescorted ship with 
rockets and gunfire forcing the crew to lock themselves in the engine room until the 
arrival of the USS Bainbridge DDG-96 (Jones 2009). By contrast, ships carrying aid that 
were accompanied by European Union naval escorts during the same period arrived 
without incident (Nyakairu 2009). 
“Since November last year, a succession of Canadian, Dutch, Danish and 
French frigates have been escorting [World Food Program] WFP ships 
without incident, delivering a total 136,500 metric tons of food – enough 
to feed 2.6 million people for three months” (Marshall 2008). 
Piracy precipitated the international community to coordinate efforts and provide 
armed escort to ships laden with humanitarian aid as an immediate and practical measure 
to mitigate the transnational threat. 
5. Unconventional Operations: the “Soft Navy” 
Although the USN sails worldwide to demonstrate its naval presence and power, 
it also performs seaborne rescues and provides both humanitarian relief and civil support. 
The “Soft Navy” encompasses these supporting efforts which bolster U.S. State 
Department policy and joint USMC/USN/USCG community strategy. Through these 
actions, the U.S. can improve its diplomatic posture with other nations, such as China that 
is reemerging as an economic and naval power. Similar to forced humanitarian aid, “Soft 
Navy” humanitarian aid requires an internationally coordinated effort. 
Prime examples of “Soft Navy” operations are the recent activities of hospital 
ships USNS Mercy T-AH-19 and USNS Comfort T-AH-20. Both ships have provided 
medical services to impoverished and disaster stricken countries. In 2007, Comfort 
treated more than 98,000 people in 12 countries during a four month mission named 
Partnership for the Americas. Medical professionals from the USN, USAF, USCG and 
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Public Health Service, as well as Canadian troops and civilian volunteers from a number 
of nonprofit organizations staffed the hospital ship (Ware 2009). Comfort also conducted 
Continuing Promise 2008 and 2009 missions which are continuing efforts from 
Partnership of the Americas. The ship transported personnel from several Non- 
Government Organizations (NGOs) including: Food for the Poor, International Aid, 
Latter Day Saints Ministries, Operation Smile and Project Hope (Marshall 2009). 
The humanitarian support from USN ships goes beyond medical facilities and 
support: 
• USS Abraham Lincoln CVN-72 was outfitted to supply potable water to 
the tsunami victims during Operation Unified Assistance 2008, providing 
over 5000 gallons of water within the first two days of reaching port (Stutz 
2005). 
• USS Fulton AS-11 furnished electrical power to the stricken island of 
Guam from 13 to 21 November after Typhoon Karen, on 11 November 
1962. The ship's sick bay was used as a hospital; five babies were born on 
board during this period (Siegel 2003). 
• After the San Francisco earthquake in October of 1989, 
“[a] variety of Naval forces provided relief services, with a total of 24 U.S. 
Navy and Military Sealift Command ships rendering assistance. LHA-5 
Peleliu provided shelter for 300 victims and provided helicopter support. 
FF-1060 Lang provided steam for power generation, FF-1054 Gray 
provided electric power, CGN-39 Texas provided communications 
support. Helicopter detachments supporting relief efforts flew from AOR-
3 Kansas City and AE-32 Flint, and Marines from the LST-1185 
Schenectady aided local relief efforts” (Siegel 2003). 
From the U.S. perspective, the TSN C4I must include USN, USMC, and USCG 
community interacting and operating with foreign nations’ navies, constabulary forces, 
non-government organizations, private industry, and individuals to secure the maritime 
domain and provide assistance when needed. “We [the U.S.] cannot be everywhere, and 
we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict” (U.S. Department of Navy 2007). 
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Currently with a fleet of less than 300 ships, the U.S. does not have the maritime 
resources to even consider fulfilling this role single handedly. 
“Consistent with the National Fleet Policy, Coast Guard forces must be 
able to operate as part of a joint task force thousands of miles from our 
shores, and naval forces must be able to respond to operational tasking 
close to home when necessary to secure our nation and support civil 
authorities. Integration and interoperability are key to success in these 
activities, particularly where diverse forces of varying capability and 
mission must work together seamlessly in support of defense, security, and 
humanitarian operations” (U.S. Department of Navy 2007). 
Coordination of these operations requires a trust that is developed by consistent 
application of soft navy operations. 
Currently, China is expanding its naval power with the ambition to perform “Soft 
Navy” operations. China has produced a naval hospital ship, dubbed Ship 866. Although 
it has military functions, if operating like USN hospital ships, 99 percent of its time and 
resources are available for humanitarian aid operations. China has shown the capability to 
protect the waters from terrorism, pirating, and illegal trafficking by venturing into the 
pirate-infested waters at the Gulf of Aden in December of 2008. Senior Colonel Huang 
Xueping, spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, noted China’s willingness “to 
share intelligence and conduct humanitarian rescue operations with other countries 
involved in the anti-piracy efforts” (Barrowclough 2008). 
B. STAKEHOLDER ORGANIZATIONS 
In the TSN concept, stakeholders having vested interests in the concept are 
partitioned into several categories as shown in Figure 4. These categories include: 
commercial manufacturers, nations’ constabulary forces, nations’ navies, private vessels, 
the commercial shipping industry, humanitarian aid organizations, and international 
maritime organizations and partnerships. 
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Figure 4. TSN Stakeholder Taxonomy. 
The TSN stakeholders are international, national, commercial, and private partners. 
1. Authorities Having Legal Jurisdiction 
International waters, those waters beyond territorial waters, are currently 
governed by two legal fields: private and public international law (Cornell University 
Law School, International). Private international law deals with legal issues between at 
least two private parties, such as shipping companies from different countries as well as 
issues between private parties and sovereign nations or international organizations. As 
part of private law, Admiralty law is concerned with maritime matters such as navigation, 
passengers, and goods at sea. Normally in private international law, a court must first 
decide if it has jurisdiction, then must decide which nation’s laws apply. Admiralty law is 
unique in that the ship’s flag determines the jurisdictional authority (Cornell University 
Law School, Admiralty). International treaties established by the UN’s International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) fall under the scope of Admiralty law which include: 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue, 1995, International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships 1973, 1978, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, and International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (International 
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Maritime Organization, List of Conventions). Shipping companies that are flagged to 
nations that have signed these treaties must adhere to Admiralty laws while underway. 
Public international law deals with legal matters between at least two sovereign 
states or a sovereign state and an international body. The United Nations Convention on 
Laws of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS III) is the predominant treaty for public international 
law. Its 320 articles define “all aspects of ocean space, such as delimitation, 
environmental control, marine scientific research, economic and commercial activities, 
transfer of technology and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters” (United 
Nations 1982). Particularly important to this study is Part 7, Section 1, Articles 86 
through 115, which define conduct on the high seas. Article 98 states a vessel must 
render assistance by proceeding “with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in 
distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably 
be expected” (United Nations 1982). The U.S. Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) 
Operational Law Handbook clearly states that 
“ships and, under certain circumstances, aircraft have the right to enter a 
foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters and corresponding airspace 
without the permission of the coastal state when rendering emergency 
assistance to those in danger or distress from perils of the sea” (Anderson 
and Zukauskas 2008). 
These principles and legal constructs are supportive of cooperation in previously 
disputed waters and provide a positive foundation for TSN. 
In addition to these issues, transnational threats on the high seas such as piracy, 
illicit drug trade, and traffic in persons are also defined in this part. Section 1 Article 100 
requires all ratifying states to “cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of 
piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State” 
(International Maritime Organization, List of Conventions). Articles 101 through 107 
deal with piracy, the seizure of ships suspected of piracy, and which ships or aircraft are 
entitled to carry out the seizure. Article 110 governs a warship’s right to board a foreign 
vessel suspected of committing a crime on the high seas and Article 111 defines a 
nation’s right of hot pursuit of that vessel or aircraft from its territorial waters to the high 
seas. U.S. forces are explicitly obligated by JAG to “repress piracy on or over 
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international waters directed against any vessel or aircraft, whether US or foreign 
flagged,” based upon “the right and obligation of unit self-defense extend[ing] to the 
persons, vessels or aircraft assisted” (Anderson and Zukauskas 2008). The prevention of 
illicit drug trafficking is covered in Article 108. Much like when a vessel requests 
assistance, it requires that all States must “cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas,” 
(United Nations 1982). Furthermore the combined international effort to outlaw traffic in 
persons, i.e. slavery, is outlined in Article 99. Although the U.S. government has not 
ratified the treaty, it does abide by its provisions. UNCLOS III relies heavily on 
international cooperation, a fundamental attribute of TSN. 
2. Constabulary Forces 
Although a large portion of the detection component of the TSN C4I system is 
conducted on private and commercial based platforms, the fundamental roles of 
enforcement, deterrence, and mitigation must also be accomplished. In territorial waters, 
these functions are most appropriate for a nation’s constabulary forces – such as the FBI, 
INTERPOL, border patrol, port police, and coast guards. To develop the C4I system, 
these forces must satisfy their user community’s expectations regarding response to 
transnational threats. The input from this community helps develop buy-in for 
participation and provides baseline national capabilities to address transnational threats. 
This baseline information supplements the TSN C4I system by declaring available 
resources at the regional and global level. 
3. Nations’ Navies 
The stakeholder primarily concerned with participation within TSN is the one 
tasked with providing force mitigation. These missions are accomplished by nations’ 
navies through the international C4I capability offered by the system. This stakeholder 
community is also the most sensitive with regard to information sharing and capability 
disclosures given the need to protect national capabilities from undue disclosure, the 
complexity of international relationships, and a continually changing political climate. 
Regardless, past performance indicates that nations’ navies answer the call for 
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humanitarian aid when needed. A primary tenet of TSN is that navies volunteer not only 
to provide force but also humanitarian aid in response to a large scale disaster. The 
feedback and buy-in of this community is vital to providing TSN with authenticity 
ensuring its effectiveness. Without naval intervention, at risk vessels are subscribing to 
private security agencies to address the transnational threat. There are concerns that this 
method only increases violence on the high seas. According to Senator John Rockefeller, 
“providing protection for U.S. ships from pirates should be the responsibility of the U.S. 
military. Arming ship crew members is not an option he said, disagreeing with several of 
those testifying” (McConnell 2009). 
4. Private Vessels 
Non-military-based detection is a key capability of the TSN C4I solution. 
Representing a significant population of sea faring vessels, it is logical to leverage the 
private community to supplement the situational awareness inputs of the TSN C4I 
system. Legacy onboard technologies, such as Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), 
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) systems, surface ship radar, marine band 
Very High Frequency (VHF) transceivers, Global Maritime Distress Safety System 
(GMDSS), INMARSAT, and NAVTEX are in use aboard pleasure craft, research 
vessels, and passenger liners. These technologies and others are developed internationally 
and further facilitate the detection of transnational threats or disasters thereby increasing 
the TSN situation awareness capacity and effectiveness. 
5. Commercial Shipping and Fishing 
The intent of the TSN C4I system is to provide the means by which responses to 
transnational threats and large-scale disasters can be coordinated. As the shipping 
industry is in the business of transporting oil, food, raw materials, and customer products 
between nations and economies, it is vital that risks are managed to ensure economic 
freedom. A C4I system solution that mitigates transnational threats inherently limits risk 
to the industry thereby decreasing insurance cost. To this end, the shipping industry 
represents a principal user of the TSN C4I system. Their input facilitates and influences 
the design of the shipboard user interface and increases the probability of valid reporting. 
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6. Humanitarian Aid Organizations 
Humanitarian aid organizations also must be included in the TSN stakeholder 
community. This group is primarily composed of NGOs, such as International Red Cross, 
World Food Organization program, Peace Corps, and Doctors Without Borders. The 
community of international humanitarian aid organizations is concerned with logistics 
pipeline issues and processes that TSN must address. According to ASEAN, the support 
necessary after a large scale disaster includes: temporary shelters, sanitation facilities, 
hygiene kits, building materials, potable water, health infrastructure, and food security 
(The Association of South East Asian Nations 2008). 
7. International Organizations and Partnerships 
Another tenet of TSN is that politics should be apparent in order to maximize 
maritime situation awareness and threat mitigation. To accomplish this, TSN relies 
heavily on international signatory organizations such as, the IMO, International Chamber 
of Commerce’s (ICC) International Marine Bureau (IMB), NATO, etc. These 
organizations participate in establishing, empowering, and enforcing legal and 
technological definitions and standards that will enable TSN interoperability. Noted in 
the ASEAN report is a key recommendation for “a coordinating platform for relief and 
recovery strategies” that “involve[s] key partners who…enhance coordination and 
information sharing” (The Association of South East Asian Nations 2008). Most 
critically, these organization and partnerships are responsible for developing clear and 
concise demarcations of roles and responsibilities that enhance coordination and 
information sharing. 
The IMB created in 1992 a prototype of the GMP. With voluntary funding the 
IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) aimed to be the “first point of contact for the 
shipmaster to report an actual or attempted attack or even suspicious movements” 
(International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre). Prior to its creation, there was no timely way for ships under attack to 
request help from law enforcement. The attacked ships were forced to broadcast distress 
signals and verbally relay their coordinates and type of emergency to accessible law 
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enforcement agencies; thereby consuming valuable response time. Furthermore, other 
ships in proximity of the crime area were put at risk due to the lack of information 
sharing regarding piracy threats. 
PRC communicates with ships via fax, email, or satellite phone giving their 
location and nature of emergency to the PRC headquarters located in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. PRC relays the ship’s information to local law enforcement as well as 
publishes the location and type of attack on the PRC website. Additionally, the 
information is formatted for distribution via various data exchange systems. PRC has 
achieved recognition for mitigating piracy attacks and generating awareness of the 
problem (International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre). 
C. EXISTING ARCHITECHURES AND SYSTEMS 
Currently, there are several fielded information architectures and systems that 
provide regional information sharing and should provide input to TSN. However despite 
their successes, these architectures and systems cannot independently accomplish all of 
the TSN tenets for various reasons. Five examples are Maritime Domain Awareness, 
FORCEnet, the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System, the Global 
Information Grid, and Caspian Guard. 
1. U.S. Maritime Domain Awareness 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective comprehension and 
response to all information associated with the global maritime environment that could 
impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. The National 
Concept of Operations for MDA has created individual hubs that are responsible for 
managing information of four separate categories: vessels, cargo, people, and 
infrastructure. There is an additional hub within MDA tasked to design and manage the 
architecture that enables sharing of the maritime information among the Global Maritime 
Community of Interest (COI). The National Plan to achieve MDA for the National 
Strategy for Maritime Security states: “The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness 
program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all 
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vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2005). This information needs to be accessed 
quickly and released to appropriate active MDA participants. 
2. U.S. Navy 
 a. FORCENET 
Sponsored by the USN, FORCEnet is an ongoing research and 
development framework that focuses on developing software products that enable MDA. 
This project comprises four projects: Department of Navy Transformation within 
Department of Defense Framework (Strategic Planning), Accelerating Joint Warfighting 
Capability (Trident Warrior), Implementing FORCEnet Requirements (FORCEnet 
Compliance), and Systems Requirements Analysis/Systems Engineering (formerly 
Osprey Hawksbill). The lifetime of this effort is 10 years beginning in FY09. “FORCEnet 
functionality is a subset of battle force functionality that can contribute to battle 
management, battlespace dominance, and sustainability” (National Research Council 
U.S. Committee on FORCEnet Implementation Strategy 2009). FORCEnet deals 
specifically with naval forces and does not offer support for humanitarian aid, making it 
unable to solely support all TSN tenets. 
 b. CENTRIXS 
In an effort to support the Global War on Terrorism, the Combined 
Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) was established. 
CENTRIXS maintains a shared, timely, common visualization of the battlespace with 
U.S. coalition and allied partners. Currently, CENTRIXS is used for time-critical 
information for combined warfighting including: operations and intelligence information 
for threat and battlefield awareness; mission requirements for integration and 
coordination of coalition forces; theater ballistic missile defense; nuclear, biological and 
chemical threat warning; regional military and civil air movement scheduling; battlefield 
campaign assessment data; force disposition, and combined force threat response data 
(Boardman and Shuey 2004). CENTRIX exchanges information on a single level of 
classification, which can be difficult to manage due to current data certification and 
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accreditation processes. Because of security restrictions and the requirement to certify the 
information, this system is limited to U.S. and its allied military forces. 
 c. Global Information Grid 
According to the Department of Defense Global Information Grid 
Architectural Vision for a Net-Centric, Service-Oriented DoD Enterprise, 
“the Global Information Grid (GIG) consists of information capabilities 
that support Department of Defense (DoD) personnel and organizations in 
accomplishing their tasks and missions – that enable the access to, 
exchange and use of information and services throughout the Department 
and with non-DoD mission partners” (U.S. Department of Defense Chief 
Information Officer 2007). 
GIG accomplishes this mission using an Internet Protocol (IP)-based 
infrastructure; which, in addition to being standardized, is widely used and accepted.  
GIG operates by utilizing major DoD programs such as terrestrial networks, mobile IP 
networks, space-based laser communications, and teleports which link the ground and 
space segments together. Example GIG systems include Joint Tactical Radio system and 
canceled Transformation Satellite Communication program. However, “there will always 
be new performance and security requirements that cannot be met in the short transitional 
term by GIG” (U.S. Department of Defense Chief Information Officer 2007). TSN’s 
interoperability function should allow for the sharing of information with external 
networks and compensate for real time shortfalls. 
 d. Caspian Guard 
The Caspian Guard’s primary objective is to provide maritime 
surveillance in the Caspian Basin and “patrol the oil-rich inland sea” (Cummins 2006). 
To accomplish this objective, the DoD assists Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the 
development of air and ground surveillance capabilities. Caspian Guard offers national-
level command, control communications and intelligence, in addition to land border 
control and monitoring. This region is of particular interest to the U.S. due to the 
explosive growth of Kazakhstan’s oil infrastructure in the Caspian Sea Region. TSN C4I 
is intended to be compatible with Caspian Guard by interfacing additional surveillance 
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and patrol systems. Caspian Guard’s biggest barrier is the region’s political climate. It is 
perceived by Russia as a military force that generates animosity toward U.S. 
D. DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 
Current legacy data exchange systems provide maritime awareness to users, 
commanders, and decision makers only in specific regions and alliances. These systems 
are often employed by commercial shipping companies and harbor masters to monitor 
coastal marine traffic and other high density areas at sea. They include both commercial 
and military systems that supply one or a combination of the following features: LRIT, 
automatic identification, situation awareness, piracy reporting, and hazardous spill 
reporting. While these disparate systems provide useful services, none are tailored 
specifically to meet the needs of an emergency response or humanitarian aid assistance. 
Listed below are descriptions of useful constabulary, commercial, and military data 
exchange systems. 
1. Automatic Identification System 
Maritime data exchange systems typically fall into one of two overarching system 
architectures typified by AIS or LRIT. AIS is the premiere non-combatant ship 
identification, tracking, and navigation system architecture in territorial waters. AIS 
systems autonomously and continually broadcast information such as “ship name, course 
and speed, classification, call sign, registration number, [Mobile Maritime Service 
Identity] MMSI, and other information” (U.S Coast Guard – Navigation Center 2009) to 
the coastal authorities at intervals defined by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee. In 
U.S. territorial waters, AIS systems utilize two dedicated marine VHF channels for 
transmission, AIS1 and AIS2 (U.S. Coast Guard – Navigation Center 2009). 
2. Long Range Identification and Tracking 
LRIT is essentially a long range version of AIS. LRIT is a requirement for the 
following non-combatant vessels on international voyage: “passenger ships, including 
high-speed craft; cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 300 gross tonnage and 
upwards” (International Maritime Organization, Long Range Identification and 
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Tracking). As defined by Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), these vessels’ LRIT systems 
must transmit at a minimum: “the ship's identity, location, and date and time of the 
position” (International Maritime Organization, Long Range Identification and Tracking). 
The fundamental difference between LRIT and AIS 
“apart from the obvious one of range, is that, whereas AIS is a broadcast 
system, data derived through LRIT will be available only to the recipients 
who are entitled to receive such information and safeguards concerning 
the confidentiality of those data have been built into the regulatory 
provisions” (International Maritime Organization, Long Range 
Identification and Tracking). 
Additionally, this information is not accessible to foreign coastal authorities that 
are in excess of 1000 nautical miles from the ship (International Maritime Organization, 
Long Range Identification and Tracking). 
3. SafeSeaNet 
SafeSeaNet (SSN) is a European Union developed, computer based AIS 
application that is tasked primarily with reducing maritime pollution and accidents in 
European coastal waters. It is intended to increase maritime domain awareness between 
cargo ships over 300 tons, as prescribed by SOLAS, 1974, and local port masters. SSN 
relies on a distributed database via a central index system. This database utilizes a 
composite of radio frequency methods and internet technology for data exchange from 
ship to land (Bergot, Hardy and Marcellus 2004). The robust application relays pertinent 
information such as position, type of accident, and souls on board to the database; which 
is then shared across the entire network. However, the main obstacle preventing SSN 
from being reused for TSN is its network security architecture. SSN relies on secure 
Trans European Services for Telematics between Administrators (S-TESTA), which is 
similar to SIPRNET in usage. S-TESTA is used to exchange data internationally between 
foreign ministries and is exclusive to the European Union (Bergot, Hardy and Marcellus 





ShipLoc is a satellite communications and computer based LRIT application 
developed in Europe. ShipLoc is operated and maintained by a subsidiary of the French 
Space Agency, Collectè Localisation Satellites (CLS). It is the official ship-security 
system of IMB’s ICC and is employed specifically to combat piracy. ShipLoc utilizes 
satellite communications to relay distress information from ships to a land based 
processing center. From there, the information is disseminated and relayed to the ship 
owner, IMB, and the flag state authority via Internet, facsimile, and phone. It can also be 
used to monitor a ship’s progress every hour or every four hours during normal operation. 
This data exchange system handles piracy extremely well, but does not address the other 
key areas of TSN. Further hindering its use, ShipLoc does not automatically alert nearby 
naval forces. Once an alert is triggered and relayed to the flag state authority, it is up to 
that authority to alert nearby naval forces through traditional military channels (Collectè 
Localisation Satellites). This process must be expedited in order to prevent hijackings 
similar to the Maersk Alabama in April, 2009. 
5. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 
The Global Justice Information Exchange is a U.S. developed data exchange 
standard that shares “pertinent justice and public safety information” between “the 
spectrum of law enforcement, judicial, correctional, and related bodies” (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2009). In development since 1998, the standard is used by The 
International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network which includes as 
members INTERPOL, U.S. Department of Homeland Defense, and many others. As 
currently developed, the USCG uses the system and standard to share missing boat 
information. Predominantly a means to share information between law enforcement 
agencies, the standard may be extended for particular needs. It is conceivable that a future 
extension of this standard could facilitate information sharing between the USN and 
USCG, fulfilling a joint law enforcement related mission. Although currently limited, the 
standard is positioned for international use, with INTERPOL as an existing user. 
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6. Joint C3 Information Exchange – Multilateral Interoperability 
Programme 
NATO’s Joint C3 Information Exchange – Multilateral Interoperability 
Programme (MIP) is a military data exchange system that “enables information exchange 
between co-operating but distinct national C2 systems” (Multilateral Interoperability 
Programme 2009) “from corps to battalion or the lowest appropriate level, in order to 
support combined and joint operations and pursue the advancement of digitization in the 
international arena, including NATO” (Multilateral Interoperability Programme 2009). 
MIP uses a common interface, the Land C2 Information Exchange Data Model, to relay 
“essential battle-space information” and achieve this interoperability goal (Multilateral 
Interoperability Programme 2009). The information passed across a full MIP network is 
“situational awareness (including inter-alia, capabilities, and status of friendly and enemy 
forces), plans and orders, and nuclear biological chemical alerts and critical messages” 
(Multilateral Interoperability Programme 2009). 
Unfortunately, because this system relays confidential military data, specifically 
situation awareness and critical messages, this data exchange system in its current form 
cannot be used by TSN C4I. It is unwise to share position information of naval forces 
with the commercial and private maritime community. Blindly broadcasting this 
information puts naval vessels, regardless of nationality, at risk to terrorist attack. It also 
puts commercial and private vessels at risk by displaying where forces are and essentially 
telling criminals where to commit their crimes. 
The concern raised in this section illustrates the need for a new data exchange 
system. This new system must seamlessly relay critical information between naval and 
non-military vessels in a manner that does not undermine military confidentiality, while 
providing a rapid response to crimes at sea and reliable situation awareness 
communication during an emergency warranting humanitarian aid. 
In summary, Chapter II discussed the historical origins of the TSN concept and its 
evolution over millennia. The effect of improved technology has limited battlespace 
volume where fewer ships are required to dominate any ocean. Subsequently, the 
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capability of a TSN in the modern era can be achieved with a fewer number of ships. 
TSN shifts from historical naval coalitions to an inclusive participatory and voluntary 
maritime alliance with an economic focus. Current non-military systems have solved 
some aspects of maritime security needs; however, a system is not in place to provide an 
integrated C4I capability to coordinate the transnational threat enforcement, humanitarian 
aid, and disaster relief/protect environment response missions. Complexities of TSN 
operations on the high seas, economic zones, and territorial waters require coordinating 
actions among the TSN stakeholders. 
A paradigm shift from the GFS, the framework of TSN is based on an 
international framework vice a U.S. framework. Legacy systems which address maritime 
security fall into two categories. The first category is an adaptation of military systems, 
such as CENTRIXS and NATO’s MIP Land C2. The second category includes 
commercial ventures and international organization systems, such as CLS’s ShipLoc, 
AIS, and LRIT. Due to defense concerns, the first category is not viable for TSN. 
However, the second category is compatible with TSN as these systems are able to 
develop situation awareness enabling C2. Presently the PRC is the only multinational 
effort to alert law enforcement, ship masters, and owners of imminent transnational 
threats. A concern is that this capability does not have a dedicated humanitarian aid, 
disaster relief or environment governance mission. 
Chapter III describes structured systems engineering methods, domain patterns, 
and analysis tools applied to develop requirements, define functions, and synthesize 





Chapter III employs an applied systems engineering methodology to develop TSN 
C4I architectures and an information exchange standard for use with the architecture. 
Figure 5 summarizes the processes, methods, and tools used in this study. 
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Figure 5. Summary of Process, Methods and Tools Used in this Study. 
A combination of processes, methods, and tools are used in this study. 
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The employed systems engineering flow describes a problem space from which a 
solution is formed on the basis of Chapter II findings. A dendritic method is used to 
describe how TSN concerns are transformed to operational functions which form the 
foundation of subsequent operational and system domain analysis. 
Operational concepts are investigated by performing a stakeholder organization 
AoA. The analysis evaluates human organization structures which restrict or constrain, 
TSN C4I solutions. Supporting the AoA a model based method analyzes TSN 
stakeholder and top level TSN operational functions addresses mission timing and 
stakeholder usage. 
Operational and system domains are analyzed using mission analysis, functional 
analysis, interpretive structural matrix analysis, design structure matrix analysis and 
development cost estimation methods. Chapter III describes the basis of each method and 
how the methods interact. The objective of these methods is the development of 
architectures, information exchange requirements, and corroborating analyses the results 
of which results are provided in Chapter IV. 
A. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Chapters I and II have set forth the problem statement for this study and presented 
the requirements for a solution. The next step in this study is to transform the top level 
requirements into a set of operational functions. In establishing these functions, a 
dendritic model is utilized to organize and group TSN C4I operational functionality. The 
model serves as the unifying product for subsequent analysis and solution development. 
©Microsoft Visio is employed to develop and manage the dendritic structure leveraging 
basic shapes and connection point functionality to allow for the greatest flexibility in 
layout. 
The dendritic model is based on a parent-child data structure which decomposes 
level-one operational functions into multiple constituent functions. The directed 
relationships, or logic flow, progresses from left to right beginning with a general parent 
function which is then derived into specific child functions. Figure 6 portrays an example 




Figure 6. Functional Dendritic Model. 
The dendritic model provides a structure for organizing top level operational functions. 
The application of the dendritic model produces multiple paths. Similar to a tree 
structure (Buede 2000), the dendritic model also employs strata of organization. This 
organization attempts to maintain the level of the functional abstraction consistent across 
the dendritic structure. This consistency implies that each of the child functions, B1-B4 
and C1-C4, are of the same level of abstraction. Also, depending on user perspective, 
functions can be both a valid parent and child function. For example, Parent Function B 
is both the parent of all child functions B1-B4; as well as the child of Child Function A1.  
A practical means to elicit and document top level TSN operational functions, the 
dendritic model provides the reference for subsequent analysis methods. 
B. FUNCTIONAL MODEL AND DECOMPOSITION 
Functional modeling is performed to describe the operational activities and 
system functions, or services, of the system. With the use of CORE® by ©Vitech 
Corporation, both Functional Flow Block Diagrams (FFBD) and Enhanced Functional 
Flow Block Diagrams (EFFBD) are developed to represent control logic and allocated 
functional behavior. The FFBD syntax provides four types of architecture/design 
patterns: series, concurrent, selection and multi-exit (Buede 2000). The EFFBD adds 
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three control patterns: iteration, looping, and replication. Additionally, data items may be 
added to the EFFBD that describe complex control and data. The typical use of the 
EFFBD is for the generation of timelines using discrete probabilistic duration values. 
These simulations provide a means to verify the consistency of the model as well as to 
develop temporal performance requirements. N by N (N2), Integration Definition for 
Function Modeling (IDEF0), hierarchy and block diagrams are also rendered from the 
model. 
Behavior and structure are associated by the use of relationships within the 
CORE® and CORE® tools. The allocation of behavior to structure is sufficiently flexible 
to allow the consideration of alternative structures where each structure represents an 
alternative architecture, component or service. The level of structure abstraction includes 
classification, interconnection, and aggregation (Keegan et al. 1997). Because behavior 
and structure models are related the models interrelate with static relationships and by 
means of the executable simulation. When properly modeled as multi-thread and multi-
instance behavior, states of an object are described as executable models. In the 
operational domain, operational scenarios are described by this means. In the system 
domain, system scenarios are described by this means. In combination with the 
aforementioned diagrams, Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
views are also generated. 
CORE® is used to perform the functional modeling and simulation. The tool is 
provided with an extensible schema which establishes the relationship framework 
between the classes of model entities. As good practice this schema should be consistent 
with the purpose and limitations of the modeling scope. Figure 7 illustrates the use of the 
schema to meet the modeling objectives of the TSN study. 
Shown in the color yellow are the classes and meta-relationships of the model 
entities used to describe the operational domain. This domain includes interrelated 
architectures, missions, and operational tasks with related operational nodes, operational 
activities, needlines, and operational requirements. Shown in color orange are the classes 
and meta-relationships of the model entities use to describe the system domain. This 
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Figure 7. CORE® Schema Used for Modeling. 
A subset of the default CORE® model schema is used for this study. 
C. PATTERN METHODOLOGY 
Pattern methodology is incorporated with functional modeling as a means to 
apply proven characterizations of the operational domain and system domain. Generally, 
a pattern is defined as “Anything proposed for imitation; an archetype; an exemplar; that 
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which is to be, or is worthy to be, copied or imitated; as, a pattern of a machine” (Bowler 
et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 8. Top-Down Relationship Among Patterns (Bowler et al. 2009). 
Operational, capability, and technical patterns are useful in architectural development. 
The framework, Figure 8, shows the relationships between operational domain 
and system domain. The operational domain is composed of both operational patterns and 
capability patterns. Operational patterns represent recurring approaches for conducting 
activities, operational functions, in a given mission context. The system domain is 
composed of both capability patterns and technical patterns. Capability patterns represent 
recurring approaches that refine an associated operational pattern with organization types, 
use cases, process flows, and operational or system functions. Capability patterns occur 
in both the operational domain and system domain. The technical pattern describes 
design element arrangements that support associated capabilities (Bowler et al.2009). 
TSN patterns are considered from DoD, law enforcement and commercial 
sources. Examining legacy systems in Chapter II provides insight to operational and 
capability patterns. To apply a pattern, the merits are evaluated for its adaptability in the 
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operational or system environment for which it is intended to be employed. In the case of 
TSN C4I, patterns are combined from multiple sources to leverage archetypes familiar to 
TSN stakeholders. 
D. INTERPRETIVE STRUCTURAL MODELING ANALYSIS 
Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM) is a method developed in the early 1960s 
for representing complex relationships between nodes in a context. The basis of ISM is 
found in the theory of nets, relations, and directed graphs. The mathematical basis of ISM 
relies on matrix mathematics (Sage 1977). This method provides an objective score of 
operational node and system component functional clusters with insight into interface 
development. 
Graphs allow the architect/designer to visualize the relationships between 
functions and components. The graphs are a formal representation of relationships among 
nodes in a set or pair where a node may represent a functional cluster or component. The 
concepts of adjacency and reachability are significant when developing operational and 
system architectures (Buede 2000). Both concepts represent a degree of connectedness, 
where technical patterns are made visible by the use of matrices. 
Two matrices useful in ISM analysis are an adjacency matrix and a reachability 
matrix. The adjacency matrix is a representation of the structural node-to-node 
relationships. The reachability matrix represents outcomes when the resultant 
relationships are exercised with some undetermined number of steps to a steady state 
(Buede 2000). The reachability matrix is calculated from the adjacency matrix using 
Equation (1), where R(A) is reachability matrix of A, A(G) is adjacency matrix of G the 
incidence matrix, I is the identity matrix, and n is the length of paths (Sage 1977). 
                                              ( ) ( )[ ]( )1−+= nIGAAR                                                (1) 
The ©Computer Assisted Design, Relationship Analysis Tool (©CADRAT) tool 
developed by Professor D. K. Hitchins uses an undirected incidence matrix to capture 
node-to-node relationships from a direction graph, Figure 9. The incidence matrix is 
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transformed into the directed adjacency matrix, similar in form to an N2 diagram where 
the association flow is clockwise by use of Equation (2) (Diestel 2005). 
                                              ( , ) ( , )( ) 2
T
i j i j qA G G G I= −                                             (2) 
A(G) is the adjacency matrix of G; G(i,j)=(V,E) where V represents the vertices and E 
represents the edge of the incidence matrix, T means the transpose of the matrix and Iq is 
the identity matrix.  
An extension of ISM analysis technique is the use of strength of association to 
represent the relative importance of one relationship to another. Higher numeric values 
correlate to more important associations, relative to another association. In Figure 9, node 
C is related to node D with an association strength of 2 and node B with an association 
strength of 9. Use of strength of association influences the clustering of nodes, where 
nodes associated with a higher number are more likely to be clustered by comparison to 
nodes that have a lower number (Hitchins 1998). The use of association values impacts 
the matrix score. 
 
Figure 9. Digraph to Undirected Incidence Translation (Hitchins 1998). 
The directed graph is converted to an incidence matrix where the points of incidence 
have strength of association. 
To score a matrix, the distance of an association from its node is multiplied by the 
strength of association. In Figure 10, the distance is dx and the association strength is 
represented by X. The sum for each row is summed and the summation row is summed 
(Hitchins 1998). Lower scores are preferred since they represent optimum node cohesion 
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and coupling. In practice, some non-optimal solutions are accepted because of other 
considerations. In these cases, the score of the non-optimum arrangement is divided by 
the optimum arrangement to provide a factor greater than or equal to one. As the value 
approaches one, the architecture solution approaches optimum modularity. 
 
Figure 10. ©CADRAT Scoring Concept (Hitchins 1998). 
The distances from each node are multiplied by the strength of association and 
summed by the row. The sums of all rows are summed to obtain an overall score. 
©CADRAT also provides a means to cluster nodes based on an implementation 
of ISM development work by J. N. Warfield in the 1970s (Hitchins 1998). Several 
algorithms are provided: manual, first moment, second moment, and automatic 
clustering. Figure 11 illustrates the effect of each of these clustering algorithms with a 
representation of the resultant graph (Hitchins 1998). Clustering has come about on the 
basis of relationships and strengths indentified individually by the architect. The tool 
transforms the data and concisely reveals the structural implications of the initial digraph 
and incidence matrix. When applied to architecture development, clustering increases 
node cohesion and decreases coupling that minimizes interchanges a technique to 
measure the degree of effective modularity. 
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Figure 11. Effect of Cluster Algorithms (Hitchins 1998). 
Clustering identifies node groups with the aim of attaining high cohesion and low 
coupling. 
E. DESIGN STRUCTURE MATRIX ANALYSIS 
Design Structure Matrix (DSM) analysis is an analytical tool for decomposition 
and integration with static and time-based DSM types (Stewart 1981). This method 
provides an objective score of the operational and system stability based upon the results 
of functional analysis and interface development. 
DSM uses a directed adjacency matrix with a counter clockwise direction of 
association flow. In addition to providing insight of series, parallel, and coupled patterns, 
this approach visually represents feedback patterns. Illustrated in Figure 12, the feedback 
is shown in the upper right of the diagonal and feed forward is shown in the lower left of 
the diagonal. 
“Feedback marks correspond to the required inputs that are not available 
at the time of executing the [function] task. In this case, the execution of 
the dependent [function] task will be based on assumptions regarding the 
status of the input [function] tasks” (Yassine 2004). 
When there is feedback, the architect manipulates the order to eliminate feedback. 
If this is not possible, the order is adjusted to position the feedback association as close to 
the diagonal as possible. As a result, fewer functions are involved in an iteration cycle; 
which results in a faster system execution process. 
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Figure 12. DSM Concept of Representing Feedback (Yassine 2004). 
Fundamental design pattern are identified with the DSM. These patterns infer 
threshold capability of the design under consideration. 
Lattix, by Lattix Software©, is one of many industry tools which implements 
DSM. It has the capability to manually build, view, and cluster components in a 
hierarchy. The metric of interest calculated by Lattix is system stability. System stability 
is a value between 0 and 1, where 1 represents maximum stability. It represents a percent 
of sensitivity to design change, where a lower percent value indicates susceptibility to 
change and a higher percent value indicates less susceptibility to change. System stability 
is calculated in Equation (3) where Average_Impact is the total number of components 
that could be affected if a change is made and Atom_Count is the total number of 
components (Lattix Knowledge Database). 
                                    Average_ImpactStability=1-
Atom_Count
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                        (3) 
F. INFORMATION EXCHANGE STANDARD 
The information exchange standard defines the information that is passed across 
the TSN C4I network to participants. It also defines the configuration items, external 
inputs, and information elements unique to TSN C4I. This standard is fundamental to the 
development and implementation of TSN C4I in the real world. Development of a 
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standard is an objective of the study and is a byproduct of the analysis described in this 
chapter. 
G. ARENA PERFORMANCE MODELING 
Arena is used to model each sub-alternative analyzed in the organizational AoA 
which is discussed in the next section. Each sub-alternative is modeled using the 
operational functions, articulated by the dendritic method, arranged into TSN missions. 
Within Arena, operational functions correspond to Arena processes and are assigned 
resource values according to Table 1. These resources are assumed to have equal, legacy 
or new, capabilities to execute operational functions. A triangle distribution is used to 
describe the duration of each modeled process where duration is derived from the number 
of organizational resources demanded by a process. Each model run occurs over one year 
with resolution in minutes replicated 10 times. The mission duration and resource usage 
results are extracted using the Arena run report. 
Arena is a Discrete Event Simulation (DES) software simulation tool which 
enables executable models with random generated inputs and processing time 
distributions. For the purpose of TSN, several operational threads, direct mitigating 
response, situation awareness, and intelligence, are combined to emulate a generalized 
mission. The generalized mission is modified by adjusting process attributes to uniquely 
model each sub-alternative. The direct mitigating response thread is initiated by events 
that occur based upon an exponential distribution. For example, the transnational threat 
event is represented by an exponential distribution with an average occurrence of 60 
hours. Situation awareness and intelligence threads are continuously running at 0.25 
hours and 24 hours, respectively. 
Since each arrival event represents real world situation, the Arena entity is 
assigned a random value as attribute of the entity. The attribute determines how much 
information is required to complete the response model. The uncertainty is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. When the attribute 
value is less than 90, transnational threat events, or less than 40, humanitarian aid, and 
disaster relief/protect environment events, the response model performs intelligence 
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gathering. The response model exits the intelligence gathering loop one the entity 
attribute exceeds the threshold. 
Each operational thread is a composite of multiple processes that apply triangle 
distributions to describe time stochastically. Notionally shown in Figure 13, triangle 
distributions are described by minimum, mode and maximum parameters. Baseline 
parameter values are established for these functions by this study’s research assuming a 
single process resource demand. In order to implement each sub-alternative the baseline 
case is modified on the basis of organizational type and number of assigned resources; a 
resource is one or more stakeholders identified by the AoA in Table 1. Three 
modification methods adjust baseline parameter values to achieve a team, group or 
committee effect. 
The team modification type integrates two triangle baseline distributions to reflect 
one spoke stakeholder and one hub stakeholder processing one function in parallel. The 
resultant parameter values shifts the minimum and mode values to the right of the 
original values shown in Figure 14. The distribution does not describe more than two 
stakeholders, as that is a group or committee model. To achieve integration an ancillary 
Arena model executes one model thread having concurrent stakeholder branches and 
each branch has one identical process. From this method a combined stakeholder triangle 
distribution achieves the effect of the team executing a single operational function 
 
 
Figure 13. Triangle Distributions Used in Arena Processes. 
The Arena model uses the triangle distribution to represent the processing time 





Figure 14. Team Model Triangle Distribution Development. 
The Team model triangle distribution is developed from a hub stakeholder and spoke 
stakeholder pair for each function. 
The group modification type integrates three or more triangle baseline 
distributions to reflect multiple spoke stakeholders processing one function in parallel. 
The resultant parameter values shifts the minimum and mode values progressively to the 
right of the original values, shown in Figure 15, with an increase of group numbers. To 
achieve integration an ancillary Arena model executes one model thread having 
concurrent stakeholder branches and each branch has one identical process. From this 
method a combined stakeholder triangle distribution achieves the effect of the group 
executing a single operational function. 
The committee modification type modifies the triangle baseline distributions by 
dividing minimum, maximum, and mode parameter values by the number of spoke 
stakeholders in the committee. The effect is a smaller adjusted spoke stakeholder 
distribution reflecting sub tasking unique to a committee model, as shown in Figure 16. 
The modification then integrates adjusted spoke stakeholder distributions to reflect 
multiple spoke stakeholders processing a single function in parallel. In addition the 
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smaller adjusted spoke stakeholder parameter values are used for the hub stakeholder 
with an additional percent added. The percent added is equal to the number of spoke 
stakeholders multiplied by ten percent to account for management overhead associated 
with the hub stakeholder. The resultant spoke and hub stakeholder distributions are added 
to form that committee triangle distribution. From this method a combined stakeholder 




Figure 15. Group Model Triangle Distribution Development. 
The group model triangle distribution integrates one to five spoke stakeholders to 
develop a distribution for each function. 
As mentioned, operational functions correspond to Arena processes and are 
assigned resource values according to Table 1. Each Arena process seizes, delays, and 
releases one or more resources. The process delay is accounted for by the triangle 
distributions previously described. Resources are seized and released proportional to their 
individual functional involvement, described by the sub-alternative in Table 1. The 
resource capacity is defined as the amount of required resources to prevent balking. The 
consequence of preventing balking is that TSN responds to all events, not to exceed the 




Figure 16. Committee Model Triangle Distribution Development. 
The committee model integrates spoke stakeholders and adds the hub stakeholder to 
develop a distribution for each function. 
H. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The TSN operational concept presents several considerations worthy of an 
operational AoA. The TSN C2 stakeholder organizational model is of paramount 
importance. Given TSN’s critical functionality as a C4I system, its fundamental 
capability is to enable effective collaboration in support of force employment decisions. 
Furthermore the pursuit of volunteer participation, a core tenet of TSN, involves complex 
interactions between diverse stakeholders with varying objectives. In order to analyze 
which organizational model is best suited for the operational concept of TSN, three 
generalized, multi-stakeholder organizational models are selected form a paper by 
Marakas (2003).The selected models are analyzed for their effectiveness using a variety 
of tools described in this chapter. The candidate models are defined as group, team, and 
committee. 
The group organization model, Figure 17, maximizes the interactions among 
stakeholders. Characteristics of the model include a high degree of communication, 
increased potential for understanding, and cooperative decision development (Marakas 
2003). The combination of these characteristics results in consensus development or buy-
in resulting in greater stakeholder engagement. Some disadvantages of the group 
approach are that it is slower to produce, tends to mediocrity, and is susceptible to 
technical error given the number of replications and translations of information required 




Figure 17. Group Organizational Alterative Structure. 
The group organization model maximizes the number of interactions between 
stakeholders by utilizing a flat topology. 
In direct contrast to the group model, the team organizational model minimizes 
the number of interactions within the stakeholder community. This is done by 
maintaining one-to-one relationships between spoke stakeholders and a centralized hub 
stakeholder per function. There are no direct relationships between the spoke 
stakeholders (Marakas 2003). Resulting from this decrease in relationships the model is 
able to process tasks faster and is less prone to error than the group model. 
Additionally, the team organizational model implements a hierarchy such that the 
hub stakeholder manages and orchestrates all the spoke stakeholders buffered from all but 
the hub stakeholder. Trust is a major consideration for TSN and the hub and spoke 
configuration requires a high degree of trust between the spoke stakeholders and the hub 
stakeholder. Of the considered structures, this structure has the minimum number of 
dependencies that need to be implemented. Figure 18 illustrates the team model as 
applied to the TSN stakeholder community. 
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Figure 18. Team Organizational Alternative Structure. 
The team organization model minimizes interaction lines by creating a hierarchical 
hub and spoke topology eliminating lower level relationships. 
The committee organization model is a hybrid approach of the two previously 
discussed organizational models. Like the team model, one hub stakeholder manages and 
orchestrates the interactions among the spoke stakeholders. However in the committee 
model the spoke stakeholders are not isolated. By blending the characteristics of the 
group and team models, the committee approach benefits from a high degree of 
interaction combined with a sense of hierarchy (Marakas 2003). 
Despite these advantages, the committee model is burdened by the need for a 
trusted hub stakeholder and has the same potential for error as the group model. 
Moreover given the concentration of interactions, the hub has implicit influence over the 













Figure 19. Committee Organizational Alternative Structure. 
The committee organization model is a hybrid of the team and group organization 
models. 
In order to realize a multi-layered volunteer force a balance is necessary between 
stakeholder participation and TSN C4I effectiveness. Table 1 provides a framework to 
analyze which of the three organization models is preferred for TSN operations. It shows 
operational functions listed in the far right column and stakeholders listed horizontally 
across the top. An L represents a legacy relationship or responsibility between the 
function and stakeholder. The extent of the relationship is not quantified in the matrix 
only that the stakeholder is involved at some level with the function and is using a legacy 
capability to execute the function. Similarly, an N represents a new relationship or 
responsibility. This indicates the stakeholder is involved, but requires new system 
capability at some level. Lastly an O indicates there is a relationship or capability but it is 
not active between the stakeholder and C4I function for the specific case in question. The 
objectives of the matrix are to identify the relationships between the stakeholders and 
functions, in addition, the matrix identities new capability required by each stakeholder. 
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Table 1. TSN Stakeholder Functional Matrix. 
The preferred stakeholder organizational model is identified through functional 
allocation to stakeholders as a function of mission type. 
A rating rubric, Table 2, is utilized to organize the qualitative and quantitative 
evaluation factors for each sub-alternative. The organizational model with the highest 
aggregate score is identified as the preferred TSN organizational approach. Evaluation 
factors include: political feasibility, Arena mission duration, Arena resource usage, 
number of relationships, number of new capabilities items, and use of legacy capability. 
Each factor has an assigned weight, shown in Table 3, determined from the 
study’s assessment of the research documented in Chapter II. From the table seventy 
percent of the weight distribution is attributed to the quantitative factors yielded by 
©Microsoft Excel relationship modeling and Arena mission modeling. The remaining 
thirty percent of the weight distribution is allocated to political feasibility, a qualitative 
factor. Difficult to assess, political feasibility factor represents the TSN objective to 
appeal as an inclusive maritime alliance vice be construed as a closed military coalition 
highlighting the ambitions of one or a few nations. 
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Table 2. AoA Rating Rubric. 
The rating rubric measures quantitative and qualitative attributes all nine sub-
alternatives. Each sub-alternative is a mission type and organizational model 
alternative combination. 
Evaluation Factor Weight
Polit ical Feasibility 0.3
Arena Resource Duration 0.2
Arena Resource Usage 0.1
Number of Relationships 0.1
Number of New Capabilit ies 0.1




Table 3. AoA Weight Distribution. 
Weight distribution identifies assessment importance and reflects the relative 
importance given to political feasibility. 
This first evaluation factor in Table 3, political feasibility, is a qualitative 
assignment based on the sub-factors: valued added, sense of fair play, and advocacy, 
perceived by each stakeholder. These sub-factors are summarized in Table 4. Value 
added signifies stakeholder perception of TSN’s capability to successfully perform its 
missions. Sense of fair play signifies stakeholder trust in TSN to protect and account for 
all interested participants. Advocacy signifies stakeholder willingness to promote TSN in 
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the international community. Table 4 outlines the sub-factor values assigned based on a 

















Medium value added, Low sense of fair play, Low advocacy
Medium value added, Medium sense of fair play, Low advocacy
Medium value added, Medium sense of fair play, Medium advocacy
High value added, Medium sense of fair play, High advocacy
Low value added, Low sense of fair play, Low advocacy
90  
Table 4. Political Feasibility Evaluation Factor Scoring Table. 
Political feasibility factor encompasses a range of attributes to consider the 
international nature of TSN.. 
 
Political Feasibility Score
















Figure 20. Political Feasibility S-Curve. 
The feasibility S- curve represents a reasonable change of values over the low, medium 
and high indices. 
The political feasibility curve, Figure 20, illustrates the range of sub-factor values 
referenced to an S-curve. The sub-factor values from Table 4, column two, are summed 
in column three. These values represent the range shown in the abscissa axis of Figure 
20. The ordinate axis represents the political feasibility score with a range 10 to 90. The 
blue connected scatter plot represents the assigned values from the study’s assessment. 
The yellow line represents a third order least square fit regression curve which 
 55
approaches an elongated S-curve. This verifies the selection of values and calculation 
method for political feasibility since its raw shape is consistent with initial accelerating 
returns and subsequent diminishing returns. 
The remaining five evaluation factors are a quantitative analysis of Arena 
modeling results and Table 1. Described in the next section, the Arena modeling results 
include the factors of mission duration and resource usage. Number of relationships 
factor is the individual sum of relationships shown in Figure 17, Figure 18, and Figure 
19. New capability factor is the sum total of new capabilities, N, from Table 1 for each 
sub-alternative. The last factor, use of legacy, is the sum total of legacy capabilities, L, 
from Table 1 for each sub-alternative. For the values of the first four factors, each are 
divided by the minimum factor value and expressed as a percent, where preferential 
consideration is given to minimizing the following: mission duration, resource usage, 
number of relationships, and number of new capabilities. For the fifth factor, each value 
is divided by the maximum factor value and expressed as a percent, where preferential 
consideration is given to maximizing legacy reuse. This effectively normalizes factors 
values for subsequent application of weights in accordance with Table 3. 
I. MISSION SUCCESS 
An overarching measure for comparing different operational architectures is the 
mission success probability, calculated from the likelihood of achieving mission 
objectives. Equations are developed to provide an algorithmic approach to measure 
mission success probability. The basis for these equations is tied to the probabilistic 
values of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP). 
1. Mathematical Basis for Combining Measure of Effectiveness and 
Measure of Performance 
MOEs are defined by “relevancy to mission, importance to mission 
accomplishment, and risk of not achieving” (Hoivik 2009). The MOEs are selected on the 
basis of TSN mission necessity. A different set of MOEs are determined for each of the 
three TSN missions: transnational threat enforcement, humanitarian aid, and disaster 
relief/protect environment response. Overall mission success is an aggregate of MOEs. 
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An MOE is a “variable that describes how well a system carries out a task or set of tasks 
within a given context” (Buede 2000). In practice, each MOE has a probabilistic value of 
a top level operational function achieving its purpose and is supported by at least one 
MOP. An MOP is a “variable that describes a specific system property or attribute for a 
given environment and context” (Buede 2000). Also probabilistic in practice, MOPs are 
constituent operational functions to top level functions typically described by parallel or 
series networks. 
In a series network, Figure 21, each process is dependent on its predecessor. If 
one function fails to complete, the entire system comes to a halt. The probability of 
success for a series network, P, is found through Equation (4) where Pi is each sub-
function’s probability of success. 
 
Figure 21. Notional Series Network (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006). 
Each function in a series network cannot be completed until the preceding function is 
completed. 







                                                     (4) 
 
Figure 22. Notional Parallel Network (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006). 
Parallel networks are able to adapt to partial network failure by rerouting to available 
options. 
INPUT OUTPUT A B C 
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In contrast, a parallel network can continue to operate by diverting to a parallel 
process. Figure 22 illustrates a notional parallel network and Equation (5) defines the 
overall probability of success, P, as a function of the individual probabilities of success, 
Pi.  







11                                             (5) 
2. Excel Decision Tree Modeling 
To obtain an estimate of the mission success of TSN the ©Microsoft Excel 
Decision Tree analysis algorithm is used, Figure 23. The algorithm builds a data mining 
model by creating a network of splits in a decision tree. The tree is composed of branches 
that ask, “What is the probability of pass or fail of the given activity?” These decisions 
are represented as nodes, or splits, in the tree. 
 
Figure 23. Mission Success Decision Tree. 
Overall mission success is determined by analyzing MOEs and MOPs. 
The decisions are limited to success of failure of individual functions having 
MOE’s, which are in turn a collection of MOP’s. First each MOP’s probability of success 
is calculated. Then, given the network structure of the MOE, either Equation (4) or (5) is 
 58
applied to determine the MOE’s probability of success. The probability utilized for each 
MOP is determined by a combination of research and subject area expert 
recommendations. The probabilities reflect available information and are updated as the 
study progresses. 
©Microsoft Excel Decision Tree takes the cost of a decision into account when 
selecting the best solution. However, cost is not yet associated with making operational 
decisions in TSN. To show mission success independent to the cost of each outcome, 
Equation (4) replaces the predefined algorithm embedded within Excel. This turns the 
entire decision tree into one overarching series network. 
J. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARCITECTURE FRAMEWORK 
MODELS 
The development of DoDAF models in CORE® subscribe to version 1.5 as 
CORE® has not incorporated the current version, DoDAF version 2.0. The DoDAF 
process follows a six step architecture development process (U.S. Department of Defense 
2009).  
• Determine Intended Use of Architecture 
• Determine Scope of Architecture 
• Determine Data Required to Support Architecture Development 
• Collect, Organize, Correlate, and Store Architectural Data 
• Conduct Analyses in Support of Architecture Objectives 
• Document Results in Accordance with Decision-Maker Needs 
1. Operational Views 
The six step DoDAF architecture development process is compatible with the 
development of the Operational View (OV) viewpoints. OV-1 is prepared by team 
analysis of the operational context and its description via a Visio diagram model. OV-2 
through OV-7 are prepared using the CORE® schema for DoDAF version 1.5 and its 
script feature. 
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2. System Views 
The six step DoDAF architecture development process is compatible with the 
development of the System View (SV) viewpoints. SV-1 through SV-10 are prepared 
using the CORE® schema for DoDAF version 1.5 and its script feature. 
3. Technical Views 
The six step DoDAF architecture development process is compatible with the 
development of the Technical View (TV) viewpoint. TV-1 is prepared using the CORE® 
schema for DoDAF version 1.5 and its script feature. 
K. COST ESTIMATION MODELING 
Cost and schedule estimation is a critical step of every systems engineering task. 
Both must be estimated at the beginning of the task, then tracked and adjusted throughout 
the system development process to assure that the project is progressing at an appropriate 
rate. The genesis of these estimates is the Constructive Cost Model (COCOMO) 
developed as a software project estimation tool by Dr. Barry Boehm in 1981 and updated 
in 2000, COCOMO II. COCOMO II has been applied across various technical fields, as it 
generates estimated values of both the early design and post-architecture phases of a 
program (Madachy 2009). Additionally, it can be customized to model a specific process 
either the Waterfall process or the University of Southern California (USC) Model-Based 
Architecting and Software Engineering process (Madachy 2009). For the TSN C4I 
estimation of development cost, the early design phase of COCOMO II is implemented as 
this study is involved in the “exploration of alternative software/system architectures and 
concepts of operation” (Madachy 2009). 
COCOMO II generates program cost estimates by first determining the effort in 
person-months required to complete the task based on the Software Source Lines of Code 
(S-SLOC). If the S-SLOC size is not known, it can be derived from the specific 
programming language and system functional points, application points, or use cases. 
Further tailoring of the effort estimation is done through scaling factors and effort 
multipliers, as shown in Equation (6) (Madachy 2009). 
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11000                                        (6) 
A is a “constant derived from historical data,” set at 2.94 (Madachy 2009). The 
scale exponent, B, rates the scaling factors: precedence, flexibility, architecture/risk 
resolution, team cohesion, and process maturity; from very low to extra high. These 
summed values, SFi, are combined in Equation (7) and applied to Equation (6) (Madachy 
2009). 









                                               (7) 
The multiplicative effort multiplier term, EMi, rates seven cost drivers from very 
low to extra high. These cost drivers result “in an overall effort adjustment factor to the 
nominal effort” (Madachy 2009). Knowing the effort allows for the schedule to be 
calculated using Equation (8). 
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                    (8) 
C is another historically derived constant, set at 3.67. Equation (7) is used again 
for B. SCED% represents the schedule “compression/expansion percentage” (Madachy 
2009). The average software development cost is found in Equation (9). All values 
estimated by COCOMO II have an 80 percent confidence level. 




averageLaborRateStaffingCost $                               (9) 
Building upon COCOMO II is the Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model 
(COSYSMO). “Despite the strong coupling between software and systems they remain 
very different activities in terms of maturity, intellectual advancement, and influences 
regarding cost” (Valerdi 2006). COSYSMO addresses specific systems engineering 
variables that are not included into COCOMO II. The COSYSMO effort, Equation (10), 
is similar to Equation (6). 
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A is a calibration constant set at 0.2536. The middle term is the sum of the easy, 
nominal, and difficult size driver weights multiplied by the number of each type of size 
driver. These size drivers are the number of system requirements, interfaces, specific 
algorithms, and operational scenarios. Both the E exponent, which represents the 
“diseconomies of scale” factor, and the multiplicative cost driver term, CDi, parallel the 
COCOMO II equation. However, the fourteen COSYSMO cost drivers, discussed in 
Chapter IV, are grouped into only two categories: application and team factors. Most 
notably, there is no formal COSYSMO schedule equation. 
There are several free and commercially available applications that apply these 
cost model equations. Two were selected to generate estimates for TSN C4I. The Naval 
Postgraduate School’s web based COSYSMO application is the primary resource for 
systems engineering cost estimation. This application was developed by NPS professor 
Dr. Raymond Madachy, who has expert insight into these cost models as he is a co-
author of Dr. Boehm’s COCOMO II book and a contributor to Dr. Ricardo Valeridi’s 
COSYSMO book. Costar™ 7.0 is a software cost estimation tool developed by Softstar 
Systems that allows for estimation of the early design phase of TSN. The application 
applies Equations (6) through (9) based on the number of TSN functional points and an 
arbitrary computer language. 
In summary, Chapter III highlighted systems engineering methods employed by 
this study to develop the TSN C4I operational architecture, system architecture, 
information exchange standard, and corroborating analysis. The dendritic method 
allowed the team to articulate operational functions and supporting functions. Use of the 
AoA, supported by Arena, established an approach to determine which candidate 
alternative TSN should employ as an organizational structure. 
Functional analysis refined operational functions and evaluated system functions 
to determine structure, process flow, and inputs/outputs of the operational and system 
domains. ISM and DSM methods use functional analysis results to conduct dependency 
and functional clustering analysis. On the basis of mission scenarios, the mission success 
method used MOE’s and MOP’s that determine expectations of achieving TSN C4I 
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mission goals. The developed system architecture characteristics used by the cost 
estimation method forecasts software and systems engineering development costs. 
In Chapter IV, results are presented on the basis of research findings in Chapter II 




Chapter IV is organized into operational domain, system domain and estimated 
cost sections. Essential figures and tables are included with discussions to support topics, 
in some discussions supporting details are provided in an appendix. 
The operational domain section describes TSN operational characteristics. Results 
of the AoA and Arena modeling provide TSN organizational insights, which are then 
incorporated into the TSN concept of operations. Evolving from the concept of 
operations, an operational node structure along with allocated operational functions and 
needlines are described using operational scenarios. Mission success is postulated on the 
basis of operational processes developed from operational functional analysis. The TSN 
operational architecture is formed by the allocation of operational functions to 
operational nodes. An allocation assessment, on the basis of operational information 
dependencies, is conducted. Integration and validation aspects of the TSN operational 
architecture are provided with an operational test and evaluation plan. 
The system domain section describes results of mapping operational functions and 
information to system functions and data items, respectively. A description of each 
system function is provided with an allocation to CSCIs based upon a technical pattern. 
Data items derived from operational information are the basis of the information 
exchange standard, an objective artifact of this study. Similar to the operational domain, 
an assessment of the example system architecture, by use of data dependencies, is 
conducted. From this TSN C4I architecture level, a cost model which represents an early 
concept development estimate is established. 
A. OPERATIONAL DOMAIN 
1. Declaration of Operational Functions 
The dendritic method develops the cornerstone operational function model, which 
is the initial point of operational domain analysis. Both provide intelligence and perform 
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command and control operational functions are needed to achieve the top function 
provide TSN. 
The provide intelligence operational function, shown in Figure 24, is based on the 
intelligence pattern Task, Process, Post, Use (TPPU) to leverage its alignment with 
Network Centric Operations’ (NCO) new communication service oriented paradigm 
(Bayne and Paul 2005). An operational capability pattern, TPPU refines the C4I 
operational capability pattern with specific intelligence process flows and operational 
functions. The function provides periodic and non-periodic intelligence support to each 
member of the community of interest, where each member is both an information 
provider and consumer. By posting intelligence products the authorized users access the 
information for decision-making; enabling their role in TSN. 
 
Figure 24. Declaration of Intelligence Operational Functions Using 
Dendritic Method. 
Intelligence operational functions are declared using the dendritic method which is the 
cornerstone of the operational domain analysis. 
The perform command and control operational function, shown in Figure 25, is 
based upon the Lawson model for C2 (Hwang et al.1982). An operational capability 
pattern, sense, assess, generate, select, and direct refines the C4I operational capability 
pattern with specific C2 process flows and operational functions. The environment, 
characteristics of objects of interest, is sensed for changes in state from an objective state. 
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An assessment transforms the information from sense into transnational threat intentions 
and capabilities, humanitarian aid requirements, and disaster or environmental 
characteristics. Courses of action are generated to mitigate deviations from the objective 
state determined by international consensus. A preferred alternative is selected with an 
evaluation of alternatives to international established criteria. The preferred alternative is 
planned in sufficient detail to direct TSN stakeholders with a coordinated set of tasks. 
 
Figure 25. Declaration of C2 Operational Functions Using Dendritic 
Method. 
C2 operational functions are declared using the dendritic method which is the 
cornerstone of the operational domain analysis. 
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2. Operational Analysis of Alternatives 
As demonstrated in the AoA described below, to optimize TSN operations, the 
committee model is shown to be the preferred approach. This is based on the evaluation 
factors: political feasibility, Arena mission duration, Arena resource usage, number of 
relationships, number of new capabilities, and use of legacy. The organizational model is 
chosen based on the qualitative and quantitative methodology discussed in Chapter III. 
This section discusses the outcome of the AoA, beginning with a description of the 
organizational models’ relationship details and ending with a summary of a populated 
rating rubric, Table 8. Arena analysis data is shown in this rubric in highlighted yellow, 
and discussed further in a subsequent section. 
 a. Supporting Arena Modeling Results 
In support of the AoA organization analysis, Arena models are created to 
generate mission processing times and mission resource requirements for each sub-
alternative. The operational functions from the dendritic results are grouped into three 
distinct Arena operational threads: direct mitigating response, situation awareness, and 
intelligence, as shown in Figure 26, Figure 27, and Figure 28, respectively. For each 
mission, the three operational threads are run concurrently with resource and processing 
times as a function of Table 1. 
To stimulate each model an Arena generator process is used which 
produces an entity based upon an exponential distribution. The transnational threat 
average occurrence is 60 hours and based upon historical data from the PRC, shown in 
Appendix VII (International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, IMB 
Live Piracy Map). The high concentration and frequency of attacks off the Somali coast 




Figure 26. Arena Response Operational Function Model. 
The Arena response model instantiates the three TSN missions. 
 
 
Figure 27 Situation Awareness Operational Function Model. 
The Arena situation awareness model implements the development and use of periodic 
situation awareness for TSN stakeholders. 
 
 
Figure 28.  Intelligence Operational Function Model. 
The Arena intelligence model implements the development and use of intelligence 
periodic products for TSN units. 
An occurrence for disaster relief is 414 natural disasters requiring 
humanitarian aid in 2007 (Bear 2008). An average occurrence for oil spills that represent 
an environment event is calculated from a 5 year (2000 - 2004) average of 18.4 spills per 
year exceeding seven metric tons (Huijer 2005). An average occurrence for humanitarian 
aid is 414 natural disasters and 34 armed conflicts in 2007 (Bear 2008). Each model 
assumes an exponential distribution parameter, λ, calculated from the reciprocal of 
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average occurrence consistent with Equation (14) and summarized in Table 5. All events 
are assumed to be independent. 
                                   ( ) xf x e λλ −=                                                     (14) 




Transnational Threat Transnational Threat 
Enforcement
60 0.0167
Disaster Relief see below 106 0.0094
Protect Environment (oil 
spills)
see below 2380 0.0004





Humanitarian Aid Humanitarian Aid 98 0.0102  
Table 5. Event Occurrence Times and Parameter Lambda. 
Calculated occurrence times are established for each model’s generation process. 
Response Functions Delay Type Minimum Mode Maximum (Units) 
Sense Environment Triangular 10.00 15.00 30.00 Minutes 
Assess Intentions and Capabilities Triangular 1.00 2.00 4.00 Hours 
Generate COAs Triangular 5.00 15.00 30.00 Minutes 
Select  Alternatives Triangular 0.75 1.00 1.50 Hours 
Plan Details Triangular 8.00 12.00 24.00 Hours 
Direct Response Triangular 1.00 2.00 3.00 Hours 
Intelligence Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 15.00 30.00 60.00 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 15.00 30.00 60.00 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 5.00 15.00 20.00 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.00 2.00 2.50 Minutes 
Situational Awareness Functions      
Sense Environment Triangular 6.00 8.00 10.00 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 0.33 0.83 1.00 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 0.33 1.00 1.00 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 0.50 0.75 2.00 Minutes 
 
Table 6. Arena Operational Function Baseline Triangle Distributions. 
Arena operational functions are based on triangle distribution: minimum, mode, and 
maximum. 
To uniquely model organizational effects, Arena process times are 
adjusted from the baseline. This approach allows for comparison between the three 
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organization models to support the AoA. The baseline is established by this study’s 
assessment. Each operational function is characterized by baseline triangle distributions 
shown in Table 6. Triangle distributions, with defined minimum, mode, and maximum 
values, are associated with all Arena process times as a conventional estimate for an 
unknown processing distribution. 
Using instantiated timing distributions, tables located in Appendix VIII, 
for each model type and process function, simulation run is exercised one year for each 
model. Data reduction, shown in Table 7, provides data sets, highlighted in green, used 
by the AoA analysis matrix, Table 8 data highlighted in yellow. Response times are 
shown as average number of hours to complete a mission. Thus, results are valid to show 



































16.400 29.100 0.000 0.000 3.400 3.000 8.65 26.17
Team Humanitarian Aid
23.500 50.300 0.000 0.000 6.700 4.500 14.17 21.90
Team Disaster Relief / 
Protect Environment 11.000 18.800 0.000 0.000 3.600 5.600 6.50 22.70
Committee  Transnational 
Threat 8.900 4.600 3.800 4.500 3.900 21.700 7.90 26.32
Committee  Humanitarian 
Aid 6.700 3.500 3.800 4.400 3.900 6.200 4.75 20.84
Committee  Disaster Relief 
/ Protect Environment 6.800 3.700 3.800 4.500 4.100 9.000 5.32 21.48
Group Transnational 
Threat 15.200 15.100 10.900 13.100 1.400 13.100 11.47 27.83
Group Humanitarian Aid
11.300 12.100 10.400 12.400 3.100 10.500 9.97 26.24
Group Disaster Relie f / 
Protect Environment 9.300 9.900 10.100 12.000 1.900 8.600 8.63 26.08
 
Table 7. Arena Modeling Results Extracted for AoA. 





 b. Team Model Analysis Results 
The team model’s number of relationships between stakeholders, R, is 
assessed with Equation (11); where N is the number of stakeholders. 
                            ( ) ( ) 5161 =−=−= NR                                                 (11) 
The team hub stakeholder in this model is best satisfied by the 
international signatory organizations. Currently international signatories have a legacy set 
of resources that service the mission of coordination and execution of multi-national 
partnerships; which TSN endeavors to accomplish. An advantage of the team model is its 
scalability of relationships. With each additional stakeholder, there is only one additional 
relationship. This linear property is unique to the team model. 
Operationally this model promotes a centralized approach to manage TSN. 
As threat events occur, awareness, information, and other information data sets pass 
through the team hub stakeholder for decision making. Therefore, the ultimate 
responsibility lies with the international signatories. This requires a bureaucracy to 
support administration of the TSN operations. Despite being a familiar organizational 
model for naval and constabulary forces, it is not widely accepted nor practiced in 
commercial and international settings. However, the model effectively leverages spoke 
stakeholder capabilities. A consequence of this model requires new capability for 
international signatories, since they have the greatest number of relationships to manage. 
 c. Group Model Analysis Results 
Stakeholders assume a position of equality within a group model yielding 
a flat organization, no hierarchical structure. Utilizing the Equation (12) generates the 
number of relationships between stakeholders. 




1 =−=−= NNR                                            (12) 
From Equation (13) fifteen relationships are managed. By contrast to the 
team model, which grows linearly, the group model grows as a power of N, refer to 
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Equation (13). The number of relationships, R, is a function of the number of 
stakeholders, N, raised to the power of approximately 1.8. 
                            1.81430.8598*( 1)R N= −                                                (13) 
From an operational perspective the group model implies several items of 
notice. First, because TSN has two major functions; perform command and control, and 
provide intelligence, each stakeholder is required to have a full capability to accomplish 
these functions. This alternative requires each stakeholder to perform both functions to 
equivalent capability. Universal tasking generates considerable information exchanges 
due to the high number of relationships of the group model. As a consequence, solution 
techniques are needed to manage the high information exchange, such as fusion, database 
replication, etc. Many of the TSN stakeholders do not currently have a complete 
functional set native to their systems. This lack of legacy capability requires new TSN 
capability of potential stakeholders to effectively engage in TSN operations. A benefit of 
the group approach, it maximizes intelligence information and C2 participation, thus 
building a stakeholder consensus. 
 d. Committee Model Analysis Results 
The committee organizational model is a hybrid of the group and team 
models where each spoke stakeholder has a direct relationship to the hub stakeholder, in 
addition to relationships between each other. The number of relationships is also fifteen, 
identical to the group model. There is an implied hierarchy where all spoke stakeholders 
are managed by the hub stakeholder, international signatories. The international 
signatories de-conflict tasking to limit duplication of efforts while optimizing resources 
available to the committee. Additionally, the international signatories ensure that each 
committee spoke stakeholder accomplishes their tasking in a constructive manner. 
As shown below, the committee model is the preferred TSN approach 




 e. TSN Rating Rubric Analysis 
The committee model is the preferred organizational model, indicated in 
Table 8, with the average score of 11.16. 
Evaluation Factors Group 
Alternative 
Value
Score Weight Score Team 
Alternative 
Value




Political Feasibility 60.00 60.00 18.00 20.00 20.00 6.00 60.00 60.00 18.00
Arena Mission Duration 27.83 74.88 14.98 25.84 80.65 16.13 26.32 79.18 15.84
Arena Resource Usage 11.47 41.33 4.13 9.70 48.88 4.89 7.91 59.96 6.00
Number of Relationships 15.00 33.33 3.33 5.00 100.00 10.00 15.00 33.33 3.33
Number of New Capabilities 50.00 2.00 0.20 1.00 100.00 10.00 27.00 3.70 0.37
Use of Legacy 154.00 96.86 19.37 75.00 47.17 9.43 110.00 69.18 13.84
Score
Evaluation Factors Group 
Alternative 
Value
Score Weight Score Team 
Alternative 
Value




Political Feasibility 80.00 80.00 24.00 40.00 40.00 12.00 80.00 80.00 24.00
Arena Resource Duration 26.24 79.42 15.88 25.94 80.34 16.07 20.84 100.00 20.00
Arena Resource Usage 9.95 47.67 4.77 8.24 57.52 5.75 4.74 100.00 10.00
Number of Relationships 15.00 33.33 3.33 5.00 100.00 10.00 15.00 33.33 3.33
Number of New Capabilities 55.00 1.82 0.18 20.00 5.00 0.50 40.00 2.50 0.25
Use of Legacy 159.00 100.00 20.00 53.00 33.33 6.67 110.00 69.18 13.84
Score
Evaluation Factors Group 
Alternative 
Value
Score Weight Score Team 
Alternative 
Value




Political Feasibility 80.00 80.00 24.00 60.00 40.00 12.00 90.00 90.00 27.00
Arena Resource Duration 26.08 79.91 15.98 25.95 80.31 16.06 21.48 97.02 19.40
Arena Resource Usage 8.65 54.85 5.48 7.23 65.58 6.56 5.30 89.47 8.95
Number of Relationships 15.00 33.33 3.33 5.00 100.00 10.00 15.00 33.33 3.33
Number of New Capabilities 55.00 1.82 0.18 24.00 4.17 0.42 40.00 2.50 0.25










Table 8. Organization Model AoA Rating Rubric. 
The scoring matrix presents each sub-alternative score and an average total for the 
group, team, and committee organizational model. 
In the Table 8 the organizational model value is converted to a score by 
means of dividing either a maxima or minima of the value set for the same evaluation 
factor of all sub-alternatives by the value. The use of a maximum or minimum is chosen 
to achieve a preferential score. For example, for the Group alternative the Arena Mission 
Duration factor divides 20.84, minima, by 27.83, times 100 to obtain 74.88. Minima are 
used by Arena Resource Usage, Number of Relationships, Number of New Capabilities 
evaluation factors to obtain the score. Use of Legacy evaluation factor uses the 
maximum. The weights used in the analysis are from Table 3. 
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Although the committee model does not score as highest for mitigating a 
transnational threat mission, it did score significantly higher for the other mission types. 
The team model scored the lowest over all; due the inefficiencies in resource 
management. Furthermore, the team model scores low in political feasibility as it 
promotes a “go-it-alone” approach to TSN missions. The group model scored a close 
second overall due to its slower and less efficient performance of the humanitarian aid 
mission. Interestingly, the group model attains the maximum score for the transnational 
threat mission due to its use of legacy capabilities. 
The highest single score, 12.00 in Table 8, of the nine sub-alternatives is the 
committee organizational model performing the disaster relief/protect environment 
mission. The prime factors contributing to this result are its political feasibility rating and 
Arena factors. These are consistent with Chapter I and Chapter II findings; that the 
international community needs synergy among nations for disaster response and 
environmental governance. 
 f. Operational Force Mix and Mission Duration Consequence 
The preferred approach, committee, offers the best resource efficiency 
across all TSN missions. By contrast to the other sub-alternatives, committee 
stakeholders employ more of their capabilities to accomplish the missions. This effect 
supports the TSN objective to promote widespread stakeholder involvement. 
 g. AoA Sensitivity Analysis 
The analysis reported in Table 8 assumes weighting distribution according 
to Table 2 of Chapter III. It is also assumed equal weighting for the three missions: 
transnational threat enforcement, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief/protect 
environment response. An evaluation of these weightings provides insight to results 
sensitivity. As discussed in Chapter III the largest weighting factor is assigned to political 
feasibility since it is a principal consideration of TSN. With an equal weighting 
distribution analysis ranking does not shift maintaining the committee model being 
preferred. Within the range of sensitivity evaluated, the team model failed to achieve a 
score greater than either committee or group. To address all missions since they are 
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equally weighted, the committee model is selected as the preferred organizational 
structure for TSN. 
3. Concept of Operations 
The concept of operations for the TSN C4I, depicted in Figure 29, is synthesized 
from the community organizational model, TSN mission types, and operational functions 
from the dendritic model. 
 
Figure 29. TSN Operational View. 
The TSN C4I system is comprised of a backbone, edge, and broadcast capability which 
join TSN stakeholders. 
The TSN C4I gathers and fuses information, shown as white unidirectional 
arrows, from all participants within the operational area and promulgates the information 
across the TSN C4I system to participants based on their individual access level. This 
allows the appropriate stakeholders, grouped by black lines, to perform mitigating 
actions, shown as green unidirectional arrows, in response to trigger events, depicted as 
transnational threats, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief/protect environment response. 
The overarching TSN C4I system, shown as the cloud in the top left corner, is a 
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combination of three distinct capabilities: TSN C4I backbone, shown as the red 
bidirectional arrow, TSN C4I participant edge, shown as the yellow bidirectional arrows, 
and TSN C4I broadcast, shown as the blue unidirectional arrows. 
The TSN C4I backbone capability is the highest trusted level of the TSN C4I 
system and is reserved for international signatory organizations, naval forces, and 
constabulary forces. This capability is primarily tasked to push and pull information that 
is too sensitive to be passed indiscriminately, such as, but not limited to, the location and 
quantity of naval units, specific commercial shipping lanes, unsubstantiated sensor 
information, and other naval and constabulary intelligence. Furthermore, the TSN C4I 
backbone capability has unrestricted access to all information pushed from the lower 
levels of the overarching TSN C4I system. 
The TSN C4I edge capability is reserved for the commercial shipping industry 
and humanitarian aid organizations. This system provides these stakeholders the ability to 
push trusted situation awareness information to the overarching TSN C4I system, while 
allowing limited pulling from the TSN C4I backbone capability. This limited pulling of 
information allows for sensor and other relevant intelligence information to be passed to 
these stakeholders without divulging the source of the information. The ability to access 
this intelligence information is critical for first responders to disaster relief/protect 
environment events and to mitigate transnational threats. Moreover, the TSN edge 
capability has unrestricted access to information pushed by the TSN C4I broadcast 
capability. 
The lowest trusted level of the TSN C4I system, the TSN C4I broadcast 
capability, is reserved for private vessels. These vessels push information to the 
overarching system, such as AIS and LRIT information types, but are only able to pull a 
limited portion of TSN C4I information. This information is limited to local transnational 
threat alerts and the location of other private vessels in the operational area. However, the 
private stakeholder can be tasked to provide first response capabilities to disaster 
relief/protect environment events. If they accept, they are then given the ability to push 
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additional situation awareness information, and pull from a limited version of the TSN 
C4I edge capability. 
The TSN operational concept differs from SSTR operations as described by the 
Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations 
Joint Operating Concept (JOC). The central idea of SSTR operations is: 
“… U.S. policy carried out by U.S. military forces, civilian government 
agencies, and, in many cases multinational partners, will on helping a 
severely stressed government avoid failure or recover from a devastating 
natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government in 
building a ‘new domestic order’ following internal collapse or defeat in 
war” (U.S. Joint Forces Command 2006). 
By contrast the TSN concept of operations carries out the consensus of the 
international community with naval and constabulary forces interacting with commercial 
and humanitarian aid organization stakeholders. The TSN concept includes similar 
missions stated in the JOC including delivery of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction 
of critical services, restoration of essential services, and establishment of rule of law 
(U.S. Joint Forces Command 2006). These missions are implemented supporting 
international guidance with volunteer forces and intelligence resources. The framework 
of the TSN C4I architecture, described in the remaining sections of the thesis, differs 
from the JOC vision which framework is centered upon U.S. military systems. 
4. Operational Functions, Nodes, and Needlines 
Level one and level two operational functions of TSN, shown in Figure 30, mirror 
the functional analysis results of the dendritic approach. They are arranged in an intuitive 
order from left to right culminating in full TSN operational functionality. 
The Provide TSN operational function, level one, implements an operational 
pattern which encompasses: standard practices, relevant capabilities, and interoperability 
requirements. The provide intelligence operational function, level two, provides 
intelligence product collection, information level fusion and intelligence products, that is, 
an intelligence summary, an operational picture for situation awareness, and discrete 
intelligence reports on vessels and persons. The perform command and control 
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operational function, level two, provides an interaction point with international 
authorities, management of TSN units, and development of coordinated TSN unit actions 
with stakeholders. The operate unit operational function, level two, provides sufficient 
interaction and unit level functionality to interoperate with TSN nodes. 
 
Figure 30. TSN Operational Function Hierarchy. 
TSN top level operational functions provide complete operational functionality. 
 a. Provide Intelligence Operational Function 
The provide intelligence operational function is composed of Task Data 
Collection, Process Data, Post Intelligence Products, and Use Intelligence Products, 
(TPPU) as shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. Provide Intelligence Operational Function FFBD. 
The TSN Provide Intelligence operational function collects and disseminates TSN 
relevant intelligence products. 
Provide intelligence obtains information of intelligence value from 
external sources and TSN units. External sources request specific military and law 
enforcement information on an as-needed basis to support TSN enforcement and 
assessment of vessels and persons of interest. Combined with TSN unit information and 
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open source information, intelligence processing develops products for broad distribution 
as well as products for specific operations. With protection mechanism in place the 
products are posted for use by authorized users. 
Task, Process, Exploit, and Disseminate (TPED) preceded TPPU which is 
the current NCO operational capability with emphasis on net centricity. Where TPED 
used centralized control of all activity, TPPU uses decentralized control and 
uncoordinated independent activities (Funk and Sorensen 2005). With TPPU the 
intelligence process posts products from which the user may obtain; whereas, with TPED 
dissemination to the user was integral to the intelligence process. The decoupled 
dependency between user and intelligence provider aligns with current architecture 
approaches of publish and subscribe style, or service oriented architecture style. 
 b. Provide Command and Control Operational Function 
The provide command and control operational function is composed of 
sense environment, assess intentions and capabilities, generate COAs, select alternatives, 
plan details, and direct response, Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32. TSN Provide Command and Control Operational Function FFBD. 
The TSN Command and Control operational function manages the TSN Unit and 
determines direction consistent with international signatories’ policies. 
The primary objective of the provide command and control operational 
function is to influence the environment by means of the TSN units. The function must 
sense the tactical environment by collecting, analyzing and forecasting TSN force assets 
and external entities which are operating in a common physical environment. The 
information is transformed to assess the intentions and capabilities of friendly, hostile and 
neutral assets. By the comparison of international policy to the situation, the function 
generates deviations and a plan, Course of Action (COA), to return to a desired state. The 
COAs are analyzed in terms of international criteria that result in a preferred plan. The 
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plan is expanded with sufficient details to make actionable TSN unit tasks which are 
promulgated to appropriate assets for implementation. 
 c. Operate Unit Operational Function 
The operate unit operational function is composed of provide unit mission 
information, inform land node, inform TSN node, perform unit action, provide unit 
sensed contacts, coordinate unit operations, process unit information, release image, and 
release contact report, Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33. TSN Operate Unit Operational Function FFBD. 
The TSN Operate Unit operational function represents those functions on TSN unit 
necessary of participation in TSN. 
The operate unit operational function is distributed among TSN units 
comprised of navy, constabulary, humanitarian, commercial, and private units. For 
compatible operations between TSN and legacy systems, the units provide relevant vessel 
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and mission information to land nodes, command and control node, and other TSN units. 
Coordinated enforcement operations are supported with unit action synchronization 
which relies on the common ability to process TSN specific unit information. 
 d. Operational Nodes 
Operational nodes are conceptual entities which include computers, 
communication and related capability. As shown in Figure 34, TSN is built from three 
principal operational nodes: command and control node, intelligence node and unit node. 
The latter node includes the following instances: constabulary node, humanitarian node, 
commercial node, private node and navy node. In total these nodes provide a structure on 
which the operational functions are projected as shown in Table 9. These projected 
operational functions include all functions and addition lower level operational functions 
articulated in the dendritic approach. 
 
Figure 34. TSN Operational Nodes Hierarchy. 







Node Assigned Operational Activities 
Command and Control 
(C2).TSN 
Collect Law Enforcement Rpt 
Collect  Fingerprints 
Collect Contact Report 
Collect Imagery 
Perform Command and Control 
Sense Environment 
Receive Humanitarian Request 
Detect Objects and Conditions 
Classify Objects and Conditions 
Identify Objects and Conditions 
Track Objects and Conditions 
Analyze ISR 














Optimize Information Act Alternative 
Optimize Reposition Act Alternative 
Optimize Protective Act Alternative 
Optimize VBSS Act Alternative 




Get More Information 
Plan Reposition Act 
Plan Protective Act 
Plan VBSS Act 
Plan Weapons Act 




Release Environment Event 
Issue Commands 
Prepare Operations 
Release Unit Vessel Incident 
Request Operational Picture  
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Node Assigned Operational Activities 
Intelligence.TSN Provide Intelligence 




Release Intelligence Tasking 
Process Data 
Collect Data 
Collect Sensed Track Files 
Collect External Data Sources 
Collect External Situational 
Information 
Collect AIS Summary 
Collect LRIT Summary 
Collect PRC Summary 
Collect Search and Rescue 
Collect Security Alert 
Collect Environmental Summary 
Collect External Intelligence 
Information 
Collect Law Enforcement Rpt 
Collect Photo 
Collect  Fingerprints 
Collect Contact Report 
Collect Imagery 
Analyze Data 
Analyze Common Picture Data 
Analyze Sensed Track Files 
Analyze AIS Summary 
Analyze LRIT Summary 
Analyze PRC Summary 
Analyze Search and Rescue 
Analyze Security Alert 
Analyze Enviromental Summary 
Analyze Intelligence Summary Data 
Analyze Unit Incident Person Msg 
Analyze Unit Intelligence Message 
Analyze Unit Incident Vessel Msg 
Develop Products 
Develop Operational Picture 
Develop Intelligence Summary 
Post Intelligence Products 
Authenticate Users 
Upload Operational Picture 
Upload Intelligence Products 
Release Intelligence Summary 
Release Operational Picture 
Use Intelligence Products 
Authenticate User Requests 
Download Products 
Download Intelligence Summary 










Provide Unit Mission Information 
Inform Land Node 
Inform TSN Node 
Perform Unit Action 
Perform Unit Coordination 
Perform Unit Intelligence Action 
Provide Unit Sensed Contacts 
Coordinate Unit Operations 
Process Unit Information 
Release Intelligence Message 
Receive Intelligence Summary 
Process COA 
Process Unit Operational Picture 
Receive Unit Intelligence Tasking 
Request Intelligence Summary 
Release Unit Person Incident 
Release Unit Vessel Incident 
Process Intelligence Tasking 
Release Image 
Release Contact Report  
Table 9. Operational Node and Operational Function Mapping. 
TSN operational nodes are mapped to operational functions. 
 e. TSN Needlines 
TSN needlines represent information interaction, shown in Figure 35, 
among TSN unit nodes, command and control node, intelligence node, and external 
entities. Based upon analysis of the operational functions for each node, needlines are 
identified to carry operational information as either input to or output from an operational 
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function. The assignment of operational functions to operational nodes and their 
needlines is provided in Table 10. 
In Appendix VIII, DoDAF OV-3 and OV-7 describe the assignment of 
operational information to needlines and the operational information hierarchy. 
 
Figure 35. TSN Needlines Operational Node Diagram. 





C2.TSN Constabulary Unit Send/Receive C2 
Humanitarian Unit Send/Receive C2 
Maritime Commercial Send/Receive C2 
Maritime Private Send/Receive C2 
Military Unit Send/Receive C2 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Intelligence 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Reachback 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Coordination Constabulary 
TSN Receive PNT 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Coordination Military  
Unit.Constabulary Constabulary Unit Send/Receive C2 
Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Intelligence 
Constabulary Unit Receive PNT 
Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Coordination Humanitarian 
Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Reachback 
Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Commercial 
Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Private 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Coordination Constabulary  
Unit.Humanitarian Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Coordination Humanitarian 
Humanitarian Unit Send/Receive C2 
Humanitarian Unit Send/Receive Intelligence 
Humanitarian Unit Receive PNT 
Military Unit Send/Receive Coordination Humanitarian  
Unit.Commercial Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Commercial 
Maritime Commercial Send/Receive C2 
Maritime Commercial Send Receive Intelligence 
Maritime Commercial Receive PNT 
Maritime Commercial Send/Receive Reachback 
Military Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Commercial  
Unit.Private Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Private 
Maritime Private Send/Receive C2 
Maritime Private Send/Receive Intelligence 
Maritime Private Receive PNT 
Maritime Private Send/Receive Reachback 
Military Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Private  
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Node  Needlines 
Unit.Navy Military Unit Send/Receive Intelligence 
Military Unit Receive PNT 
Military Unit Send/Receive Reachback 
Military Unit Send/Receive Coordination Humanitarian 
Military Unit Send/Receive C2 
Military Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Commercial 
Military Unit Send/Receive Coordination Maritime Private 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Coordination Military  
Intelligence.TSN Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Intelligence 
Humanitarian Unit Send/Receive Intelligence 
Maritime Commercial Send Receive Intelligence 
Maritime Private Send/Receive Intelligence 
Military Unit Send/Receive Intelligence 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Intelligence 
Intelligence Send/Receive Reachback  
External Nodes Constabulary Unit Send/Receive Reachback 
Maritime Commercial Send/Receive Reachback 
Maritime Private Send/Receive Reachback 
Unit Send/Receive Reachback 
TSN C2 Send/Receive Reachback 
Intelligence Send/Receive Reachback  
Table 10. TSN Operational Nodes and Needlines. 
TSN nodes are connected by needlines. 
5. Operational Scenarios 
TSN missions are refined with the description of operational scenarios. Each 
operational scenario employs a unique set of operational functions which correspond to 
an operational process. The following operational scenarios are described for TSN: 
evaluate range of options; collect and distribute intelligence; situation awareness, 
transnational threat; humanitarian aid; and disaster relief/protect environment. 
The diagrams provided for the scenarios are shown as multi-threaded multi-
instance diagrams where each thread is allocated to an operational node. This complex 
style of modeling, compared to a FFBD single thread, models behavior characteristics 
which are useful for depicting scenarios. For convenience the diagrams are labeled FFBD 
vice state machines to mask the subtlety employed. 
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 a. Evaluate Range of Options Operational Scenario 
The evaluate range of options operational scenario, Figure 36, describes 
how TSN transforms international policy, objective state and ROEs into tactical 
constructs. An external international body, IMB or IMO, issues guidance to TSN 
concerning expectations and restrictions which are based on international community 
consensus building in reaction to historical and current events. 
 
Figure 36. TSN Evaluate Range of Options Operational Scenario FFBD. 
TSN Evaluate Range of Options Operational Scenario transforms international policy 
to tactical constructs. 
Tactical options range from information gathering to armed resolution of 
the situation. The options are evaluated with respect to changes of international policy 
and in the context of the region and its national authorities. The most benign option is 
gathering additional information which is enabled by an intelligence tasking request from 
the Intelligence node. The means of information collection might be constrained by 
international or internal policy. The next two acts escalate the response to performing an 
act to influence the behavior of other vessels or persons. The tactics employed may be 
restricted to avoid creating an international incident or violating Admiralty Law. The 
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Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) category involves contact with a vessel or 
persons on a vessel. The decisions involved with implementing any one of these specific 
acts and corresponding tactics are restricted by international and internal policies. 
 b. Collect and Distribute Intelligence Operational Scenario 
The collect and distribute intelligence operational scenario, Figure 37, 
describes how TSN performs intelligence collection, processing, and distribution.  
 
Figure 37. TSN Collect and Distribute Intelligence Operational Scenario FFBD. 
TSN Collects and Distribute Intelligence Operational Scenario builds products for 
Command and Control, and TSN Unit Operational Nodes. 
Sources of intelligence include the military, law enforcement, TSN 
stakeholders and open sources. TSN continuously prepares intelligence products from 
TSN stakeholders and open sources while intelligence received from military and law 
enforcement is available on a restricted basis in response to an incident. This approach 
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acknowledges the sensitivities of nation-states to access their intelligence sources without 
which they would not likely participate in TSN C4I. 
The principal operational nodes involved in the scenario are command and 
control, intelligence, and TSN units, i.e., navy and constabulary. The intelligence node 
provides related products such as alerts, reports, bulletins, criminal records, fingerprints, 
and photos. Release of this information is either arranged by means of a memorandum of 
understanding or in response to a specific request by the TSN intelligence node on behalf 
of the command and control node. Essentially, the intelligence node collects disparate 
information, analyzes the information, fuses information, and releases products to the 
command and control and units operational nodes. TSN units may be tasked by the 
Intelligence node to collect information on a vessel or person. 
 c. Situation Awareness Operational Scenario 
The situation awareness operational scenario, Figure 38, describes how 
TSN builds situation awareness for the TSN stakeholders. Sources of information include 
external sources from legacy regional maritime systems, such as, SHIPLOC, AIS, LRIT, 
and PRC. Additional external sources include regional environment monitoring agencies 
and GMDSS. The intelligence node combines TSN unit node, i.e., navy, constabulary, 
sensed tracks with external information to generate operational pictures. For information 
management purposes, the operational picture has three versions consistent with the 
concept of operations. 
The versions of the operational picture are differentiated by the levels of 
stakeholder trust and need. For example, navy and constabulary units are assumed to 
have the highest trust and need, whereas, private vessels likely have the least trust and 
need. As a result the operational picture version accessible to naval and constabulary 
forces contains tactical content authorized and where permitted source information, 




Figure 38. TSN Situation Awareness Operational Scenario FFBD. 
TSN Situation Awareness Operational Scenario prepares a situation awareness view 
for TSN stakeholders. 
 d. Transnational Threat Operational Scenario 
The transnational threat operational scenario, Figure 39, describes how 
military and law enforcement nodes conduct mutual enforcement operations. The 
Intelligence node continues to process and post intelligence summaries and versions of 
the operational picture for authorized users. The command and control node develops 
alternatives from the enforcement mandate and then transforms them into tactical options. 
Candidate tactical actions are selected to a definite course of action by predictive analysis 
supported by historical patterns. The TSN unit node, i.e., navy and constabulary, while 
aware of the intelligence summaries and an operational picture responds to the directed 
course of action. 
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Figure 39. TSN Transnational Threat Operational Scenario FFBD. 
TSN Transnational Threat Operational Scenario describes the response to suspect and 
overt criminal acts on the high seas and territorial waters. 
 e. Deliver Humanitarian Aid Operational Scenario 
The deliver humanitarian aid operational scenario, Figure 40, describes 
how humanitarian aid stakeholders or regional nation-state authorities coordinate with 
TSN forces to safely deliver aid. External entities request the safe delivery of aid to 
disadvantaged locations or disaster areas. The command and control node responds to the 
request by assessing any additional mission requirements from TSN operations. Given 
the range of possible methods for safe delivery of aid, TSN options are evaluated to 
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determine the preferred course of action. A course of action is composed and 
communicated to the TSN unit node, i.e., navy, constabulary, humanitarian, commercial, 
and private. 
 
Figure 40. TSN Deliver Humanitarian Aid Operational Scenario FFBD 
TSN Deliver Humanitarian Aid Operational Scenario describes the response to 
requests by the Humanitarian Aid stakeholder or regional nation-state authorities. 
 f. Disaster Relief/Protect Environment Operational Scenario 
The disaster relief/protect environment operational scenario, Figure 41, 
describes TSN response to disasters and environment protection events. Notification of 
disasters and environment protection issues are provided by external entities and TSN 
Unit nodes, i.e., navy, constabulary, humanitarian, commercial, and private. Of particular 
interest, the TSN unit node may provide information to either a land node or TSN. In the 
former case the land node, external entity, alerts TSN. In this case the TSN response is 
limited to three options: obtain more information, perform reposition act, and perform a 
protective act. The protective act may involve the immediate application of available 
TSN force resources such as fuel, water, food, and assessment teams. By contrast to the 
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other operational scenarios, minimal planning is conducted. At some point the disaster 
relief mission component evolves to a humanitarian aid mission which includes extensive 
planning. 
 
Figure 41. TSN Disaster Relief/Protect Environment Operational Scenario 
FFBD. 
TSN Disaster Relief/Protect Environment Operational Scenario describes the response 
to disasters and environment governance. 
6. Estimate of Mission Success 
Mission success results are derived from MOEs and MOPs for each operational 
scenario: transnational threat enforcement, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief/protect 
environment response. The operational scenario with the highest mission success is 
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disaster relief/protect environment with 75 percent followed by humanitarian aid with 64 
percent and last by the transnational threat enforcement with 63 percent. The arrangement 
of mission functions and their quantity determine the mission success. 
For this study all level four mission functions, denoted by the function number 
(level 1 dot level 2 dot level 3 dot level 4), MOPs are assumed to be 0.9772 probability of 
success. Additionally, the level three mission functions of the operate unit operational 
function are also assumed to be 0.9772 since the lower level functions of the operate unit 
operational function are not developed. 
The disaster relief/protect environment high mission success is achieved with 
fewer functions since in this operational scenario TSN reacts to events with minimal 
planning. On the other hand, the transnational threat enforcement low mission success is 
the effect of additional functions to safely conduct a response. 














Paralle l MO P 
(%) Total
1.1.4 Use Intelligence Products 0.977 1.1.4.1 0.977 1.1.4.2.1, 
1.1.4.2.2
0.999





1.2.3 Generate COAs 0.955 1.2.3.1, 
1.2.3.2
0.955 n/a n/a













1.3.4 Perform Unit Action 0.977 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1.3.6 Coordinate Unit Operations 0.977 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1.3.7 Process Unit Information 0.977 n/a n/a n/a n/a
0.630Transnational Threat Enforcement Mission 
Success  
Table 11. TSN Mission Success for Transnational Threat Enforcement. 
The TSN mission success for the Transnational Threat Enforcement is 63 percent 
assuming a 0.9772 probability of success of lower level operational functions. 
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The calculation of transnational threat enforcement mission success is 
based upon the operational function structure depicted in Figure 39. Shown in this figure, 
level three and level four mission functions are combined into an overall mission success 
value, Table 11. The function level number correlates to the operational function name 
which matches the operational functions developed by the dendritic method. 
Corresponding MOEs are calculated for each operational function based on the product 
of the sub-function, level four. In Table 11, each sub-function is listed with a 
corresponding calculated MOP on the basis of a serial and/or parallel arrangement. The 
effect is a mathematical representation of the mission process for developing MOEs and 
overall mission success. A graphical depiction of how the MOEs contribute to the overall 




Coordinate Unit Operations   
  0.023
0.977 Cannot Process Unit Information




Direct Response Cannot Coordinate Unit Operations
0
    
0.933 0.023
Plan Details Cannot Perform Unit Action
0
    
0.933 0.088
Select Alternatives Cannot Direct Response
 0
    
0.955 0.088
Generate COAs Cannot Plan Details
0
    
0.912 0.067
Assess Intentions and Capabilities Cannot Select Alternatives
0
    
0.977 0.045
Use Intelligence Products Cannot Generate COAs
0
    
0.088
Cannot Assess Intentions and Capabilities
0
0.629991   
0.023
Cannot Use Intelligence Products
0  
Figure 42. TSN Transnational Threat Enforcement Mission Tree Analysis. 
The TSN Transnational Threat Enforcement mission tree shows the serial sequence of 
ten operational functions needed to achieve mission success. 
 b. Humanitarian Aid Mission Success 
The calculation of humanitarian aid mission success is based on the 
operational function structure depicted in Figure 40. Shown in this figure, level three and 
level four mission functions are combined into an overall mission success value, Table 
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12. The function level number correlates to the operational function name which matches 
the operational functions developed by the dendritic method. Corresponding MOEs are 
calculated for each operational function based on the product of the sub-function, level 
four. In Table 12, each sub-function is listed with a corresponding calculated MOP on the 
basis of a serial and/or parallel arrangement. The effect is a mathematical representation 
of the mission process for developing MOEs and overall mission success. A graphical 
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Paralle l MO P 
(%) Total
1.1.4 Use Intelligence Products 0.955 1.1.4.1, 
1.1.4.2.2
0.955 n/a n/a
1.2.1 Sense Environment 0.955 1.2.1.1, 
1.2.1.6
0.955 n/a n/a
1.2.3 Generate COAs 0.955 1.2.3.1, 
1.2.3.2
0.955 n/a n/a













1.3.4 Perform Unit Action 0.977 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1.3.6 Coordinate Unit Operations 0.977 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1.3.7 Process Unit  Information 0.977 n/a n/a n/a n/a
0.645Humanitarian Aid Mission Success  
Table 12. TSN Mission Success for Humanitarian Aid. 
The TSN mission success for the Humanitarian Aid is 64 percent assuming a 0.9772 





Coordinate Unit Operations   
  0.023
0.977 Cannot Process Unit Information




Direct Response Cannot Coordinate Unit Operations
0
    
0.933 0.023
Plan Details Cannot Perform Unit Action
0
    
0.933 0.088
Select Alternatives Cannot Direct Response
 0
    
0.955 0.088
Generate COAs Cannot Plan Details
0
    
0.955 0.067
Sense Environment Cannot Select Alternatives
0
    
0.955 0.045
Use Intelligence Products Cannot Generate COAs
0




0.64484   
0.045
Cannot Use Intelligence Products
0  
Figure 43. TSN Humanitarian Aid Mission Tree Analysis. 
The TSN Humanitarian Aid mission tree shows the serial sequence of nine operational 
functions needed to achieve mission success. 
 c. Disaster Relief/Protect Environment Response Mission Success 
The calculation of transnational threat enforcement mission success is 
based on the operational function structure depicted in Figure 41. Shown in this figure, 
level three and level four mission functions are combined into an overall mission success 
value, Table 13. The function level number correlates to the operational function name 
which matches the operational functions developed by the dendritic method. 
Corresponding MOEs are calculated for each operational function based on the product 
of the sub-function, level four. In Table 13, each sub-function is listed with a 
corresponding calculated MOP on the basis of a serial and/or parallel arrangement. The 
effect is a mathematical representation of the mission process for developing MOEs and 
overall mission success. A graphical depiction of how the MOEs contribute to the overall 














Paralle l MO P 
(%) Total
1.1.4 Use Intelligence Products 0.955 1.1.4.1, 
1.1.4.2.2
0.955 n/a n/a
1.2.1 Sense Environment 0.977 1.2.1.6 0.977 n/a n/a




1.2.5 Plan Details 0.955 1.2.5.1-5, 
1.2.5.1
0.955 n/a n/a





1.3 top branch 0.977 1.3.1 0.977 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 0.999
1.3 lower branch 0.933 1.3.4, 1.3.2, 
1.3.3
0.933 n/a n/a
1.3 total Operate Unit 0.998
0.757Disaster Relief/Protect Environment 
Response Mission Success  
Table 13. TSN Mission Success for Disaster Relief/Protect Environment. 
The TSN mission success for the Disaster Relief/Protect Environment is 75 percent 








Plan Details Cannot Operate Unit
 
    
0.933  
Select Alternatives Cannot Direct Response
    
0.977 0.045
Sense Environment Cannot Plan Details
    
0.955 0.067
Use Intelligence Products Cannot Select Alternatives
    
0.023
Cannot Sense Environment
0.756673   
0.045
Cannot Use Intelligence Products  
Figure 44. TSN Disaster Relief/Protect Environment Mission Tree Analysis. 
The TSN Disaster Relief/Protect Environment mission tree applies both the serial and 
parallel sequences of operational functions needed to achieve mission success. 
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7. Operational Architecture Assessment 
The resultant ISM and DSM analysis indicates reasonable allocation of functions 
to nodes. Using the ISM technique the cluster factor is 1.8 where 1.0 is the ideal value. 
Based on a different methodology the DSM analysis offers further insight regarding the 
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Figure 45. Operational Architecture Method Analysis Summary. 
DSM with a score of 72 percent substantiates ISM with score of 1.8. 
DSM analysis substantiates the trend indicated by the ISM analysis. Shown in 
Figure 45, the summary level analysis view shows how the operational functions are 
grouped to operational nodes. Several observations are presented. First, the largest values 
tend to be closer to the diagonal than at the lower left and upper right corner which 
indicates lower functional coupling effects. Second, most feedback values are close to the 
diagonal, disregarding external constraints, which reduces feedback affecting system 
latency. Third, the apparent cluster bounded by Use Intelligence Products, upper left 
corner, and Assess Intentions and Capabilities, lower right corner, is a false cluster. 
 99
Analysis indicates that forming this group into a node reduces overall system stability 
score by 10 percentage points. The effect of clustering and directional dependencies 
yields a system stability score of 72 percent where 100 percent is the ideal. 
8. Operational Requirements 
The following are a list of operational requirements derived by the study based on 
their research and the results of functional analysis. 
• The TSN C4I system operational availability must be 0.99 (threshold). 
• The TSN C4I system must support 24/7 continuous operations. 
• The TSN C4I system should operate in all climate zones. 
• The TSN C4I system should be suitable for vessels with Gross Weight 
Tonnage (GWT) > 300 tons (threshold), GWT > 1 ton (objective). 
• The TSN C4I system must process maritime reports from multiple sources 
including AIS, LRIT, etc. 
• The TSN C4I system must process intelligence information from 
combatant ships and intelligence agencies. 
• The TSN C4I system must distribute situation awareness information to 
commercial vessels, private vessels, combatants, humanitarian aid vessels 
and constabulary vessels. 
• The TSN C4I system must distribute situational awareness to the shipping 
industry, maritime organizations, non-government organizations (WFP, 
IRC, etc.), ports and harbors, and enforcement agencies. 
• The TSN C4I system must exchange information in multiple languages. 
• The TSN C4I system must authenticate user roles to provide a trustworthy 
capability. 
• The TSN C4I system must deny access to unauthorized users. 
• The TSN C4I system should employ user internationally identifiable 
interfaces, templates, and protocols. 
• The TSN C4I system hardware must scale effectively with respect to size, 
weight, and power variable for use on large (GWT > 300 tons) or small 
vessels (GWT > 1 ton) (objective). 
• The onboard TSN C4I system cost must be less than 2 percent of the 
vessel’s original equipment configuration cost. 
9. Operational Test and Evaluation Plan 





B. SYSTEM DOMAIN 
1. System Functions and Services 
Level one and level two system functions of TSN C4I are shown in the functional 
hierarchy, Figure 46. They are arranged in an intuitive order from left to right 
culminating in full TSN C4I functionality. Provide C4I system function is modified from 
existing C4I functional capability patterns which describes implementation approaches to 
C4I operational requirements. An explanation of each system function follows with the 
top level IDEF0 diagram and each system function’s IDEF0 diagram located in Appendix 
X. 
 
Figure 46. TSN C4I System Function Hierarchy. 
TSN C4I top level functions provides full system functionality. 
The manage communication and network system function provides inter-unit 
communications and networking, as well as, intra-unit networking to enable operational 
and tactical collaboration. The develop situation awareness system function provides 
inter-unit information from multiple sources including land based centers and TSN units. 
The develop object of interest system function provides declaration and development of 
both human and non-human track files with multimedia information. The obtain 
intelligence products system function provides processed intelligence to select TSN units 
and land based centers. The develop and evaluate plans system function provides joint 
TSN developed plans to: respond to disaster and environment, deliver humanitarian aid, 
and provide transnational threat enforcement consistent with stated international policies. 
The coordinate and monitor operations system function provides tactical coordination 
among TSN force assets while executing assigned tasks. The generate after action 
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Evaluation provides generation, review, and release of news briefs, situation reports, and 
evidence material to TSN stakeholders. 
 a. Operational Activities and System Function Mapping. 
Operational functions are related to system functions, shown in Table 14. 
Of particular interest, the manage communication and network system function provides 
the means of information interoperability and impacts all operational activities. The 












































































































































































X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Develop Situation 
Awareness X X X X X X X X X X X
Develop Object of 
Interest Tracks X X
Obtain Intelligence 
Products X X X X X X X
Develop and 










Table 14. System View 5, Operational Activities to System Function Mapping. 
TSN operational functions are mapped to system functions in the form of a DoDAF 
SV-5. 
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 b. Operational Information and Information Item Mapping 
Operational information is related to information item, shown in Table 15. 
Similar in concept to the SV-5, this view describes the continuity between the operational 
domain information and the system domain information. Describing this continuity is an 






Unit Intelligence Tasking Approved Plan  
Intelligence Summary Intelligence Information  
Operational Picture Operational Picture  
Intelligence Msg Asset Contact Report Item 
Asset Situation Report  
Incident Person Asset Incident Report 
Personal Identification Information  
Request Intelligence Summary Asset Intelligence Request  
Sensed Track Files Track Information  
Request Intelligence Request Intelligence  
Incident Vessel  Asset Incident Report  
Request Operational Picture Operational Picture Request  
Sensor Reports Track Information  
Environmental Alert TSN Node Environment Event Alert  
Security Incident Asset Incident Report  
Search & Rescue Msg Maritime Search and Rescue Request 
Maritime Request for Assistance  
Course of Action Approved Plan  
Constabulary Tasking Plan Maritime Request for Assistance  
PRC Tasking Plan Maritime Request for Assistance  
Planned Movement Intentions and Movement Report  
Environment Alert Land Node Environment Event Alert  






Evidence Static Vessel Information 
Dynamic Vessel Information 
Voyage Vessel Information 
Asset Contact Report  
Asset Incident Report  
Asset Situation Report 
Intelligence Information Item 
Personal Identification Information 
Track Information 
 Intelligence and Situation Awareness  
Situation Asset Situation Report  
Logistics Need Logistics Request  
Status and Update Report Asset Situation Report  
Position and Timing Navigation Information  
Center LRIT Summary Static Vessel Information 
Dynamic Vessel Information 
Voyage Vessel Information  
Center AIS Summary Static Vessel Information 
Dynamic Vessel Information 
Voyage Vessel Information  
PRC Summary Track Information  
Environment Summary Track Information  
Security Alert Summary Transnational Threat Alert Item 
Transnational Enforcement Event Item 
Transnational Threat Request for Assistance 
Asset Intelligence Request  
Search & Rescue Summary Track Information  
Objective State Statement of Objectives  
Rules of Engagement Rules of Engagement  
Policy and Directives Statement of Objectives  
Humanitarian Request Humanitarian Aid Request  
Law Enforcement Intelligence Intelligence Information Item 
Law Enforcement Blotter 
Personal Identification Information  
Vessel Communications Communication and Network Control 
Communication Management  
Table 15. Operational Information to Information Item Mapping. 
TSN operational information is mapped to system domain information items. 
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 c. Manage Communication and Network 
The manage communication and network system function, is composed of 
provide asymmetric security, provide communication, and provide networking computing 
system functions, located in Appendix X. 
Communication management jointly manages communication links and 
networks with the use of a communications plan. The plan accommodates 
communication reach back to land sites. It also accommodates communication among 
vessels by Line of Sight (LOS) and Non-LOS means. Considerations of the 
communication plan include: disparate communication systems; data forwarding; circuit 
bandwidth versus data type; spectrum management; transmission security issues; 
authentication methods and contingency circuits. Communications network establishes 
connectivity between Host Nation, Regional Nation, Non-DoD National agencies, 
International Organizations, International Non-Government Organizations, nations’ 
navies, and constabulary forces. 
Network Operations provides continuity of operations over a range of 
conditions to include degraded network operations, disadvantaged network operations, 
limited communication bandwidth, and intermittent connectivity. The network routes 
information between the processing and storage components to support application 
services and common services. The network maintains status information regarding its 
nodes and interconnecting devices. 
 d. Develop Situation Awareness 
The develop situation awareness system function is composed of collect 
information, fuse information, and promulgate TSN information system functions, 
located in Appendix X. 
Situation awareness provides a graphical view of various overlays where 
each provides different views of information. A particular view of information may be 
restricted to certain stakeholders. The following overlays are included: jurisdiction, tracks 
(commercial, nations’ navies, constabulary, etc.), density of events, planned operations 
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(armed, VBSS, reposition, etc.), boundaries and areas, navigation, topology, socio-
political, cities and infrastructure, weather, and enforcement status/resources. 
 e. Develop Object of Interest Tracks. 
The develop object of interest tracks system function is composed of 
identify object of interest, fuse object characteristics, and produce object of interest track 
system functions, located in Appendix X. 
Tracks are developed from organic and non-organic sensors and human 
intelligence. Tracks are either human or non-human objects, such as vessels. If provided, 
the error of a track is used or estimated to associate closely-spaced tracks. Track 
information includes identification, priority (protected, monitored, suspicious, etc.), 
kinematic state, associated tracks, associated image, history, status, and assessment. 
 f. Obtain Intelligence Products 
The obtain intelligence products system function is composed of task 
intelligence assets, fuse intelligence information, and promulgate TSN intelligence 
information system functions, located in Appendix X. 
Multi-modal information sources are collected, analyzed, and correlated 
by TSN C4I to provide an integrated set of products for use by TSN stakeholders. 
Intelligence information is tagged with source, data type, date created, date accessed, 
keywords, abstract, size, and access restrictions. Intelligence information includes text, 
images, audio, video, and biometric data, i.e., fingerprints. 
 g. Develop and Evaluate Plans 
The develop and evaluate plans system function is composed of evaluate 
international objective state, develop natural disaster and environment response, develop 
humanitarian aid response, develop transnational threat enforcement, evaluate force 
capability, and release plan system functions, located in Appendix X. 
Plans are jointly developed and coordinated including logistic 
requirements for Host Nation, Regional Nation, Non-DoD National agencies, 
International Organizations, International Non-Government Organizations, nations’ 
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navies, and constabulary forces. Collaborative evaluation of the plans looks for intended 
and unintended effects, non-lethal and lethal, of a plan in the context of the stated 
internationally recognized policy, and regional needs. Joint development assumes a pre-
existing navy combatant and constabulary force in the area or the intent of nation-states 
to provide assets. A plan identifies the situation context and location with evaluated 
enforcement options. Each option provides compliance to international policy an ROE, 
basis of intelligence, needed assets and their resources, timeframe whereby option 
remains valid, and probability of success. The plan is generated on the basis of an 
enforcement concern based on intelligence assessments or as a reaction to a particular 
event regardless of mission type. The plan identifies significant boundaries (territorial 
waters, economic zone, high seas etc.), areas (military, shipping, fishing, anchorage etc.), 
and navigation concerns. Boundary areas and navigation concerns are superimposed with 
the established enforcement jurisdictional zones. Each plan summarizes responsibilities, 
resource needs, communication plan and tactical restrictions. 
 h. Coordinate and Monitor Operations 
The coordinate and monitor operations system function is composed of 
direct TSN force assets, and release TSN force assets system functions, located in 
Appendix X. 
Primarily navies and constabulary force assets perform tasks of a COA. 
They receive and evaluate information, instructions, call for backup, call for fire, 
declaration of intention whether hostile, friendly or unknown, coordinate vessel 
movements, specify handover responsibility, assess status of weapons, and perform 
inventory of goods and services. 
 i. Generate After Action Evaluation 
The generate after action evaluation system function is composed of 
collect assessments, assess action effectiveness and promulgate report system functions, 
located in Appendix X. 
Following an operational action or training action, a report is generated 
which provides a summary of action and the effect of action. Processing of the asset 
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reports are combined with force level planning and monitoring information to provide 
lessons learned for future missions, news brief for public awareness and information 
useful as evidence. Situation reports are generated prior to, during, and following any of 
the missions: disaster and environment response; humanitarian aid response; and 
transnational threat enforcement. 
2. System Function to Components Assignment 
System functions are assigned to an example component structure, shown in 
Figure 47. The component structure is one of several potential implementation 
approaches. One advantage of the software approach is portability to heterogeneous TSN 
stakeholder hardware environments, an advantage for the diverse TSN community. Using 
this approach, a cost estimate for the development effort can be easily determined. 
 
Figure 47. TSN C4I Component Physical Diagram. 
The TSN C4I solution example is modified from existing technical patterns which 
offer solutions to meet recurring C4I system requirements. A recognizable technical 
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pattern based on software engineering practice is used for the TSN C4I component 
structure. The pattern hosts the Computer Software Configuration Items (CSCIs) on a 
computing network which has connectivity to the external communications system. The 
approach scales with the information technology infrastructure capability of the vessel 
and facility. As discussed in the concept of operations, scaling of functionality to fit the 
asset type is a TSN objective. While the analysis describing scaling is beyond the current 
scope of the thesis, Table 16 provides a reference baseline mapping of system functions 
and components. 
The candidate physical structure shown as CSCIs hosted on service style architecture. 
Component Assigned System Function 
Asset Management CSCI 1.2.1.1 Manage Asset List 
1.6.1.1 Develop Tasks Function  
1.6.2.1 Evaluate Asset Action Report Function  
1.6.2.2 Release Asset Function  
1.6.2.3 Update Asset Status  
Situation Awareness CSCI 1.2.1.2 Request Information 
1.2.1.3 Evaluate Time Varying Information 
1.2.1.4 Evaluate Persistent Information  
1.2.1.5 Evaluate Navigation and Timing 
1.2.3.1 Populate Information Overlays 
1.2.3.2 Approve Operational Picture Release  
Fusion CSCI 1.2.2.1 Combine Disparate Single Sensor Information 
1.2.2.2 Combine Disparate Multi-Sensor Information 
1.2.2.3 Combine Disparate Data Streams 
1.2.2.4 Combine Disparate Socio-Political Information 
1.2.2.5 Combine Disparate Environment Features 
1.2.2.6 Combine Disparate Weather Information 
1.3.1.1 Classify Object Function 
1.3.1.2 Validate Object Function 
1.3.1.3 Verify Object Function  
1.3.2.1 Combine Image Information Function 
1.3.2.2 Combine Textual Information Function 
1.3.2.3 Combine Video Information Function 
1.3.2.4 Combine Audio Information 
1.3.3.1 Manage Track File Function 
1.3.3.2 Release Track Information  
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Component Assigned System Function 
Intelligence CSCI 1.4.1.1 Request Intelligence Information 
1.4.1.2 Evaluate Received Intelligence Information 
1.4.2.1 Process Open Source Information 
1.4.2.2 Process Asset Provided Information 
1.4.3.1 Prepare Intelligence Product 
1.4.3.2 Approve Intelligence Product for Post  
Mission Planning CSCI 1.5.1.1 Analyze Objectives 
1.5.1.2 Reconcile Objectives Function 
1.5.2.1 Prepare for Disaster or Environment Response 
1.5.2.2 Update Disaster or Environment Plan Function 
1.5.3.1 Develop Engineering Assistance and Construction 
Options 
1.5.3.2 Develop Medical and Dental Assistance Options 
1.5.3.3 Develop Bulk Aid Protection and Delivery 
Options 
1.5.3.4 Evaluate Use of Force 
1.5.4.1 Evaluate Criminal Profile 
1.5.4.2 Anticipate Time Critical Issues 
1.5.4.3 Develop Mitigation Approaches 
1.5.4.4 Rank Mitigation Techniques and Plan 
1.5.5.1 Assess Situation 
1.5.5.2 Evaluate Asset Capability 
1.5.5.3 Evaluate Criminal Capability 
1.5.5.4 Predict Plan Success 
1.5.6 Release Plan  
Mission Operations CSCI 1.6.1.1 Develop Tasks 
1.6.1.2 Coordinate Mission Tasks 
1.6.1.3 Status Tasks  
Mission Analysis CSCI 1.7.1.1 Compile Asset Action Reports Function 
1.7.1.2 Gather Affected Area or Object of Interest Status 
1.7.2.1 Reconstruct Action Events and Information 
1.7.2.2 Compare Events to Plan 
1.7.2.3 Develop Lessons Learned 
Information Release CSCI 1.7.3.1 Prepare News Brief 
1.7.3.2 Prepare Situation Report 
1.7.3.3 Prepare Evidence Package  
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Component Assigned System Function 
Communications and Network Management 
Service 
1.1.1.1 Provide Physical Security 
1.1.1.2 Provide Communications and Transmission 
Security 
1.1.1.3 Provide Network Security 
1.1.2.1 Provide LOS/BLOS Radio 
1.1.2.2 Provide Communication Network Service 
1.1.3.1 Provide Network Communication Services 
1.1.3.2 Provide Network Infrastructure Service 
1.1.3.3 Provide COI Enterprise Service 
1.1.3.4 Provide System Management Service  
Table 16. Component and System Function Assignment. 
TSN components are mapped to system functions. 
 a. Component Interfaces and Information Exchange 
Software interfaces are envisioned between the components which carry 
information items and data payload, shown in Table 17. The interface summary in the 
table is expounded upon in Appendix X which provides full interface details. This data 
analysis provides the foundation on which the information exchange standard is based. 
Component Interface Information Item Information Item Payload 
Hosted Fusion CSCI  Static Vessel Information 1.1 Vessel Port Destination 
1.2 Vessel Estimated Time of Arrival 
1.3 Vessel Estimated Time of Departure 
1.4 Vessel Cargo Type 
1.5 Vessel Last Visited Ports 
1.6 Vessel Crew Data of Birth 
1.7 Vessel Crew Name 
1.8 Vessel Crew Nationality 
1.9 Vessel Crew Passport Number  
Hosted Fusion CSCI  Dynamic Vessel 
Information 
2.1 Vessel Status 
2.2 Vessel Alerts  
Hosted Fusion CSCI  Voyage Vessel Information 3.1 Vessel Location 
3.2 Vessel Course 
3.3 Vessel Rate of Turn 
3.4 Vessel Speed  
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Component Interface Information Item Information Item Payload 
Hosted Mission Planning 
CSCI  
 
Hosted Intelligence CSCI 
Events and Requests 4.1 Humanitarian Aid Request  
4.2 Disaster Event Alert 
4.3 Environment Event Alert 
4.4 Maritime Search and Rescue Request 
4.5 Maritime Request for Assistance 
4.6 Transnational Threat Alert 
4.7 Transnational Enforcement Event 
4.8 Transnational Threat Request for 
Assistance 
4.9 Asset Intelligence Request 







Hosted Mission Planning 
CSCI  
Approved Plan 5.1 Asset Name 
5.2 Asset Sensor Plan 
5.3 Asset Movement 
5.4 Asset Communication Plan 
5.5 Asset Task Objective 
5.6 Asset Task Restrictions 







Hosted Mission Planning 
CSCI  
Asset Reports 6.1 Asset Contact Report 
6.2 Asset Incident Report 
6.3 Asset Situation Report 
6.4 Intentions and Movement Report  
Hosted Intelligence CSCI 
 
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Open Source Information 7.1 Weather 
7.2 News 
7.3 Search  
Hosted Fusion CSCI 
 
Hosted Intelligence CSCI  
Intelligence Information 8.1 Object Name, Pseudo Name, Alias 
8.2 Object Physical Characteristics 
8.3 Object Recent History 
8.4 Object Contact Sheet 
8.5 Object Fingerprints 
8.6 Object Image 
8.7 Object Audio 
8.8 Object Video 
8.9 Object Capabilities  
Hosted Intelligence CSCI  Intelligence Reports 9.1 Law Enforcement Blotter 
9.2 PRC Information 
9.3 AIS Information 
9.4 LRIT Information 
9.5 Regional Constabulary Information 
9.6 Regional Military Information  
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Component Interface Information Item Information Item Payload 




10.1 International Authority Name 
10.2 Statement of Objectives 
10.3 Restrictions 
10.4 Preferred Methods 
10.5 Rules of Engagement 
10.6 International Authority Role  
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Navigation Information 11.1 Navigation Message 
11.2 Ephemeris 
11.3 Almanac 
11.4 Time Reference 
11.5 Chart Data 
11.6 Map Data 
11.7 Navigation Reference Point  
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Operational Picture 12.1 Weather Overlay 
12.2 Chart Overlay 
12.3 Topographical Overlay 
12.4 Vessel Overlay 
12.5 Object of Interest Overlay 
12.6 Mission Planning Overlay 
12.7 Intelligence Overlay 
12.8 Situation Information Request 
12.9 Information Need  





13.4 Hair Color 




13.9 Passport Number 
13.10 National Card Identification Number  
Hosted Information 
Release CSCI  
Released Information 14.1 News Brief 
14.2 Situation Report 
14.3 Evidence Package  
Hosted Fusion CSCI 
 
Hosted Intelligence CSCI  
Request Intelligence 15.1 Object of Interest 
15.2 Area of Interest 
15.3 Type of Information 
15.4 Timeframe of Interest 
15.5 Needed Date and Time 
15.6 Security and Confidentiality Certification 
Hosted Fusion CSCI 
 
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Track Information 16.1 Track Number 
16.2 Track Type 
16.3 Track Status 
16.4 Track Identification 
16.5 Track Location 
16.6 Track Trend 
16.7 Track Associations  
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Component Interface Information Item Information Item Payload 
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Weather Information 17.1 Region 
17.2 Wave Height 
17.3 Wave Period 
17.4 Wave Direction 
17.5 Sea State 
17.6 Wind Speed Sustained 
17.7 Wind Speed Gusts 
17.8 Wind Direction 
17.9 Visibility 
17.10 Cloud Cover 
17.11 Precipitation 
17.12 Humidity 
17.13 Sun Rise and Set 
17.14 Moon Rise and Set 
17.15 Tidal Conditions 
17.16 Effective Period of Forecast 









19.2 Planned Communication Channels 
19.3 Participant List 
19.4 RF Spectrum Management 
19.5 Message Type and Size 
19.6 Encryption List 
19.7 Communication Management Downlink 









20.5 Network Routes 
20.6 Routing Protocol 





Awareness CSCI  
Managed Asset Information 21.1 Asset ID 
21.2 Asset Sensors 
21.3 Asset Weapons 
21.4 Asset Status 
21.5 Asset Type and Characteristics 
21.6 Asset Communications  
Hosted Fusion CSCI 
 
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Fused Information  
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Hosted Mission Analysis 
CSCI  
 




Release CSCI  
Mission Analysis 23.1 Action Assessments 
23.2 Action Issues 
23.3 Mission Lessons Learned 
23.4 Plan Issues 
23.5 Reconstructed Action 
23.6 Synthesized Events and Results 
23.7 Asset Status Change  
Hosted Mission Planning 
CSCI  
Mission Planning 24.1 Asset Capability 
24.2 Conflicted Objectives 
24.3 Criminal Capability 
24.4 Disaster or Environment Response Plan 
24.4.1 Disaster or Environment Response 
Update 
24.4.2 Disaster or Environment Response 
Initial Plan 
24.5 Humanitarian Aid Response Plan 
24.6 Plan 
24.7 Reconciled International Objectives 
24.8 Request Criminal Response 
24.9 Response Timeline 
24.10 Transnational Threat Response 
Approaches 
24.11 Transnational Threat Response Plan 












Mission Operations 25.1 Asset Final Action Report 
25.2 Asset Task Order 
25.3 Asset Task Status 
25.4 Coordinated Mission Tasks 
25.5 Modified Tasks  
Hosted Intelligence CSCI 
 
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Intelligence and Situation 
Awareness 
26.1 Classified Object 
26.2 Fused Intelligence Information 
26.3 Fused Object Information 
26.4 Object Report 
26.5 Object Track File 
26.6 Validated Object  
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Component Interface Information Item Information Item Payload 
Hosted Mission Planning 
CSCI  
Logistics Request 27.1 Fuel Oil and Lubricants 
27.2 Food and Provisions 
27.3 Repair Parts 
27.4 Medical Supplies 
27.5 Port Visit Services 
27.6 Personnel (linguists, cultural experts, 
specialists, etc.) 
27.7 Munitions 
27.8 Transfer and Ambulatory Service  
Table 17. Information Items Carried on Component Interfaces. 
TSN component interfaces carry information items and their payload. 
 b. Architecture Assessment 
The ISM and DSM analysis indicates reasonable allocation of functions to 
components. Using the ISM technique the cluster factor is 1.5 where 1.0 is the ideal 
value. Based on a different methodology the DSM analysis offers further insight 
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Figure 48. System Architecture Method Analysis Summary. 
DSM with a score of 80 percent substantiates the ISM with a score of 1.5. 
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DSM analysis substantiates the trend indicated by the ISM analysis. 
Shown in Figure 48, the summary level analysis view shows the components and their 
dependencies that are based on the clustering of system functions. Several observations 
are presented. First, there is more forward directionality as indicated by more numbers in 
the lower left of the matrix as compared to the upper right of the matrix which improves 
overall system responsiveness. Second, the largest values tend to be closer to the diagonal 
than at the lower left and upper right corners which lowers functional coupling effects. 
Third, higher feedback values are close to the diagonal, disregarding external constraints, 
which reduces feedback related system latency. The effect of component clustering and 
directional dependencies yields a score of 80 percent where 100 percent is the ideal. 
3. Information Exchange Standard 
Located in Appendix XI the Information Exchange Standard is provided for the 
TSN C4I system. The style of the standard mimics resolutions ratified by the Maritime 
Security Council (MSC), a division of the IMB. Section 1 outlines the fundamental 
characteristics of the TSN C4I network and the scope of the standard. Section 1.2 defines 
the TSN C4I network, in a general sense, while Sections 1.3 and 1.4 scope the network. 
These three sections directly relate to the Chapter I discussion of the system’s scope. 
Section 2 defines the types of information to be transmitted by all non-military, 
participating vessels within the TSN mission area. The four information categories listed 
are parallel to the categories defined in the AIS Performance Standard (MSC.74 (69) 
Annex 3, Section 6). Setting it apart from the AIS standard is the inclusion of LRIT 
information, identification of the ship’s flag nation, the last transmission time to the TSN 
C4I network, and defining the safety related information transmitted. 
Section 3 elaborates on the types of external inputs with which the TSN C4I 
network must interface. Section 4 defines the information refresh rates in a nation’s 
territorial waters and international waters. 
Section 5 defines the unique TSN information elements. The fifteen information 
elements are listed below in Table 18. 
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Element Nomenclature Element Nomenclature 
TSN-001 Static Vessel Element TSN-009 International Objectives Element 
TSN-002 Dynamic Vessel Element TSN-010 Common Operating Picture Element 
TSN-003 Event and Request Element TSN-011 Communications Link Element 
TSN-004 Planning Element TSN-012 Network Management Element 
TSN-005 Asset Reporting Element TSN-013 Tracking Element 
TSN-006 Open-Source Element TSN-014 Personal Identification Element 
TSN-007 Object Information Element TSN-015 Logistics Request Element 
TSN-008 Intelligence Report Element      
Table 18. TSN C4I Network Information Elements. 
TSN C4I information exchange standard comprises fifteen information elements. 
These information elements are derived from the CORE® model and provide 
linkage between the documents. Listed with each information element are the unique 
information segments that are required. These segments elaborate on the information 
types listed in Section 2 of the standard. Included with each information element are 
minimum durations to maintain tactical relevancy and informational truth within a 
constantly evolving mission area. 
Lastly, Section 6 defines both the CSCI and the Hardware Configuration Items 
(HWCIs); shown in Table 19 and Table 20 respectively. The nine CSCIs and two HWCIs 
are items that can be sent out for bid to industry. 
CSCI Nomenclature 
SW-001 Distributed Communications and Networking Management CSCI 
SW-002 Distributed Situational Awareness Development CSCI 
SW-003 Information Fusion CSCI 
SW-004 Distributed Intelligence Product Acquisition CSCI 
SW-005 Distributed Mission Analysis CSCI 
SW-006 Distributed Mission Operations CSCI 
SW-007 Distributed Mission Planning CSCI 
SW-008 Asset Management CSCI 
SW-009 Distributed After Action Report Generation CSCI 
 
Table 19. TSN C4I Network CSCI List. 
TSN C4I is composed of nine CSCIs. 
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HWCI Nomenclature 
HW-001 External Communications HWCI 
HW-002 Networking HWCI 
 
Table 20. TSN C4I Network CSCI List. 
TSN C4I is composed of two HWCIs. 
4. Critical Technical Parameters 
The TSN C4I Critical Technical Parameters (CTPs), shown in Table 21, are 
measureable critical system characteristics that when achieved allow TSN to achieve its 
operational capabilities. Response time and accuracy are consistent with legacy systems, 
for example, AIS and LRIT. Arguably the most important parameter, language 
translation, enables understanding among the languages likely to be encountered by the 
multi-national TSN force. Reliability and continuity of operations CTPs concentrate on 
mission reliability. 
Categories Parameters Values 
Message Response Situation Awareness Update 30 minutes 
 Data Exchange Latency 5 minutes 
Positional Accuracy Spatial Mean Error 3 meters 
Language Translation Latency < 10 seconds 
 Accuracy < one error per 100 words 
 
 Language Types English, French, Spanish, 
Japanese, Chinese, German 
Reliability MTBF >500 hours 
 MTTR < 1 hour 
Continuity of Operations Recovery Time Objective < 8 hours 
 
 Recovery Point Objective < 8 hours 
Table 21. TSN C4I Critical Technical Parameters. 
The TSN CTP identify critical performance measures to achieve operational capability. 
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C. MISSION APPLICATIONS SYSTEM AND SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING COST ESTIMATE 
1. Mission Applications Systems Engineering Cost Estimate 
A cost estimate for the TSN C4I system is only performed on the favored 
committee model approach which is a distributed system architecture involving hosted 
critical software mission applications. Estimating TSN’s systems engineering 
developmental costs begins by applying Equation (11) and defining the size drivers. First, 
the scale factor, E, from Equation (11) is set to 1.06. Then, from the derived TSN 
requirements in Chapter IV: Section A7, there are seven nominal and seven complex 
operational requirements. The operational requirements are used in place of the system 
requirements due to the early design nature of TSN. From the CORE model, there are 
four easy, thirty-six nominal, and fourteen complex interfaces. From the information 
standard, there are a total of fifteen TSN unique data elements. This correlates to seven 
nominal and eight complex algorithms. From the Operational Test and Evaluation Plan, 
there are six nominal operational scenarios. These values are entered into the NPS web-
based COSYSMO/COCOMO II application, Figure 49. 
 
Figure 49. TSN C4I COSYSMO Size Drivers. 
TSN COSYSMO size drivers are extracted from Operational Test and Evaluation Plan, 
Information Exchange Standard, and functional models. 
Next, the COSYSMO cost drivers are defined using Dr. Valerdi’s book for 
guidance (Valerdi 2009). Illustrated in Figure 50, the team cost drivers, Team Cohesion 
(TEAM), Personnel Capability (PCAP), Personnel Experience (PEXP), and Process 
Capability (PCAP), are assumed to be nominal; as a baseline for estimation. The Tool 
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Support (TOOL) cost driver assumes that basic systems engineering tools are integrated 
throughout the systems engineering process; and is scored as nominal. Given that most 
systems engineering groups operate with wideband electronic communications, widely 
used and accepted collaborative tools, and are often collocated, the Multisite coordination 
(SITE) cost driver is scored as very high. 
 
Figure 50. TSN C4I COSYSMO Team Cost Drivers. 
TSN team cost drivers assume average personnel are assigned to the systems 
engineering developmental task; with average tools and facilities 
The COSYSMO application cost drivers, shown in Figure 51, are defined in the 
following manner. Each stakeholder is assumed to have a reasonable understanding of 
both the requirements (RQMT) and architecture (ARCH); resulting in a nominal score for 
the RQMT and ARCH cost drivers. Knowing that failure of TSN can result in a high 
financial loss for these stakeholders, the Level of Service Requirement (LSCV) cost 
driver is scored as high. Given the scale of TSN, there must be a high amount of 
standards-driven Documentation (DOCU); resulting in a high score for the DOCU cost 
driver. Illustrated by the fielded data exchange systems listed in Chapter II, the 
Technological Risk (TRSK) cost driver is scored as nominal. Additionally, given the 
concept of operations, complex interdependencies must be coordinated; resulting in a 




Figure 51. TSN C4I COSYSMO Application Cost Drivers. 
TSN application cost drivers assume reasonable stakeholder understanding and well 
documented processes for future work. 
The number and diversity of Installations/Platforms (INST) cost driver is an 
averaged value of three sub-factors: installations, operating environment, and platforms. 
From the concept of operations, there are 2 to 3 installation configurations and a need for 
TSN to be heterogeneous but compatible. From the Operational Requirements, Chapter 
IV: Section A7, there are ruggedized platform and information security requirements.  
Furthermore, like most large programs, TSN is developed using a mix of industry 
standard and proprietary protocols. These sub-factors correlate to an average score of 
very high for the INST cost driver. Lastly, the Migration Complexity (MIGR) cost driver 
is rated as very high due to the extensive list of legacy contractors that offer information 
inputs to TSN. 
Entering these values into the NPS web-based application yields an effort 
estimation of 448 person-months. Assuming a rate of $60/hour for all staff and a 152 
hour work-month, the developmental cost for TSN’s systems engineering tasks is 
$4.09M; shown in Table 22 and Figure 52. 
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Table 22 TSN C4I Systems Engineering Developmental Costs. 
TSN systems engineering developmental costs are divided into four pre-defined phases; 
derived from ISO/IEC 15288: Systems Engineering – System Life Cycle Processes. 
(Valerdi R., 2006). 
 
Figure 52. TSN C4I Systems Engineering Costs per Phase. 
TSN systems engineering developmental costs total $4.09M. 
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2. Mission Applications Software Cost Estimate 
TSN’s software development cost estimation begins with by defining the 
functional points of the system. From the CORE® model, discussed in Chapter IV, the 
number of external inputs, external outputs, logical internal files, external interface files, 
and external queries is determined. The result of this analysis is entered into the Costar™ 
7.0 application; and shown in Figure 53. These function points relate to a 67,000 SLOC; 
regardless of computing language. 
 
Figure 53. TSN C4I COCOMO II functional point summary. 
TSN functional points are derived from the System Functional Hierarchy diagram and 
CORE model. 
The COCOMO II scale exponent, Equation (7) is defined in the following manner 
for TSN. A nominal score is applied to the five scale factors listed in Figure 54; due to 
the nominal degree to which past experience applies the nominal need to conform to 
requirements, the nominal design thoroughness, the nominal synchronization of 
stakeholders, and the nominal process maturity. 
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Figure 54. TSN C4I COCOMO II Scale Factors. 
TSN scale factors assume average personnel and processes are used for the software 
developmental task. 
The seven early design effort multipliers in COCOMO II are averages of specific 
groups of the post-architecture effort multipliers (Boehm et al. 2000). The values in Table 
23 are assigned to their respective post-architecture effort multipliers score then 
averaged; to find the early design value. 
Score Value 




Very High 5 
Extremely High 6  
Table 23. Early Design Values for Post-Architecture Cost Factors (Boehm et al. 
2000). 
TSN early design cost factors are averaged values of specific groups of post-
architecture cost factors. 
Shown in Table 24, the required Reusability (RUSE) and development Schedule 
(SCED) effort multipliers are direct corollaries to their post-architecture effort 
multipliers. TSN assumes a nominal schedule constraint and reusability across the 










Reliability (RELY) Very High 5 
Database size (DATA) High 4 




(RCPX) Documentation (DOCU) Nominal 3 




Reusability (RUSE) Very High 5 5 Very High 
Time constraint (TIME) Nominal 3 
Storage constraint (STOR) Nominal 3 Platform Difficulty (PDIF) 
Platform volatility (PVOL) Nominal 3 
3 Nominal
Analyst capability (ACAP) Nominal 3 
Programmer capability (PCAP) Nominal 3 
Personnel 
Capability 
(PERS) Personnel continuity (PCON) Nominal 3 
3 Nominal
Analyst experience (AEXP) Nominal 3 
Programmer experience (PEXP) Nominal 3 
Personnel 
Experience 
(PREX) Language experience (LTEX) Nominal 3 
3 Nominal
Software tool usage (TOOL) Nominal 3 
Facilities (FCIL) 
Multisite development (SITE) Very High 5 
4 High 
Development 
Schedule (SCED) Development schedule (SCED) Nominal 3 3 Nominal  
Table 24. TSN C4I Early Design Cost Factors (Boehm et al. 2000). 
The early design effort multipliers for TSN are averaged values of specific post-
architecture effort multipliers. 
The product Reliability and Complexity (RCPX) score is a combination of the 
four effort multiplier scores grouped in Table 24. Failure of TSN results in a high 
financial loss to the stakeholders, thus a very high score is set for the software Reliability 
(RELY) effort multiplier. Given the large amount of data handled by TSN and the 
complexity of interactions, the Database Size effort multiplier (DATA) is assumed to be 
high and the Complexity effort multiplier (CPLX) is set at very high. The lifecycle 
documentation effort multiplier (DOCU) is set at nominal, denoting the right size for 
lifecycle needs. 
The Platform Difficulty (PDIF) effort multiplier is assigned a nominal value 
based on the following assumptions. Less than 50 percent of the available execution time 
and available main storage of TSN is used. Furthermore, major updates to the system are 
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assumed to occur only every six months; minor updates are assumed to be released bi-
weekly. 
The Personnel Capability (PERS) effort multiplier assumes that the analysts and 
programmers assigned to the development of TSN are within the 55th percentile of 
capability; ACAP and PCAP respectively. Another assumption is that the annual turnover 
rate for employees in these developmental organizations is 12 percent per year. These 
nominal scores for ACAP, PCAP, and PCON result in a score of nominal for PERS. 
The Personnel Experience effort multiplier (PREX) is closely related to the PERS 
effort multiplier. It assumes that the analysts and programmers average one year of 
application, platform, and language/tool experience; AEXP, PEXP, and LTEX 
respectively. These values result in a nominal score for PREX.  
The Facilities effort multiplier (FCIL) is a combination of the assumed Tool 
Support (TOOL) and Multisite coordination (SITE). Given that most engineering 
organizations are collocated when assigned to a task, and wideband communications are 
essentially an industry standard, the SITE effort multiplier is set at very high. Basic 
software tools are assumed to be moderately integrated throughout the lifecycle; denoted 
by the nominal score for TOOL. 
These values are entered into the Costar™ application and result in a confidence 
level of 612.5 person-months and a schedule of 33.4 months; at 80 percent. Applying the 
same cost per month as the systems engineering task yields a software development 
lifecycle cost of $5.59M, Figure 55. 
An estimated total for developing the critical mission applications to support the 
TSN C4I system implementing a committee organization is the combination of both 
systems engineering costs and software engineering costs. With a confidence level of 50 
percent for systems engineering estimate and 80 percent for software engineering 
estimate the total estimate cost is $9.68 million assuming a $60.00 labor rate. 
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Figure 55. TSN C4I Software Development Cost Estimate. 
TSN C4I software development costs total $5.59M across the Waterfall model. 
In summary the TSN C4I intends to provide C2 capability for all TSN missions 
by applying a committee organizational construct to its stakeholders. Supported by the 
AoA, the committee approach is favored over the traditional team or group approaches 
primarily due to political feasibility. The AoA is a weighted normalized matrix that 
transforms team assessments and data from nine sub-alternatives. In Arena, each model is 
stimulated by random events having an average occurrence of 60 hours for transnational 
threat enforcement, 98 hours for humanitarian aid, and 101 hours for disaster 
relief/protect environment response. Results from these models include resource usage 
and mission duration times which are used by the AoA. 
Employing the committee organizational approach, three C4I tiers are used to 
involve stakeholders using backbone, edge and broadcast capabilities. Backbone 
capabilities include nations’ navies, constabulary and intelligence units with the highest 
access to TSN information and operations. Edge capabilities include commercial units 
and humanitarian organizations with access to TSN information and limited operations. 
Broadcast capabilities include all other stakeholders, e.g., private stakeholders, with the 
lowest level of access restricted to TSN situation awareness information. 
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TSN C4I is organized into three critical operational functions: Provide 
Intelligence, Perform Command and Control, and Operate Unit. Traditional operational 
capability patterns are used for the first two functions. The operational capability pattern 
for Provide Intelligence is task, process, post, and use. The operational capability pattern 
for Perform Command and Control is sense, assess, generate, select, plan, and direct. 
From functional analysis sub-functions are derived and allocated to the following 
operational nodes: C2, Intelligence, and Unit. The latter node is further instantiated to 
navy, constabulary, humanitarian, commercial, and private. Between these nodes, 
needlines and operational information describe the dependencies between these nodes. 
From the arrangement of operational nodes an operational architecture is 
developed and assessed with mission success and structural analysis. The following 
operational scenarios have a mission success likelihood of: 75 percent for disaster 
relief/protect environment, 64 percent for humanitarian aid, and 63 percent for 
transnational threat. The difference of functional arrangements associated with each 
operational scenario drive separate results. Structural assessment of the operational 
architecture results in the following acceptable scores: a cluster factor of 1.8, where 1.0 is 
ideal, and a system stability of 72 percent, where 100 percent is ideal. Additionally, an 
operational test and evaluation plan is provided for the TSN C4I system as a validation 
approach, when the TSN C4I system undergoes operational testing. 
A software system architecture is derived from the operational architecture that is 
portable across heterogeneous environments. Derived system functions are mapped to 
operational functions using a Department of Defense Architecture Framework version 1.5 
(DoDAF) System View Five (SV-5). System sub-functions are derived and allocated to 
the following system architecture components: Asset Management Computer Software 
Configuration Item (CSCI), Situation Awareness CSCI, Fusion CSCI, Intelligence CSCI, 
Mission Planning CSCI, Mission Operations CSCI, Mission Analysis CSCI, Information 
Release CSCI, and Communications, and Network Management Service. Structural 
assessment of the system architecture also results in acceptable scores: a cluster factor of 
1.5, where 1.0 is ideal, and a system stability of 80 percent, where 100 percent is ideal. 
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Determined from the operational architecture, needlines and operational 
information, system data items, and their interfaces are developed. On this foundation an 
information exchange standard is provided for the TSN C4I system. This exchange 
standard represents essential information elements which pass among TSN stakeholders. 
As the final achievement of this study, the TSN C4I architectures are evaluated 
for a candidate solution development cost. An estimated total for developing the CSCIs 
hosted by the TSN C4I system, implementing a committee organization, is the 
combination of both systems and software engineering costs. With a confidence level of 
50 percent for the systems engineering estimate, and 80 percent for the software 























The Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) enterprise objective is to pursue an 
international consensus to cooperatively provision a naval presence to stabilize global 
maritime operations, a concept referred to as the Thousand Ship Navy (TSN). A segment 
of TSN is Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C4I), which provides 
the ability to conduct the following missions: transnational threat enforcement, 
humanitarian aid, and disaster relief/protect environment response. These missions are 
highly complex and cannot be solved by any single nation. At the USN and USCG flag 
level a vision has formed for Naval and Coast Guard maritime forces to combine 
resources. This vision endeavors to protect the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) 
from threats affecting international communities consistent with the restrictions of law. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem addressed in this study is a lack of a C4I system enabling an 
international coordinated response to transnational threats, events compelling 
humanitarian assistance, and environment governance. Development of such a capability 
is confounded by the nature of internationalism. Among these obstacles are: diverse 
information standards, disparate communication systems, various navigation systems, 
dissimilar operating procedures, and an absent organizational framework. In this 
international setting, TSN must balance confidentiality, privacy and information 
exchange to support nations, businesses, and security forces’ to promote participation in a 
voluntary TSN. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Chapter II discussed the historical origins of the TSN concept and its evolution 
over millennia. The effect of improved technology has limited battlespace volume where 
fewer ships are required to dominate any ocean. Subsequently, the capability of a TSN in 
the modern era can be achieved with a fewer number of ships. The TSN shifts the 
historical military coalition to an inclusive participatory and voluntary maritime alliance 
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with a global economy focus. Current non-military systems have solved aspects of 
maritime community security needs; however, a system is not in place to provide an 
integrated C4I architecture to coordinate transnational threat enforcement, humanitarian 
aid, and disaster relief/protect environment responses. Complexities of enforcement 
actions on high seas, economic zones and territorial waters impact TSN C4I approaches. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Chapter III highlighted systems engineering methods employed by the study with 
the objective of developing a TSN C4I operational architecture, system architecture, 
information exchange standard, and corroborating analysis. Figure 56 illustrates the 
follow down of the process, methods, and tools used to reach the conclusions of this 
report. The dendritic descriptive method allowed the team to articulate operational 
functions and supporting functions. This enabled functional decomposition and analysis 
to be conducted within operational and system domains. The use of Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) was supported by Arena’s Discrete Event Simulation (DES) 
environment that resulted in mission durations and resource usages which served as 
evaluation factors for the AoA. The analysis considered team, group, and committee 
organizational models for TSN. 
Functional analysis methods transformed operational functions into system 
functions that enabled the determination of structure, process flow, inputs and outputs of 
the system domain. Allocation results were used by Interpretive Structure Matrix (ISM) 
and Design Structure Matrix (DSM) methods providing an assessment of dependencies 
and functional clustering. An additional architecture assessment of mission scenarios was 
described using the mission success method based upon Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP). Established from the architecture, a cost 
estimation method described the estimated software and systems engineering 
developmental costs. 
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Figure 56. Flow Down of Processes, Methods and Tools Used to Reach 
Conclusion. 
A combination of processes, methods, and tools are used in this study. 
D. STUDY RESULTS 
Chapter IV declared the committee organizational model as the preferred 
alternative for TSN. Suggested by the AoA, the committee approach, shown in Figure 57, 
was favored over the traditional team or group approaches primarily due to political 
feasibility. The AoA was a weighted normalized matrix that transformed team 
assessments and data from nine sub-alternatives. Random events stimulated each model 
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having an average occurrence of 60 hours for transnational threat enforcement, 98 hours 
for humanitarian aid, and 101 hours for disaster relief/protect environment response. 
Results from these models included resource usage and mission duration times which 
were used by the AoA. 
 
 
Figure 57. Committee Organizational Model. 
The committee model scored the highest average value in the AoA assuming equal 
weighting of the three TSN missions. 
Employing the committee organizational model, three C4I tiers were used to 
involve stakeholders using backbone, edge and broadcast capabilities. Backbone 
capabilities include nations’ navies, constabulary and intelligence units with the highest 
access to TSN information and operations. Edge capability includes commercial and 
humanitarian organizations with access to TSN information and limited operations. 
Broadcast capabilities include all other stakeholders, e.g., private stakeholders, with the 
lowest level access to TSN situation awareness information. 
TSN C4I was organized into three critical operational functions: Provide 
Intelligence, Perform Command and Control, and Operate Unit. Traditional operational 
capability patterns were used for the first two functions. The operational capability 
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pattern for Provide Intelligence was Task, Process Post and Use. The operational 
capability pattern for Perform Command and Control was Sense, Assess, Generate, 
Select, Plan, and Direct. From functional analysis, sub-functions were derived and 
allocated to the following operational nodes: C2, Intelligence, and Unit. The latter node 
was further instantiated to navy, constabulary, humanitarian, commercial and private. 
Between these nodes, needlines and operational information described the dependencies 
between the nodes. 
From the arrangement of operational nodes an operational architecture was 
developed and assessed with the use of mission success and a structural assessment. 
Mission success of operational scenarios scored disaster relief/protect environment with a 
75 percent likelihood of success, humanitarian aid with a 64 percent likelihood of 
success, and transnational threat enforcement with a 63 percent likelihood of success. The 
difference of functions and their arrangement determined separate results. Structural 
assessment of the operational architecture results yielded acceptable scores: a cluster 
factor of 1.8, where 1.0 is ideal, and a system stability of 72 percent, where 100 percent is 
ideal. An additional assessment, the operational test and evaluation plan, developed for 
the TSN C4I system was provided as a validation approach that can be applied when 
TSN C4I undergoes operational testing. 
An example system architecture was derived from the operational architecture for 
the purpose of developing a software solution that was portable across heterogeneous 
environments. System functions were derived and mapped to operational functions with a 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) System View Five (SV-5). 
System sub-functions were derived and allocated to the following system architecture 
components: Asset Management Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI), 
Situation Awareness CSCI, Fusion CSCI, Intelligence CSCI, Mission Planning CSCI, 
Mission Operations CSCI, Mission Analysis CSCI, Information Release CSCI, and 
Communications and Network Management Service. Structural assessment of the system 
architecture results yielded acceptable scores: a cluster factor of 1.5, where 1.0 is ideal, 
and a system stability of 80 percent, where 100 percent is ideal. 
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Derived from the operational architecture needlines and operational information, 
system data items and their interfaces were developed. On this foundation, an information 
exchange standard was developed for the TSN C4I system. The standard represents 
essential information elements which pass among TSN stakeholders. 
As the final achievement of the study, the TSN C4I architectures evaluated 
developmental cost. An estimated total for developing the CSCIs to support the TSN C4I 
system implementing a committee organization was the combination of both systems 
engineering costs and software engineering costs. With a confidence level of 50 percent 
for the systems engineering estimate and 80 percent for the software engineering 
estimate, the total estimate cost was determined to be $9.68 million assuming a $60.00 
labor rate. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study by no means is the end of establish a TSN solution that can be funded 
and implemented. Rather, this study, the design-of-the-design, explores the operational 
and system domain characteristics of TSN finishing with investigating developmental 
costs and an information exchange standard. The intent of this study, a product of the 
systems engineering process, serves as the useful basis for follow on engineering efforts. 
These efforts include, but are not limited to: establishing a full set of stakeholder 
capabilities and resource entities, sub-system level hardware and software block 
diagrams, information exchange standard element details, data structure, performance 
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VII. PIRACY ANALYSIS 
H M S H M S
2009/001 1-Jan 3:37 13 5 0 N 47 3 0 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 2 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/003 1-Jan 7:47 13 55 0 N 47 58 0 E CARGO G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 HIJACKED YES NO
2009/002 1-Jan 12:30 13 53 0 N 49 29 0 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/012 1-Jan 7:30 14 21 0 N 50 34 0 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 ATTEMPT NO YES
2009/013 1-Jan 14:05 14 47 0 N 51 47 0 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 2 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/005 2-Jan 4:27 13 51 0 N 47 32 5 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 3 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/020 2-Jan 11:20 - - - N - - - E CARGO G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/004 2-Jan 8:07 13 42 0 N 50 39 0 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 3 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/009 3-Jan 5:00 12 55 0 N 45 50 0 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 4 HIJACKED YES NO
2009/016 4-Jan 3:35 13 24 0 N 48 55 0 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/007 4-Jan 5:40 13 3 0 N 48 42 5 E CARGO G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/024 8-Jan 0:30 1 44 58 S 41 29 7 E FISHING INDIAN O KENYA 1 BOARDED YES NO
2009/014 13-Jan 8:10 12 24 5 N 44 57 7 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/022 14-Jan 12:45 13 2 18 N 46 41 6 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 2 ATTEMPT NO YES
2009/032 29-Jan 6:20 12 27 7 N 44 50 5 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 6 ATTEMPT NO YES
2009/030 29-Jan 3:40 14 50 0 N 49 58 0 E LPG G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 HIJACKED YES NO
2009/011 1-Feb 4:40 13 53 0 N 47 32 0 E CARGO G OF ADEN YEMEN 2 ATTEMPT NO YES
2009/036 11-Feb 6:30 10 39 0 N 55 54 0 E BULK INDIAN O SOMALIA 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/038 11-Feb 11:30 12 59 0 N 48 56 0 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 ATTEMPT NO YES
2009/040 12-Feb 14:30 13 9 0 N 49 9 0 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/046 12-Feb 0:01 12 44 0 N 47 46 2 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/049 19-Feb 16:30 4 33 0 N 52 55 0 E FISHING INDIAN O SOMALIA 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/50 21-Feb 19:00 14 31 1 N 53 43 1 E CARGO G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 ATTEMPT NO NO
2009/051 22-Feb 4:00 12 33 98 N 47 1 32 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 HIJACKED YES NO
2009/057 25-Feb 10:30 13 8 4 N 49 9 5 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/053 26-Feb 6:00 12 11 0 N 43 31 0 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 3 ATTEMPT NO NO
2009/058 2-Mar 6:49 12 9 0 N 45 33 0 E TANKER G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/059 3-Mar 6:12 13 2 0 N 48 43 0 E CARGO G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/061 4-Mar 7:35 12 17 9 N 44 9 9 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 5 ATTEMPT NO NO
2009/062 5-Mar 3:45 7 56 0 N 65 28 0 E CARGO INDIAN O SOMALIA 1 ATTEMPT NO NO
2009/064 9-Mar 18:00 8 2 0 N 58 45 0 E BULK INDIAN O SOMALIA 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/065 10-Mar 5:00 8 6 0 N 59 11 0 E BULK INDIAN O SOMALIA 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/069 12-Mar 22:20 4 2 0 S 46 33 0 E CARGO INDIAN O SOMALIA 2 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/068 11-Mar 5:20 13 16 5 N 49 44 3 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 1 ATTEMPT NO YES
2009/070 13-Mar 7:13 7 11 0 N 58 50 0 E FISHING INDIAN O SOMALIA 1 FIRED UPON NO NO
2009/071 14-Mar 6:45 13 43 26 N 49 19 35 E BULK G OF ADEN YEMEN 2 FIRED UPON NO YES
2009/078 20-Mar 10:02 7 51 8 S 45 4 5 E CARGO INDIAN O SOMALIA 1 ATTEMPT NO NO
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Table 25. Gulf of Aden Piracy Analysis January 2009 to March 2009 (International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial 
Crime Services, IMB Live Piracy Map). 

















VIII. APPENDIX OPERATIONAL DOMAIN SUPPORTING MATERIAL 
Response Functions Delay Type Minimum Value Maximum (Units) 
Sense Environment Triangular 10.39 21.89 30 Minutes 
Assess Intentions and Capabilit ies Triangular 1.18 2.89 4 Hours 
Generate COAs Triangular 5.62 23.24 30 Minutes 
Select Alternatives Triangular 0.79 1.25 1.5 Hours 
Plan Details Triangular 9.43 16.37 24 Hours 
Direct Response Triangular 1.11 2.61 3 Hours 
Intelligence (Gather) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 16.02 45.06 60 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 16.02 45.06 60 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 5.48 19.88 20 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.06 2.5 2.5 Minutes 
Situational Aw areness Functions      
Sense Environment Triangular 6.11 9.3 10 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 0.58 1 1 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 0.79 1 1 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 0.59 1.55 2 Minutes 
Intelligence (Posting) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 18.5 51.04 60 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 21.23 54.1 60 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 9.35 20 20 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.3 2.5 2.5 Minutes 
 
 
Table 26. Team Organization Process Times for Transnational Threat Enforcement, Humanitarian Aid, and Disaster 
Relief/Protect Environment. 
Team process times are adjusted based on stakeholders assignment to complete a process. 
  VIII-2
Response Functions Delay Type Minimum Mode Maximum (Units) 
Sense Environment Triangular 6.82 13.59 15 Minutes
Assess Intentions and Capabilit ies Triangular 1.05 2.51 3.07 Hours 
Generate COAs Triangular 5 15 30 Minutes
Select Alternatives Triangular 0.75 1 1.5 Hours 
Plan Details Triangular 8 12 24 Hours 
Direct Response Triangular 1.3 2.75 3 Hours 
Intelligence (Gather) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 16.02 45.06 60 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 16.02 45.06 60 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 5.48 19.88 20 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.3 2.5 2.5 Minutes
Situational Awareness Functions      
Sense Environment Triangular 3.17 4.44 4.5 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 0.65 1.7 2 Minutes
Intelligence (Posting) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 16.02 45.06 60 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 14.19 39.13 46 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 5.97 15.34 15.34 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.45 2.5 2.5 Minutes
  
Table 27. Committee Organization Process Times for Transnational Threat Enforcement. 
Committee process times are adjusted based on stakeholders assignment to complete a process. 
 
  VIII-3
Response Functions Delay Type Minimum Mode Maximum (Units) 
Sense Environment Triangular 12.4 26.54 30 Minutes 
Assess Intentions and Capabilit ies Triangular 1.74 3.77 4 Hours 
Generate COAs Triangular 7.13 26.26 30 Minutes 
Select Alternatives Triangular 0.81 1.35 1.5 Hours 
Plan Details Triangular 9.68 19.45 24 Hours 
Direct Response Triangular 1.3 2.75 3 Hours 
Intelligence (Gather) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 24.42 54.87 60 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 18.5 51.04 60 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 7.79 20 20 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.54 2.5 2.5 Minutes 
Situational Awareness Functions      
Sense Environment Triangular 7.03 9.85 10 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 0.77 1.85 2 Minutes 
Intelligence (Posting) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 26.08 56.75 60 Minutes 
Process Data Triangular 18.5 51.04 60 Minutes 
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 7.79 20 20 Minutes 
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.63 2.5 2.5 Minutes 
  
Table 28. Group Organization Process Times for Transnational Threat Enforcement. 





Response Functions Delay Type Minimum Mode Maximum (Units) 
Sense Environment Triangular 6.82 13.59 15 Minutes
Assess Intentions and Capabilit ies Triangular 1.05 2.51 3.07 Hours 
Generate COAs Triangular 5.62 23.24 30 Minutes
Select Alternatives Triangular 0.75 1 1.5 Hours 
Plan Details Triangular 8 12 24 Hours 
Direct Response Triangular 1.43 2.86 3 Hours 
Intelligence (Gather) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 16.02 45.06 60 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 14.19 39.13 46 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 5.97 15.34 15.34 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.45 2.5 2.5 Minutes
Situational Awareness Functions      
Sense Environment Triangular 3.17 4.44 4.5 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 0.65 1.7 2 Minutes
Intelligence (Posting) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 16.02 45.06 60 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 14.18 39.13 46 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 5.97 15.34 15.34 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.45 2.5 2.5 Minutes
  
Table 29. Committee Organization Process Times for Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief/Protect Environment 
Response. 
Committee process times are adjusted based on stakeholders assignment to complete a process. 
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Response Functions Delay Type Minimum Mode Maximum (Units) 
Sense Environment Triangular 12.4 26.54 30 Minutes
Assess Intentions and Capabilit ies Triangular 1.74 3.77 4 Hours 
Generate COAs Triangular 8.79 27.66 30 Minutes
Select Alternatives Triangular 0.86 1.42 1.5 Hours 
Plan Details Triangular 10.99 19.88 24 Hours 
Direct Response Triangular 1.43 2.86 3 Hours 
Intelligence (Gather) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 26.08 56.75 60 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 18.5 51.04 60 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 7.79 20 20 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.63 2.5 2.5 Minutes
Situational Aw areness Functions      
Sense Environment Triangular 7.03 9.85 10 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 0.52 1 1 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 0.77 1.85 2 Minutes
Intelligence (Posting) Functions      
Task Data Collections Triangular 26.08 56.75 60 Minutes
Process Data Triangular 18.5 51.04 60 Minutes
Post Intelligence Products Triangular 7.79 20 20 Minutes
Use Intelligence Products Triangular 1.63 2.5 2.5 Minutes
  
Table 30. Group Organization Process Times for Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief/Protect Environment Response. 
Group process times are adjusted based on stakeholders assignment to complete a process. 
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Needline Operational Information Element Information Source Information Destination 
Constabulary Unit Receive 
PNT 
Position and Timing 
Description:  Satellite navigation signals from 
one of four global satellite navigation systems. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Generate Position and 
Time 
External Nodes 
     NGO Receive Position and Timing 
External Nodes 
     Operate AIS 
External Nodes 
     Operate Environment Monitoring 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
External Nodes 
     Operate LRIT 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Data 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit Information 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Provide Unit Sensed Contacts 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Sense Environment 
Constabulary Unit 
Send/Receive C2 
Environmental Alert TSN Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Inform TSN Node 
C2.TSN 
     Detect Objects and Conditions 
C2.TSN 
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     Generate COAs 
 Sensor Reports 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Provide Unit Sensed 
Contacts 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Release Image 
C2.TSN 
     Collect Imagery 
C2.TSN 




Constabulary Tasking Plan 
Description:  Allows the CG center to task CG 
units and interrogate commercial and private 
vessels. 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Perform Unit 
Coordination 
Unit.Constabulary 




Constabulary Tasking Plan 
Description:  Allows the CG center to task CG 
units and interrogate commercial and private 
vessels. 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Perform Unit 
Coordination 
Unit.Constabulary 




Constabulary Tasking Plan 
Description:  Allows the CG center to task CG 
units and interrogate commercial and private 
vessels. 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Perform Unit 
Coordination 
Unit.Constabulary 




Description:  Incident report or contact report of 
a person of interest.  Message may also be a 
request for information. 
Accuracy:  Is the report of the intended person. 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit 
Information 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Incident Vessel 
Description:  Incident report or contact report of 
a vessel of interest.  Message may also be a 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Assess Intentions and 
Capabilities 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
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request for information. 
Accuracy:  Is the report of the intended person. 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit 
Information 
 Intelligence Msg 
Description:  Intelligence message of HUMNT, 
SIGINT, ELINT, SNOOPY or other means.  
Message may also be a request for information. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit 
Information 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Intelligence Summary 
Description:  Summary of general intelligence 
(Law Enforcement and Military sources) in the 
AOR. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
Analysis provided and relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Products 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit Information 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Sense Environment 
 Operational Picture 
Description:  TSN produced common operational 
geospatial Awareness from fused sources of 
information.  The information may be provided 
in different layers where each layer provides 
different information depending of level of 
service. Level of service is dependent of role: 
Authority, Commercial, Private. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Operatonal 
Picture 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit Information 
 Request Intelligence Summary 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit 
Information 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Release Intelligence Summary 
 Request Operational Picture 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Request Operational 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Release Operational Picture 
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relevant Picture 
 Unit Intelligence Tasking 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Task Data Collection 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit Information 
Constabulary Unit 
Send/Receive Reachback 
Environment Alert Land Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Inform Land Node 
External Nodes 
     Operate Communication 
External Nodes 
     Receive Environment Event 
Humanitarian Unit Receive 
PNT 
Position and Timing 
Description:  Satellite navigation signals from 
one of four global satellite navigation systems. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Generate Position and 
Time 
External Nodes 
     NGO Receive Position and Timing 
External Nodes 
     Operate AIS 
External Nodes 
     Operate Environment Monitoring 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
External Nodes 
     Operate LRIT 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Process Data 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Process Unit Information 
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Unit.Humanitarian 
     Provide Unit Sensed Contacts 
Unit.Humanitarian 




Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Provide Unit Sensed 
Contacts 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Release Image 
C2.TSN 
     Collect Imagery 
C2.TSN 




Description:  TSN produced common operational 
geospatial Awareness from fused sources of 
information.  The information may be provided 
in different layers where each layer provides 
different information depending of level of 
service. Level of service is dependent of role: 
Authority, Commercial, Private. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Operatonal 
Picture 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Process Unit Information 
 Request Operational Picture 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Request Operational 
Picture 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Release Operational Picture 
Intelligence Send/Receive 
Reachback 
Center AIS Summary 
Description:  Composite tracks and AIS 
information with vessel static voyage and 
dynamic information. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
External Nodes 
     Operate AIS 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Center LRIT Summary External Nodes External Nodes 
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Description:  Composite tracks and LRIT 
information vessel static voyage and dynamic 
information. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
     Operate LRIT      Operate Commercial Enterprise 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Environment Summary 
Description:  Summary of the environmental 
status, alerts and incidents. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
External Nodes 
     Operate Environment 
Monitoring 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Operational Picture 
Description:  TSN produced common operational 
geospatial Awareness from fused sources of 
information.  The information may be provided 
in different layers where each layer provides 
different information depending of level of 
service. Level of service is dependent of role: 
Authority, Commercial, Private. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Operatonal 
Picture 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
External Nodes 
     NGO Process Operational Picture 
External Nodes 
     Operate Commercial Enterprise 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate NGO 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
External Nodes 
     PRC Receive TSN Operational Picture 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Unit Information 
 PRC Summary 
Description:  Composite tracks and PRC 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
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information 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
 Search & Rescue Summary 
Description:  Summary of search and rescue 
events with status information. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Security Alert Summary 
Description:  Summary of maritime domain 
security events with status information. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
External Nodes 
     Operate Maritime 
Security 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
Maritime Commercial 
Receive PNT 
Position and Timing 
Description:  Satellite navigation signals from 
one of four global satellite navigation systems. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Generate Position and 
Time 
External Nodes 
     NGO Receive Position and Timing 
External Nodes 
     Operate AIS 
External Nodes 
     Operate Environment Monitoring 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
External Nodes 
     Operate LRIT 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
External Nodes 
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     Operate PRC 
Unit.Maritime Commercial 
     Process Data 
Unit.Maritime Commercial 
     Process Unit Information 
Unit.Maritime Commercial 
     Provide Unit Sensed Contacts 
Unit.Maritime Commercial 
     Sense Environment 
Maritime Commercial Send 
Receive Intelligence 
Operational Picture 
Description:  TSN produced common operational 
geospatial Awareness from fused sources of 
information.  The information may be provided 
in different layers where each layer provides 
different information depending of level of 
service. Level of service is dependent of role: 
Authority, Commercial, Private. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Operatonal 
Picture 
Unit.Commercial 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
Unit.Commercial 
     Process Unit Information 
 Request Operational Picture 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Commercial 
     Request Operational 
Picture 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Release Operational Picture 
Maritime Commercial 
Send/Receive C2 
Environmental Alert TSN Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit.Commercial 
     Inform TSN Node 
C2.TSN 
     Detect Objects and Conditions 
C2.TSN 
     Generate COAs 
 Sensor Reports 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Commercial 
     Provide Unit Sensed 
Contacts 
C2.TSN 
     Collect Imagery 
C2.TSN 
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Unit.Commercial 
     Release Image 
     Sense Environment 
Maritime Commercial 
Send/Receive Reachback 
Environment Alert Land Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit.Commercial 
     Inform Land Node 
External Nodes 
     Operate Communication 
External Nodes 
     Receive Environment Event 
 Planned Movement 
Description:  Coordination of a vessel intentions 
with the PRC. 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Unit.Maritime Commercial
     Provide Unit Mission 
Information 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
 PRC Tasking Plan 
Description:  Allows the PRC center to request 
assistance from military, constabulary, 
commercial and private vessels. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Unit.Commercial 
     Process COA 
 Search & Rescue Msg 
Description:  Search and rescue message sent 
from vessel. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Commercial 
     Provide Unit Mission 
Information 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
 Security Incident 
Description:  Security incident from a vessel. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
Unit.Commercial 
     Provide Unit Mission 
Information 
External Nodes 
     Operate Maritime Security 
Maritime Private Receive 
PNT 
Position and Timing 
Description:  Satellite navigation signals from 
one of four global satellite navigation systems. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Generate Position and 
Time 
External Nodes 
     NGO Receive Position and Timing 
External Nodes 
     Operate AIS 
External Nodes 
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     Operate Environment Monitoring 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
External Nodes 
     Operate LRIT 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Unit.Private 
     Process Data 
Unit.Private 
     Process Unit Information 
Unit.Private 
     Provide Unit Sensed Contacts 
Unit.Private 
     Sense Environment 
Maritime Private 
Send/Receive C2 
Environmental Alert TSN Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit.Private 
     Inform TSN Node 
C2.TSN 
     Detect Objects and Conditions 
C2.TSN 
     Generate COAs 
 Sensor Reports 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Private 
     Provide Unit Sensed 
Contacts 
Unit.Private 
     Release Image 
C2.TSN 
     Collect Imagery 
C2.TSN 
     Sense Environment 
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Description:  TSN produced common operational 
geospatial Awareness from fused sources of 
information.  The information may be provided 
in different layers where each layer provides 
different information depending of level of 
service. Level of service is dependent of role: 
Authority, Commercial, Private. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Operatonal 
Picture 
Unit.Private 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
Unit.Private 
     Process Unit Information 
 Request Operational Picture 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Private 
     Request Operational 
Picture 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Release Operational Picture 
Maritime Private 
Send/Receive Reachback 
Environment Alert Land Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit.Private 
     Inform Land Node 
External Nodes 
     Operate Communication 
External Nodes 
     Receive Environment Event 
 Search & Rescue Msg 
Description:  Search and rescue message sent 
from vessel. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit.Private 
     Provide Unit Mission 
Information 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
Military Unit Receive PNT Position and Timing 
Description:  Satellite navigation signals from 
one of four global satellite navigation systems. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Generate Position and 
Time 
External Nodes 
     NGO Receive Position and Timing 
External Nodes 
     Operate AIS 
External Nodes 
     Operate Environment Monitoring 
External Nodes 
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     Operate GMDSS 
External Nodes 
     Operate LRIT 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Unit.Navy 
     Process Data 
Unit.Navy 
     Process Unit Information 
Unit. Navy 
     Provide Unit Sensed Contacts 
Unit. Navy 
     Sense Environment 
Military Unit Send/Receive 
C2 
Environmental Alert TSN Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit. Navy 
     Inform TSN Node 
C2.TSN 
     Detect Objects and Conditions 
C2.TSN 
     Generate COAs 
 Sensor Reports 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit. Navy 
     Provide Unit Sensed 
Contacts 
Unit. Navy 
     Release Image 
C2.TSN 
     Collect Imagery 
C2.TSN 
     Sense Environment 
Military Unit Send/Receive 
Coordination Humanitarian 
Vessel Communications 
Description:  Means for vessels to coordinate 
Unit.Humanitarian 
     Coordinate Unit 
Unit.Humanitarian 
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rules of the sea and other matters. 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Operations      Perform Unit Action 




Description:  Means for vessels to coordinate 
rules of the sea and other matters. 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Unit.Commercial 
     Coordinate Unit 
Operations 
Unit.Commercial 
     Perform Unit Action 




Description:  Means for vessels to coordinate 
rules of the sea and other matters. 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Unit.Private 
     Coordinate Unit 
Operations 
Unit.Private 
     Perform Unit Action 
Military Unit Send/Receive 
Intelligence 
Incident Person 
Description:  Incident report or contact report of 
a person of interest.  Message may also be a 
request for information. 
Accuracy:  Is the report of the intended person. 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit 
Information 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Incident Vessel 
Description:  Incident report or contact report of 
a vessel of interest.  Message may also be a 
request for information. 
Accuracy:  Is the report of the intended person. 
Unit. Navy 
     Assess Intentions and 
Capabilities 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit 
Information 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Intelligence Msg 
Description:  Intelligence message of HUMNT, 
SIGINT, ELINT, SNOOPY or other means.  
Message may also be a request for information. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit 
Information 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
 Intelligence Summary 
Description:  Summary of general intelligence 
(Law Enforcement and Military sources) in the 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Unit. Navy 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
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AOR. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
Analysis provided and relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Products 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit Information 
Unit. Navy 
     Sense Environment 
 Operational Picture 
Description:  TSN produced common operational 
geospatial Awareness from fused sources of 
information.  The information may be provided 
in different layers where each layer provides 
different information depending of level of 
service. Level of service is dependent of role: 
Authority, Commercial, Private. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Operatonal 
Picture 
Unit. Navy 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit Information 
 Request Intelligence Summary 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit 
Information 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Release Intelligence Summary 
 Request Operational Picture 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
Unit. Navy 
     Request Operational 
Picture 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Release Operational Picture 
 Unit Intelligence Tasking 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Task Data Collection 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit Information 
Military Unit Send/Receive 
Reachback 
Environment Alert Land Node 
Description:  Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Accuracy:  Correct information 
Unit.Navy 
     Inform Land Node 
External Nodes 
     Operate Communication 
External Nodes 
     Receive Environment Event 
 Planned Movement 
Description:  Coordination of a vessel intentions 
with the PRC. 
Unit. Navy 
     Provide Unit Mission 
Information 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
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Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
 PRC Tasking Plan 
Description:  Allows the PRC center to request 
assistance from military, constabulary, 
commercial and private vessels. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
Unit. Navy 
     Process COA 
TSN C2 Send/Receive 
Coordination Constabulary 
Course of Action 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
C2.TSN 
     Direct Response 
Unit.Constabulary 
     Process Unit Information 
TSN C2 Send/Receive 
Coordination Military 
Course of Action 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
C2.TSN 
     Direct Response 
Unit. Navy 
     Process Unit Information 
TSN C2 Send/Receive 
Intelligence 
Intelligence Summary 
Description:  Summary of general intelligence 
(Law Enforcement and Military sources) in the 
AOR. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
Analysis provided and relevant 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Post Intelligence 
Products 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Download Products 
C2.TSN 
     Assess Intentions and Capabilities 
C2.TSN 
     Process Unit Information 
C2.TSN 
     Sense Environment 
 Request Intelligence 
Accuracy:  Correct Tactical Unit 
C2.TSN 
     Optimize Information 
Act Alternative 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Task Data Collection 
 Sensed Track Files 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
unambiguous 
C2.TSN 
     Provide Unit Sensed 
Contacts 
Intelligence.TSN 
     Process Data 
TSN C2 Send/Receive 
Reachback 
Environment Event 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality and 
relevant 
C2.TSN 
     Direct Response 
External Nodes 
     Operate Environment Monitoring 
 Evidence C2.TSN External Nodes 
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     Direct Response      Perform Law Enforcement 
 Humanitarian Request 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality, 
unambiguous, relevant 
External Nodes 
     Operate NGO 
External Nodes 
     NCO Release 
Humanitarian Request 
C2.TSN 
     Generate COAs 
C2.TSN 
     Sense Environment 
 Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Description:  Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Operational Information 
External Nodes 
     Perform External 
Activities 
C2.TSN 
     Provide TSN 
 Logistics Need C2.TSN 
     Plan Details 
External Nodes 
     Determine Desired State 
 Objective State 
Description:  International consensus of the 
desired maritime domain security concerns for an 
AOR. 
Accuracy:  Released via authority 
External Nodes 
     Determine Desired 
State 
C2.TSN 
     Identify Criteria 
 Policy and Directives 
Description:  International consensus of the 
policies and directives for a particular AOR. 
Accuracy:  Released via authority 
External Nodes 
     Determine Desired 
State 
C2.TSN 
     Identify Criteria 
 Rules of Engagement 
Description:  International consensus of the rules 
of engagement for a particular AOR. 
Accuracy:  Released via authority 
External Nodes 
     Determine Desired 
State 
C2.TSN 
     Identify Criteria 
 Situation C2.TSN 
     Direct Response 
External Nodes 
     Determine Desired State 
 Status and Update Report 
Accuracy:  Is the report of the intended person or 
C2.TSN C2.TSN 
  VIII-22
Needline Operational Information Element Information Source Information Destination 
vessel.      Operate Unit      Collect Contact Report 
TSN Receive PNT Position and Timing 
Description:  Satellite navigation signals from 
one of four global satellite navigation systems. 
Accuracy:  Commercial SATNAV quality 
External Nodes 
     Generate Position and 
Time 
External Nodes 
     NGO Receive Position and Timing 
External Nodes 
     Operate AIS 
External Nodes 
     Operate Environment Monitoring 
External Nodes 
     Operate GMDSS 
External Nodes 
     Operate LRIT 
External Nodes 
     Operate NCA 
External Nodes 
     Operate Port 
External Nodes 
     Operate PRC 
C2.TSN 
     Process Data 
C2.TSN 
     Process Unit Information 
C2.TSN 
     Provide Unit Sensed Contacts 
C2.TSN 
     Sense Environment 
Table 31. DODAF Operational View 3 Information Exchange. 
The OV-3 describes which node and operational function interact and with what content. 
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1  TSN Intelligence Products Intelligence Product Operational 
Information 
 Decomposed By: 
1.1  Unit Intelligence Tasking 
1.2  Intelligence Summary 
1.3  Operational Picture 
1.1  Unit Intelligence Tasking A force unit is tasked to collect 
intelligence on an object by use of 
sensors and VBSS techniques. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Correct Tactical Unit 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
1  TSN Intelligence Products 
1.2  Intelligence Summary Summary of general intelligence (Law 
Enforcement and Military sources) in 
the AOR. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 




1  TSN Intelligence Products 
1.3  Operational Picture TSN produced common operational 
geospatial Awareness from fused 
sources of information.  The 
information may be provided in 
different layers where each layer 
provides different information 
depending of level of service. Level of 
service is dependent of role: 
Authority, Commercial, Private. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: 30 min 
Decomposes: 
1  TSN Intelligence Products 
2  Intelligence Report and Request Intelligence Report and Request 
Operational Information 
 Decomposed By: 
2.1  Intelligence Msg 
2.2  Incident Person 
2.3  Request Intelligence Summary 
2.4  Sensed Track Files 
2.5  Request Intelligence 
2.6  Incident Vessel 
2.1  Intelligence Msg Intelligence message of HUMNT, 
SIGINT, ELINT, SNOOPY or other 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
Decomposes: 
2  Intelligence Report and Request 
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means.  Message may also be a 
request for information. 
quality 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
2.2  Incident Person Incident report or contact report of a 
person of interest.  Message may also 
be a request for information. 
Priority: medium 




2  Intelligence Report and Request 
2.3  Request Intelligence Summary A force unit use this information type 
to request the intelligence summaries. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
2  Intelligence Report and Request 
2.4  Sensed Track Files A force unit provides sensor track 
files to TSN. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and unambiguous 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
2  Intelligence Report and Request 
2.5  Request Intelligence TSN command and control requests  
intelligence from TSN intelligence. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Correct Tactical Unit 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
2  Intelligence Report and Request 
2.6  Incident Vessel Incident report or contact report of a 
vessel of interest.  Message may also 
be a request for information. 
Priority: medium 




2  Intelligence Report and Request 
3  Unit Reports Unit Report Operational Information  Decomposes: 
3  Unit Reports 
Decomposed By: 
3  Unit Reports 
3.1  Sensor Reports 
3.2  Environmental Alert TSN Node 
3.3  Security Incident 
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3.4  Search & Rescue Msg 
3.1  Sensor Reports A force unit provides sensor reports. Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: periodic 
Decomposes: 
3  Unit Reports 
3.2  Environmental Alert TSN Node Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Correct information 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
3  Unit Reports 
3.3  Security Incident Security incident from a vessel. Priority: high 




3  Unit Reports 
3.4  Search & Rescue Msg Search and rescue message sent from 
vessel. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
3  Unit Reports 
4  Tasking Tasking Operational Information  Decomposed By: 
4.1  Course of Action 
4.1  Course of Action The course of action and its tasking is 
provided to force units. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: periodic 
Decomposes: 
4  Tasking 
5  TSN and Unit Reachback Reachback Operational Information  Decomposed By: 
5.1  Planned Movement 
5.2  Environment Alert Land Node 
5.3  Environment Event 
5.4  Evidence 
5.5  Situation 
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Operational Information Description Attributes Hierarchical Reference 
5.6  Logistics Need 
5.7  Status and Update Report 
5.1  Planned Movement Coordination of a vessel intentions 
with the PRC. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Correct Tactical Unit 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
5  TSN and Unit Reachback 
5.2  Environment Alert Land Node Vessel report of the environmental 
status, alert or incident. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Correct information 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
5  TSN and Unit Reachback 
5.3  Environment Event Alerts the occurrence of an 
environmental event. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
5  TSN and Unit Reachback 
5.4  Evidence Evidence is provided on vessels and 
people as the result of an action for 
use by the prosecutorial elements. 
Priority: medium 




5  TSN and Unit Reachback 
5.5  Situation TSN provides situation reports and 
updates to international authorities. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
5  TSN and Unit Reachback 
5.6  Logistics Need TSN logistic needs are provided to 
international authorities as needed to 
conduct missions. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Quantity and Specification 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
5  TSN and Unit Reachback 
5.7  Status and Update Report A force unit provides its status with 
updates to the TSN. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Is the report of the intended 
person or vessel. 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
5  TSN and Unit Reachback 
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Operational Information Description Attributes Hierarchical Reference 
6  Navigation Data Navigation Operational Information  Decomposed By: 
6.1  Position and Timing 
6.1  Position and Timing Satellite navigation signals from one 
of four global satellite navigation 
systems. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality 
Timeliness: Commercial SATNAV 
quality 
Decomposes: 
6  Navigation Data 
7  Land-Centers Information Land-Centers Operational Information  Decomposed By: 
7.1  Center LRIT Summary 
7.2  Center AIS Summary 
7.3  PRC Summary 
7.4  Environment Summary 
7.5  Security Alert Summary 
7.6  Search & Rescue Summary 
7.1  Center LRIT Summary Composite tracks and LRIT 
information vessel static voyage and 
dynamic information. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality 
Timeliness: 60 min 
Decomposes: 
7  Land-Centers Information 
7.2  Center AIS Summary Composite tracks and AIS 
information with vessel static voyage 
and dynamic information. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: 20 min 
Decomposes: 
7  Land-Centers Information 
7.3  PRC Summary Composite tracks and PRC 
information 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: periodic 
Decomposes: 
7  Land-Centers Information 
7.4  Environment Summary Summary of the environmental status, 
alerts and incidents. 
Priority: low 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
Decomposes: 
7  Land-Centers Information 
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Operational Information Description Attributes Hierarchical Reference 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: periodic 
7.5  Security Alert Summary Summary of maritime domain 
security events with status 
information. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: periodic 
Decomposes: 
7  Land-Centers Information 
7.6  Search & Rescue Summary Summary of search and rescue events 
with status information. 
Priority: medium 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality and relevant 
Timeliness: periodic 
Decomposes: 
7  Land-Centers Information 
8  International Policy International Policy Operational 
Information 
  
9  Requests Requests Operational Information  Decomposed By: 
9.1  Humanitarian Request 
9.1  Humanitarian Request NGO stakeholders sent requests for 
Humanitarian assistance to the TSN. 
Priority: high 
Accuracy: Commercial SATNAV 
quality, unambiguous, relevant 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
Decomposes: 
9  Requests 
10  Law Enforcement Intelligence Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Operational Information 
Priority: high 




11  Vessel Communications Means for vessels to coordinate rules 
of the sea and other matters. 
Priority: low 
Accuracy: Correct Tactical Unit 
Timeliness: asynchronous 
 
Table 32. DODAF Operational View 7 Data Model. 
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Figure 58. Design Structured Matrix (Lattix) Complete Analysis Worksheet for Operational Domain. 





































































































































Perform External Activities 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.1.1 Identify Gap 2 B 1
1.1.2 Identify Method 3 C 1
1.1.3 Plan Gathering 4 1 D 1
1.1.4 Release Intelligence Tasking 5 1 1 E
1.2.1 Collect Data 6 1 F 1 1 1 1
1.2.2 Analyze Data 7 1 G 1
1.2.3 Develop Products 8 1 H 1
1.3.1 Authenticate Users 9 1 I 1 1
1.3.2 Upload Operational Picture 10 1 J 1 1
1.3.3 Upload Intelligence Products 11 1 1 K 1
1.4.1 Authenticate User Requests 12 L 1 1 1 1 1
1.4.2 Dow nload Products 13 1 1 1 M 1
2.1.5 Receive Humaitarian Request 14 1 N 1 1 1
2.1.1 Detect Objects and Conditions 15 1 O 1 1
2.1.2 Classify Objects and Conditions 16 1 1 P 1
2.1.3 Identify Objects and Conditions 17 1 1 1 Q 1
2.1.4 Track Objects and Conditions 18 1 1 R 1
2.1.6 Analyze ISR 19 1 1 1 1 S
2.2.1 Transform Information 20 1 T 1
2.2.2 Evaluate Capabilites 21 1 1 U 1
2.2.3 Evaluate Intentions 22 1 1 V 1
2.2.4 Evaluate Deviation 23 1 1 W 1
2.3.1 Develop Deviation Corrections 24 1 1 X 1 1
2.3.2 Develop Alternatives 25 1 Y
2.4.1 Identify Criteria 26 1 Z 1
2.4.2 Evaluate Options 27 1 1 AA 1 1 1 1 1
2.4.3 Optimize Protective Act Alternative 
28 1 AB 1
2.4.4 Optimize Reposition Act Alternative 
29 1 AC 1
2.4.5 Optimze Armed Act Alternative 30 1 AD 1
2.4.6 Optimize VBSS Act Alternative 31 1 AE 1
2.4.7 Optimize Information Act Alternative 
32 1 AF 1
2.5.1 Identify Resources 33 1 AG 1
2.5.2 Develop Implementation 34 1 1 1 1 1 1 AH 1 1 1
2.5.3 Predict Probability of Success 35 1 AI
2.6.1 Generate Commands 36 1 AJ 1 1 1
2.6.2 Inform Community 37 1 1 1 AK
2.6.3 Issue Commands 38 1 AL
2.6.4 Prepare Operations 39 1 AM 1
4.0 Operate Unit 40 1 1 1 1 AN  
Figure 59. Interpretative Structured Matrix (CADRAT) Complete Analysis for Operational Domain. 
The ISM analysis matrix maps the nodes and their dependencies as based on operation function clusters. 
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IX. APPENDIX OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 
PLAN 
A. SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1. Purpose 
Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), an enterprise also referred to as the 1000 
Ship Navy (TSN) concept, is composed of maritime nations, the commercial shipping 
industry and other international partners which have limited knowledge exchange 
capabilities. The ability to conduct coordinated maritime security and humanitarian 
assistance operations is hampered when components of the enterprise are not supported 
by an integrated command and control process. This study seeks to define a systems 
architecture and information standard for a Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capability to enable collaboration within the TSN. 
2. System Description 
The GMP enterprise is reliant on the “cooperation among maritime nations, who 
share a stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas”. The 
C2 pattern is employed at the enterprise level, as well as the platform level. To participate 
in the enterprise the platform must exercise its C2 and contribute towards one or more 
enterprise C2 activities. The C4I system of systems is composed of the “Watch” chain 
activities to only include a subset of these activities that occur after an external threat or 
event. These activities are shared between the military, constabulary, and commercial 
maritime industrial systems. 
B. SECTION 2. MISSION NEED AND OPERATIONAL 
REQUIREMENT 
1. Mission Need 
Maritime security is increasingly linked to economic prosperity. It requires a 
common understanding and combined efforts for action on a global scale. Maritime 
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security is necessary to ensure freedom of the seas, facilitate freedom of navigation and 
commerce, advance prosperity and sovereignty, and protect the resources of the oceans.  
Nations have a common interest in achieving maritime security that underpins economic 
security; yet terrorism, rogue states, and international criminal activity threaten that 
security and prosperity. There is a clear imperative for a collaborative international 
approach to deal with the new global strategic environment. As such, the GMP is 
consistent with the strategic goals of the Department of State’s International Outreach 
and Coordination Strategy. It solicits international support for maritime security 
programs and initiatives which are central to an effective global maritime security 
framework. 
2. Operational Requirements 
Refer to Chapter IV. 
C. SECTION 3. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 
1. Critical Technical Parameters 
Refer to Chapter IV. 
2. Critical Operational Issues 
COI 1.:  Can the C4I system sense information from multiple sources and generate 
a relevant common operational picture? 
COI 2.:  Can the C4I system maintain data assurance? 
COI 3.:  Can the C4I system identify non-military, paramilitary, and non-traditional 
threat/event? 
COI 4.:  Can the C4I system Generate Maritime Tactics for Commander? 
COI 5.:  Will the C4I system evaluate options considering complex international 
relationships? 
COI 6.:  Can the C4I system plan and evaluate courses of actions for situation 
adaptation? 
COI 7.:  Can the C4I system allow the user to effectively task the course of action? 
COI 8.:  Can the C4I system direct TSN international units to perform course of 
action? 
COI 9.:  Can the C4I system monitor the actions of the units tasked with TSN 
requirements? 
COI 10.:  Can the C4I system survive the operational environment? 
COI 11.:  Can the C4I system survive a virtual attack? 
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COI 12.:  Can the C4I system effectively interoperate with international data 
exchange systems? 
3. Measures of Effectiveness/Suitability, Measures of Performance and Data 
Record 
Two distinct MOE and MOP are described shown. In this appendix the 
operational test and evaluation approach is shown based on the Test and Evaluation 
course OA 4603. This approach is different from the approach discussed in Chapter IV. 
COI 1.:  Can the C4I system sense information from multiple sources and generate a 
relevant common operational? 
MOE 1.1.:  Percent of accurately receiving data 
MOP 1.1.1.:  Percent of transmissions received 
DR 1.1.1.1.:  Total number of packets sent 
DR 1.1.1.2.:  Total number of data packets lost 
MOP 1.1.2.:  Accuracy of static ship location 
MOP 1.1.3.:  Number of nodes the system can accommodate 
MOE 1.2.:  Percent data fused correctly 
MOP 1.2.1.:  Timeliness of information 
MOP 1.2.2.:  Rate at which data fusion identifies and nominates targets 
MOE 1.3.:  Percent of common operational picture’s (COP) generated properly 
MOP 1.3.1.:  Average time to receive COP after joining network 
MOP 1.3.2.:  Percent of nodes contributing to the COP 
MOP 1.3.3.:  Average time to generate COP 
COI 2.:  Can the C4I system maintain data assurance? 
MOE 2.1.:  Percent of protected data maintained 
MOP 2.1.1.:  Percent of protected information correctly segregated from public 
nodes 
DR 2.1.1.1.:  Total amount of protected information broadcast to C4I network 
DR 2.1.1.2.:  Total amount of protected information received by public nodes 
MOP 2.1.2.:  Average time to validate data from a trusted source and separate 
protected information from public information 
MOP 2.1.3.:  Average number of transmission errors 
MOE 2.2.:   Percent of public data maintained 
MOP 2.2.1.:  Average number of public nodes sending data to the C4I network 
per event type 
MOP 2.2.2.:  Average time to validate public data and relay to security forces 
MOP 2.2.3.:  Average time to translate foreign data into appropriate common 
syntax 
COI 3.:  Can the C4I system identify non-military, paramilitary, and non-traditional 
threat/event? 
MOE 3.1.:  Probability that events/threats are statically identified 
MOP 3.1.1.:  Percentage of non-traditional threats/events correctly identified 
DR 3.1.1.1.:  Total number of non-traditional threat nodes 
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DR 3.1.1.2.:  Total number of friendly nodes incorrectly identified as a threat 
MOP 3.1.2.:  Average time to identify after detection of suspicious vessel by 
friendly node  
MOE 3.2.:   Probability that security/humanitarian forces are identified properly 
MOP 3.2.1.:  Average time to notify local nodes and security nodes 
MOP 3.2.2.:  Average time for authority nodes to change course to respond to 
alert 
MOP 3.2.3.:  Percentage of local nodes notified to threat/event 
MOE 3.3.:  Probability of events/threats dynamically tracked 
MOP 3.3.1.:  Average number of system tracks 
MOP 3.3.2.:  Mean and variance of data refresh rate 
COI 4.:  Can the C4I system generate maritime tactics for commander? 
MOE 4.1.:   Percent of maritime tactical options made available to the commander 
MOP 4.1.1.:   Average number of threats tracked 
DR 4.1.1.1.:    Number of threats that are reported 
MOP 4.1.2.:   Average time threats are identified 
DR 4.1.2.1.:    Time to report a target  
MOP 4.1.3.:    Average number of friendly vessels available to engage 
DR 4.1.3.1.:  Range of friendly resources 
DR 4.1.3.2.:  Status and resources of vessel 
MOE 4.2.:   Probability that a commander can operate within rules of engagement 
MOP 4.2.1.:  Percent of options that meet ROE 
DR 4.2.1.1.:  Number options that meet ROE 
DR 4.2.1.2.:  Number of options that do not meet ROE 
MOP 4.2.2.:  Percent of properly presented ROE’s 
COI 5.:  Will the C4I system evaluate options considering complex international 
relationships? 
MOE 5.1.:   Probability that jurisdictional conflicts are identified 
MOP 5.1.1.:  Percent conflicts identified correctly 
DR 5.1.1.1.:  Number conflicts identified 
DR 5.1.1.2.:  Number conflicts not identified or indentified in error 
MOP 5.1.2.:  Percent of participants correctly identified as a member of the TSN 
MOP 5.1.3.:  Average time to determine participant’s status 
MOP 5.1.4.:  Percent accuracy of participant’s roles and responsibilities. 
MOP 5.1.5.:  Percent accuracy of participant’s available resources 
COI 6.:  Can the C4I system plan and evaluate courses of actions for situation 
adaptation? 
MOE 6.1.:  Probability that provided COAs are adaptable 
MOP 6.1.1.:  Average number of units that can change from original objective  
DR 6.1.1.1.:  Number of units that can alter objectives 
DR 6.1.1.2.:  Number of units that can not alter objectives 
MOP 6.1.2.:    Average time to reformulate course of actions  
COI 7.:  Can the C4I system allow the user to effectively task the course of action? 
MOE 7.1.:  Percentage of the user interface that is flexible 
MOP 7.1.1.:  Percent of user interface that user reconfigures 
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DR 7.1.1.1.:  Area of user interface that user may modify 
MOP 7.1.2.:  User mean time to reconfigure the interface 
DR 7.1.2.1.:  Time the user takes to reconfigure the user interface 
MOE 7.2.:  Percentage of the presented data that can be deciphered by the user 
MOP 7.2.1.:  Average time the user needs to read and act on information 
DR 7.2.1.1.:  Time that user reads and takes next action 
MOP 7.2.2.:  Percent of time the user is searching for information 
DR 7.2.2.1.:  Time from initiating a search to finding relevant information 
that a user needs to perform a task 
COI 8.:   Can the C4I system direct TSN international units to perform course of 
action? 
MOE 8.1.:  Percent of tasking orders translated into internationally recognizable 
actions 
MOP 8.1.1.:  Percent of common international maritime tactics 
DR 8.1.1.1.:  Number of common international maritime tactics 
DR 8.1.1.2.:  Total number of international maritime tactics 
MOP 8.1.2.:  Average number of task clarification requests 
DR 8.1.2.1.:  Number of task clarification requests 
MOE 8.2.:  Probability of commander tasking TSN units 
MOP 8.2.1.:  Average time to formulate, send and initiate tasking 
DR 8.2.1.1.:  Time to draft the tasking 
DR 8.2.1.2.:  Time to send tasking 
DR 8.2.1.3.:  Time to initiate tasking from receipt of task 
MOP 8.2.2.:  Average distance tasked unit travels from point tasked to 
destination point 
DR 8.2.2.1.:  Travel distance 
COI 9.:  Can the C4I system monitor the actions of the units tasked with TSN 
requirements? 
MOE 9.1.:   Probability that the commander has supervision of TSN units tasked 
MOP 9.1.1.:   Average time the TSN units are displayed on the situational 
awareness picture 
DR 9.1.1.1.:   Time a TSN unit symbol is active on the situational awareness 
picture 
MOP 9.1.2.:   Average radial error of the viewed or reported location of the TSN 
unit 
DR 9.1.2.1.:  Viewed or reported distance in range, cross range and height 
relative to truth 
MOE 9.2.:   Probability of predicting vessel courses to appraise likeliness of tactical 
success 
MOP 9.2.1.:   Rate of planning time forward 
DR 9.2.1.1.:   Projected time from observed location 
MOP 9.2.2.:   Percent of false projections of a unit’s track 
DR 9.2.2.1.:   Number of false tracks 
COI 10.:  Can the C4I system survive the operational environment? 
MOE 10.1.:  Probability that the system can function in operational environments 
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MOP 10.1.1.:   Percent availability in operational climate zones 
DR 10.1.1.1.:  Temperature Reading 
DR 10.1.1.2.:  Humidity Reading 
DR 10.1.1.3.:  Sea State 
DR 10.1.1.4.:  Atmospheric pressure 
MOE 10.2.:  Percentage of physical security attacks survived 
MOP 10.2.1.:   Number of Minutes prior to Intrusion to Facilities 
DR 10.2.1.1.:  Start Time of Intrusion 
DR 10.2.1.2.:  Stop Time of Intrusion 
DR 10.2.1.3.:  Start Location of Intruding Personnel 
DR 10.2.1.4.:  Start Location of Intrusion Personnel 
COI 11.:  Can the C4I system survive a virtual attack? 
MOE 11.1.:  Percentage of thwarted virtual attacks 
MOP 11.1.1.:  Average time of successful virtual attack 
DR 11.1.1.1.:  Time when initiating the virtual attack attempt 
DR 11.1.1.2.:  Time when virtual attacker/hacker has access to information 
DR 11.1.1.3.:  Time when virtual attacker/hacker manipulates information 
DR 11.1.1.4.:  Time when virtual attacker/hacker controls network 
MOP 11.1.2.:  Minimum detection time after virtual attack 
MOP 11.1.3.:  Minimum response time after virtual attack 
MOE 11.2.:   Probability of Denial of Service (DoS) 
MOP 11.2.1.:  Percentage of network bandwidth available prior to DoS 
MOP 11.2.2.:  Percentage of network bandwidth affected by DoS 
MOE 11.3.:  Probability of acceptable recovery after a virtual attack 
MOP 11.3.1.:  Percentage of nodes fully operational 
MOP 11.3.2.:  Percentage of nodes partially operational 
COI 12.:  Can the C4I system effectively interoperate with international data exchange 
systems? 
MOE 12.1.:  Percent of information translated 
MOP 12.1.1.:  Percent successful translation from Stakeholder 
DR 12.1.1.1.:  Data size received 
DR 12.1.1.2.:  Data size translated 
MOE 12.2.:  Percent of information converted to the international data standard 
MOP 12.2.1.:  Percent successful conversion to stakeholder 
DR 12.2.1.1.:  Data size translated 
DR 12.2.1.2.:  Data size converted 
 
COI Test Objectives and Sub-Objectives Test 
Receiving Capability 
To assess the receiving capability of the C4I network: 
Single node transmit to the network (E-1a) 
Multiple transmitting nodes (E-1b) 
Time to relay data from maximum respective ranges of nodes 
(E-1c) 
Volume of data passed to the network (E-1d) 
Common operating picture generation (E-1e) 
E-1 
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COI Test Objectives and Sub-Objectives Test 
Assurance Capability 
To determine data assurance of the C4I network: 
Convert data into common form (E-2a) 
Validate data per node type (E-2b) 
Errors per node type (E-2c) 
E-2 
Identify Capability 
To evaluate the identification capability of the C4I network: 
Threat classification (E-3a) 
Natural event classification (E-3b) 




To assess generated Maritime Tactics: 
ROE options (E-4a) 
Ship details (E-4b) 




To evaluate complex International Relationships: 
 Determination of conflicts (E-5a) 




To plan and evaluate courses of actions for situational 
awareness: 
Develop course of action (E-6a) 
Adapt course of action (E-6b) 
E-6 
COA Tasking Capability  
To assess the utility of the system to help the user to effective 
task the COA: 





To assess the capability of the TSN to direct an international 
unit to perform COA: 




To assess the capability to monitor an international TSN unit’s 
actions: 
Situational awareness (E-8a) 




To assess the availability of the system as it operates in its 
environment: 
System mean time to failure (S-2a) 




To assess the system’s vulnerability to cyber attacks: 
Malicious known and unknown attacks (S-3a) 
Degraded mode of operation (S-3b) 
S-3 
Interoperable Capability 
To assess the interoperability among the TSN units 
communication systems: 
Information exchange (E-9a) 
Information translation (E-9b) 
E-9 
Table 33. Test Objective Matrix. 
The test objective matrix correlates the COI with test and category. 
4. Test Scenarios 
¾ Scenario A.  Deliver Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.  The TSN evaluates 
options to provide or support the forceful delivery of humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief to stricken areas. 
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¾ Scenario B.  Monitor Environment.  The TSN observes and reports acts against 
the environment and conditions of environmental concern to authorities. 
¾ Scenario C.  Prepare Intelligence Information.  The TSN collects processes and 
posts information for users; a user type (warship or constabulary unit) receives 
information commensurate with the user role. 
¾ Scenario D.  Interdict Vessel.  The TSN interdicts another vessel in collaboration 
with other international naval units or constabulary units or both to suppress 
transnational criminals and smuggling (people, drugs, weapons, and other 
contraband).  
¾ Scenario E.  Perform Planning for AOR.  The TSN plans the framework of 
operations in a particular region based on international objectives, rules and 
restrictions. 
¾ Scenario F.  Generate TSN Operational Picture. The TSN generates a relevant 
operational picture for a region of interest that is distributed in varying degrees of 
specificity; a user type receives an operational picture commensurate with the 
user role. 
5. Instrumentation Requirements 
1. Scenario A. Deliver Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.  The TSN 
evaluates options to provide or support the forceful delivery of humanitarian 
aid and disaster relief to stricken areas. 
a. Data Center 
b. C2 Center 
c. Sensor Platforms 
d. Communications Platforms 
e. Sea Training Range Areas (Int./Terr.) 
f. International Ground Training Area 
g. Port Mooring and instrumentation Area 
h. Sea platform tracking system 
i. Information Grid Network Access (terrestrial, BLOS) 
j. 1 Mock Village post disaster condition 
k. Simulation of humanitarian aid logistics deliveries 
l. Simulation of environmental disaster 
m. logistics and planning team 
n. center instrumentation team 
o. platform instrumentation team 
p. village instrumentation team 
q. system center operations team 
r. test squadron team (data/ops center) 
s. platform skeleton crews 
t. international authority team 
 
2. Scenario B. Monitor Environment.  The TSN observes and reports acts against 
the environment and conditions of environmental concern to authorities. 
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a. Data Center 
b. C2 Center 
c. Sensor Platforms 
d. Communications Platforms 
e. Sea Training Range Areas (Int./Terr.) 
f. International Ground Training Area 
g. Port Mooring and instrumentation Area 
h. Sea platform tracking system 
i. Information Grid Network Access (terrestrial, BLOS) 
j. Simulation of environmental disaster 
k. logistics and planning team 
l. center instrumentation team 
m. platform instrumentation team 
n. system center operations team 
o. test squadron team (data/ops center) 
p. platform skeleton crews 
q. international authority team 
 
3. Scenario C. Prepare Intelligence Information.  The TSN collects processes and 
posts information for users; a user type (warship or constabulary unit) receives 
information commensurate with the user role. 
a. Data Center 
b. C2 Center 
c. International Ground Training Area 
d. Information Grid Network Access (terrestrial, BLOS) 
e. Transnational threat (TNT) <65’ vessels 
f. Simulation of humanitarian aid logistics deliveries 
g. Simulation of coordinated weapon engagement 
h. Simulation of environmental disaster 
i. logistics and planning team 
j. center instrumentation team 
k. system center operations team 
l. test squadron team (data/ops center) 
m. international authority team 
 
4. Scenario D. Interdict Vessel.  The TSN interdicts another vessel in 
collaboration with other international naval units or constabulary units or both 
to suppress transnational criminals and smuggling (people, drugs, weapons, 
and other contraband). 
a. Data Center 
b. C2 Center 
c. Sensor Platforms 
d. Communications Platforms 
e. Sea Training Range Areas (Int./Terr.) 
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f. International Ground Training Area 
g. Port Mooring and instrumentation Area 
h. Sea platform tracking system 
i. Information Grid Network Access (terrestrial, BLOS) 
j. 3 Transnational threat <65’ vessels 
k. Simulation of coordinated weapon engagement 
l. logistics and planning team 
m. center instrumentation team 
n. platform instrumentation team 
o. system center operations team 
p. test squadron team (data/ops center) 
q. platform skeleton crews 
r. international authority team 
s. TNT platform skeleton crews 
 
5. Scenario E. Perform Planning for AOR.  The TSN plans the framework of 
operations in a particular region based on international objectives, rules and 
restrictions. 
a. Data Center 
b. C2 Center 
c. International Ground Training Area 
d. Information Grid Network Access (terrestrial, BLOS) 
e. Simulation of humanitarian aid logistics deliveries 
f. Simulation of coordinated weapon engagement 
g. Simulation of environmental disaster 
h. logistics and planning team 
i. center instrumentation team 
j. system center operations team 
k. test squadron team (data/ops center) 
l. international authority team 
 
6. Scenario F. Generate TSN Operational Picture. The TSN generates a relevant 
operational picture for a region of interest that is distributed in varying 
degrees of specificity; a user type receives an operational picture 
commensurate with the user role. 
a. Data Center 
b. C2 Center 
c. Sensor Platforms 
d. Communications Platforms 
e. Sea Training Range Areas (Int./Terr.) 
f. International Ground Training Area 
g. Port Mooring and instrumentation Area 
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h. Sea platform tracking system 
i. Information Grid Network Access (terrestrial, BLOS) 
j. Transnational threat <65’ vessels 
k. Mock Village post disaster condition 
l. Simulation of humanitarian aid logistics deliveries 
m. Simulation of coordinated weapon engagement 
n. Simulation of environmental disaster 
o. logistics and planning team 
p. center instrumentation team 
q. platform instrumentation team 
r. village instrumentation team 
s. system center operations team 
t. test squadron team (data/ops center) 
u. platform skeleton crews 
v. international authority team 
w. TNT platform skeleton crews 
 





Sea platform tracking system 
 
Information Grid Network Access 
(terrestrial, BLOS) 
 
The several teams associated with the tests should 
reflect actual personnel from the international 
operations community.  The TSN vessel platforms 
may be a combination of test vessels as well as actual 
volunteers that represent the private community 
willing to have their vessels outfitted with TSN gear 
that is packaged for external tie-in. 
C2 Center 
 
Data Center  
In terms of equipment, for the first three scenarios 
should employ a combination of actual operations 
hardware and virtual machines and modeling 
software to simulate the threat environment to test 
the virtual capabilities of TSN to plan, generate an 
ops picture, and prepare information. 
Simulation of humanitarian aid logistics 
deliveries 
 
Simulation of coordinated weapon 
engagement 
 
Simulation of environmental disaster 
 
Transnational threat <65’ vessels 
In terms of the tests site military ranges both sea 
based and ground based should be employed to 
maintain safety and freedom to re-create the 
environment as much as possible.  The TNT threat 
will have to be simulated by a counter-terrorism team 
that has studies the enemies’ tactics and known 
technology employed.  Actual mitigation by force of 
the TNT threat will have to employ some type of sea 
base MILES system.  The humanitarian aid threat 
will have to be simulated as they are referred to as 
acts of God for a reason.  The mitigation transport of 
material for aid will also have to be simulated. 
 
Due to the scope of the type of threats we will have 
to simulate our COI’s for the TNT and Disaster 
threats will not have as a high a probability of 
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Test Resources Limitations to Scope of Test 
confidence as those for the data side only test. 
Table 34. Limitation to Scope of Test 
The table provides limitations of tests. 
D. SECTION 4: OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Test Scenario Descriptions 
 
Figure 60 OT&E Plan Scenario Diagram. 
Scenario A: Deliver Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief. The TSN evaluates 
options to provide or support the forceful delivery of humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
to stricken areas. 
• Scenario begins with multi-national 1000 Ship Navy (TSN) force positioned in 
the area of interest performing usual surveillance and assessment operations. 
• A Non-Government Organization (NGO), e.g. World Food Program, issues a 
request to any TSN unit in the vicinity of an area impacted by a natural disaster to 
provide escort duty for commercial vessel contracted to carry humanitarian aid. 
[COI: Can the C4I system assess public and protected information in a useful 
duration?] 
• The TSN C4I system recognizes the request and develops a course of action in 
collaboration with the TSN units in the vicinity. [COI: Can the C4I system allow 
the user to effectively task the course of action?] 
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• Each TSN unit confirms assignment to respond to the event. A message is sent to 
the NGO and commercial vessel describing the specifics of the plan. [COI: Can 
the C4I system direct TSN international units to perform course of action?] 
• One TSN unit departs its patrol area and heads to rendezvous with the commercial 
vessel.  The remaining TSN units adjust position to cover portions of the vacated 
patrol area. [COI: Can the C4I system direct TSN international units to perform 
course of action?] 
• When in sensor range of the commercial vessel the TSN unit performs a 
surveillance of the area and establishes a position to follow the commercial 
vessel.  The TSN unit establishes voice communications with the commercial 
vessel to provide awareness of nearby vessels. [COI: Can the C4I system 
interoperate with other international units in an effective means?] 
• The commercial vessel makes way towards the port with escort. 
• The commercial vessel arrives at port. 
• TSN unit collaborates with the TSN C4I to determine next task. 
 
Scenario B: Monitor Environment. The TSN observes and reports acts against the 
environment and conditions of environmental concern to authorities. 
• Scenario begins with multi-national 1000 Ship Navy (TSN) force positioned in 
the area of interest performing usual surveillance and assessment operations. 
• A report is received by the TSN C4I from a private vessel of an oil slick in the 
vicinity of a ship in distress (another scenario). [COI: Can the C4I system identify 
non-military, paramilitary, and non-traditional threat/event?] 
• The TSN C4I system recognizes the report and develops a course of action in 
collaboration with the TSN units in the vicinity. 
• One TSN unit departs its patrol area and heads to the location of the oil slick 
sighting. The remaining TSN units adjust position to cover portions of the vacated 
patrol area. [COI: Can the C4I system direct TSN international units to perform 
course of action?] 
• On arrival the TSN unit surveys the oil slick and makes a detailed report of its 
dimensions and local weather patterns to the TSN C4I. [COI: Can the C4I system 
monitor the actions of the units tasked with TSN requirements?] 
• The TSN C4I updates the situation awareness picture with the information and 
submits an environmental alert to the nation-states in the region. [COI: Is the C4I 
system sensing information from multiple sources and generating a relevant 
common operational picture at a 95 percent confidence?] 
• The responding TSN unit remains on station and makes status reports until the 
arrival of resources for the nation-states to monitor the situation. [COI: Can the 
C4I system monitor the actions of the units tasked with TSN requirements?] 
• On arrival of nation-state resources, the TSN unit collaborates with the TSN C4I 
to determine next task. 
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2.  E-Tests  Descriptions 
Test E-1.  Receiving capability. 
a. Objective:  To assess the receiving capability of the C4I network 
b. Procedure:  The C4I network is operated and evaluated in multiple test 
scenarios to determine the receiving, fusing, and disseminating capability 
of the C4I system.  The system receives multiple static and dynamic ship 
locations from both LRIT and AIS systems at predetermined ranges.  This 
information is then fused internal to the network and a Common 
Operating Picture (COP) is promulgated to at least one C2 (protected) 
node and one local public node.  
c. Data Analysis:  COPs are displayed by system instrumentation.  Screen 
captures are recorded and saved to external hard disks.  Data fusion error 
ellipses are recorded by network instrumentation and analyzed against 
requirements.  End-to-end throughput is also analyzed against 
requirements.  The effectiveness is recorded on datasheet E-1 by the 
system operator and network administrator. 
 
 
Test E-2.  Data assurance capability. 
a. Objective:  To evaluate the C4I network’s ability to maintain incidence 
data assurance 
b. Procedure:  The C4I network is operated and evaluated in multiple test 
scenarios to assess the network’s ability to maintain and update 
situational awareness data based on data received from disparate systems.  
The network timestamps and posts each transmission to the COP with 
internal instrumentation.   
c. Data Analysis:  After initial posting, internal instrumentation measures 
the duration between each subsequent posting and analyzes it against 
operational requirements and information assurance decay curves.  The 
effectiveness of the system data assurance is recorded on datasheet E-3 by 
the system operator. 
 
 
 Test E-3.  Identification capability. 
a. Objective:  To evaluate the identification capability of the C4I network 
b. Procedure:  The C4I network is operated and evaluated in multiple test 
scenarios to determine the identification capability of the C4I network.  
The system receives and confirms information from disparate sources. 
The system then produces and presents multiple identification taxonomy 
levels on the COP.  The system resolves target identification confirmation 
and uncertainty in reports. 
c. Data Analysis:  Identification is resolved by and promulgated across the 
network.  Multiples hostile and friendly contacts are recorded by local 
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external hard disk with screen captures.  Mean and variance of positive 
identification probability for each test scenario is analyzed against 
operational requirements.  The effectiveness of the system identification 
is recorded on datasheet E-2 by the system operator.   
 
 
Test E-4.  Generate maritime tactics capability. 
a. Objective:  To evaluate the C4I system’s ability to generate maritime 
tactics 
b. Procedure:  The C4I system is operated and evaluated in test scenarios to 
determine its ability to generate maritime tactics for commanders.  The 
system receives information from the network and system 
instrumentation generates multiple courses of action based on location 
and type of incident.  The system operator records which course of action 
(COA) is taken, or if an alternative course of action is better.   
c. Data Analysis:  The courses of action are recorded by system 
instrumentation and saved to external hard disks.  The system operator 




Test E-5.  International Relationship Capability. 
a. Objective:  To assess the C4I system’s ability to generate COA taking 
into consideration of multi-national laws and code of conducts 
b. Procedure:  The C4I system is operated and evaluated under test scenarios 
to determine its ability to generate a suitable COA given an incident.  The 
C4I system will produce multiple COAs.  The C4I will also produce 
international and multi-national acceptable rules of engagement and 
conduct and suggest which COA to take.  
c. Data Analysis:  Statistics are generated on number of successfully 
suggested COAs versus total number of COAs.  These results are 
generated and stored by the instrumented C4I platforms and saved to 
external hard disk.  The effectiveness of the COA suggestion will be 
recorded by an operator directly under the commanding official who 
made the decision on data sheet E-5. 
 
 
Test E-7.  Direct International TSN units capability. 
a. Objective:  To evaluate the C4I system’s ability to relay information to 
multi-national forces 
b. Procedure:  The C4I system is operated and evaluated in test scenarios 
involving both multi-national security nodes and public nodes.  
Information is sent from both categories of nodes flagged to one nation, 
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through the system and relayed to both types of nodes flagged under a 
different nation.  Total number of packets sent versus number received is 
recorded by system instrumentation and statistics are saved to external 
hard disks.   
c. Data Analysis: Described above.  The system’s relay effectiveness is 




E. SECTION 5. OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY 
1. Test S-2. Surviving the operational environment capability. 
a. Objective: To determine the environmental settings in which the C4I 
system without interruption to operations. 
b. Procedure: The C4I system will be operated in various temperatures, 
humidity conditions, sea status, and atmospheric pressures as specified in 
Scenario A & B that deal with environmental procedures.   The system 
will also have to operate while having a security breaches and the start 
and stop time of intrusion.  The system will also have to locations of 
intrusions and intruders.   
c. Data Analysis:  The time that the C4I system will lose operational 
capability during the test scenarios will be recorded.  Inability to maintain 
operational status during the different tests can result in a no GO.  
Confidence levels will be calculated using the t-statistic.  The Suitability 
data will be recorded on Data Sheet S-2.  
2. Test S-3. Degraded operations capability. 
a. Objective:  To assess the C4I system’s ability to survive a virtual attack 
b. Procedure:  The C4I system is operated and evaluated under test scenarios 
to determine its ability to survive a virtual attack.  The C4I system is 
subjected to various unpredictable attacks that target both access to the 
network and theft of information.  The attacks last the duration of the test 
scenario.  If the network is compromised, the time to recover from the 
attack will be recorded by system instrumentation and the system 
operator.   
c. Data Analysis:  Statistics are generated on number of successful attacks 
and system recovery time.  These results are generated and stored by the 
attacking platforms and saved to external hard disk.  The effectiveness of 
the system’s ability to survive a virtual attack is recorded by the system 
operator on datasheet S-3. 
F. T&E ANNEX A: RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 
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Table 35. Resource Requirements. 
Table list the resources for OT&E. 
Type of Resource Required 
Test Articles 
1 Data Center 
1 C2 Center 
2 Sensor Platforms 
2 Communications Platforms 
Test Sites 
Alpha – Sea Training Range Areas (Int./Terr.) 
Bravo – International Ground Training Area 
Charlie – Port Mooring and instrumentation Area 
Instrumentation Sea platform tracking system Information Grid Network Access (terrestrial, BLOS) 
Threat Systems and Simulators 3 Transnational threat <65’ vessels 1 Mock Village post disaster condition 
Simulations/Models 
Simulation of humanitarian aid logistics deliveries 
Simulation of coordinated weapon engagement 
Simulation of environmental disaster 
Manpower/Personnel Training 
1 logistics and planning team 
7 weeks 
1 center instrumentation team 
1 platform instrumentation team 
1 village instrumentation team 
2 weeks 
2 system center operations team 
2 test squadron team (data/ops center) 
4 platform skeleton crews 
2 weeks 
1 international authority team 
3 TNT platform skeleton crews 
3 weeks 
Special Requirements Each platform and threat should be operated from a different nation 
T&E Funding TBD 
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G. T&E ANNEX B: DATA SHEETS AND QUESTIONNAIRES 










Category (reference deficiency category guide): 
 

















Annotate the Deficiency Reports Category (I or II) and the corresponding alpha-numeric 
priority (1A-5).  Submit a Category I Deficiency Report and assign the corresponding 
priority when a condition: 
CAT I Priority Impact 
 1A If uncorrected, may cause death, severe injury, or severe occupational illness and 
no workaround is known; or, 
 1B 
 
If uncorrected, may cause major loss or damage to equipment or a system and 
no workaround is known; or,  
 1C 
 
Prevents the accomplishment of an essential capability or critically restricts 
OSS&E, to include required interaction with other mission critical platforms or 
systems; and no acceptable workaround is known. 
 2A Adversely affects an essential capability or negatively impacts operational safety, 
suitability, or effectiveness and no acceptable workarounds are known. 
 2B Adversely affects technical, cost, or schedule risks to the project or to life cycle 
support of the system, or, results in a production line stoppage and no acceptable 
workaround is known.  
When the condition does not meet the safety or mission impact criteria of a Category I report, 
submit a Category II Deficiency Report with the corresponding priority (3A-5) when the condition:  
CAT 
II Priority Impact 
 3A Adversely affects an essential capability or negatively impacts operational safety, 
suitability, or effectiveness and adequate performance is achieved through 
significant compensation or acceptable workaround.   
 3B Adversely affects technical, cost, or schedule risks to the project or to life cycle 
support of the system, but an acceptable workaround is known.   
 4A 
 
Does not affect an essential capability but may result in user/operator 
inconvenience or annoyance.  Adequate performance is achieved through minimal 
compensation. 
 4B Results in inconvenience or annoyance for development or maintenance 
personnel, but does not prevent the accomplishment of the task.  Adequate 
performance is achieved through minimal compensation. 
 5 Any other effect  
NOTES: 
Careful consideration should be given in assigning the category and corresponding priority recommendation to 
accurately define the deficiencies impact.   
Priority 1A - 1C are considered Emergency Conditions;  
Priority 2A - 3B are considered Urgent Conditions; and  
Priority 4A – 5 are considered Routine Conditions. 
Priority selection, DREAMS field I63, is mandatory for Category I reports and all T&E reports. 
Category I reports shall be coordinated with the appropriate organizational authority prior to submission. 
Originators/Originating Points should consider factors such as cost, schedule and performance risks; availability of 
spares; difficulty of operation or maintenance, repair, or replacement; system redundancy; associated trends; secondary 
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failures or damages; and environmental impacts among other possible factors. 
Workarounds refer to approved / authorized alternate procedures which could include, but are not  limited to:  manual 
processes, order of task accomplishment, more restrictive or intensive procedures, and the use of back-up or redundant 
systems or processes, etc. 
 








Submitted By / MOS: 
 
Previous experience with operations consoles 
 
What is an operations console? 
 
What did you like about the TSN console interface? 
 
What would change in the TSN console interface? 
 
Were the audio loop selection button color, size, and action appropriate for 
communication control? 
 
What was the easiest action performed through the interface? 
 
What was the most difficult action performed through the interface? 
 
Was the interface display at the appropriate eye level? 
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Did the PTT interface hand unit or foot pedal respond as expected? 
 
Were all routine functions able to be performed without having to leave the 
console seat? 
 
Was the audio level for each loop appropriately loud and intelligible? 
 
What should be changed about the TSN interface? 
 










X. APPENDIX SYSTEM DOMAIN SUPPORTING MATERIAL 
 
Figure 61. TSN C4I Top Level A-1 IDEF0 Diagram. 
Figure shows the system domain top level IDEF0 diagram. 
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Figure 62. Manage Communication and Network System Function IDEF0 Diagram. 





Figure 63. Develop Situation Awareness System Function IDEF0 Diagram. 




Figure 64. Develop Object of Interest Tracks System Function IDEF0 Diagram. 




Figure 65. Obtain Intelligence Products System Function IDEF0 Diagram. 




Figure 66. Develop and Evaluate Plans System Function IDEF0 Diagram. 




Figure 67. Coordinate and Monitor Operations System Function IDEF0 Diagram. 




Figure 68. Generate After Action Evaluation System Function IDEF0 Diagram. 

















1.1 Vessel Port 
Destination 
1.2 Vessel Estimated 
Time of Arrival 
1.3 Vessel Estimated 
Time of Departure 
1.4 Vessel Cargo Type 
1.5 Vessel Last Visited 
Ports 
1.6 Vessel Crew Data of 
Birth 
1.7 Vessel Crew Name 
1.8 Vessel Crew 
Nationality 
1.9 Vessel Crew Passport 
Number  






2.1 Vessel Status 
2.2 Vessel Alerts  





3.1 Vessel Location 
3.2 Vessel Course 
3.3 Vessel Rate of Turn 
3.4 Vessel Speed  












4.1 Humanitarian Aid 
Request  
4.2 Disaster Event Alert 
4.3 Environment Event 
Alert 
4.4 Maritime Search and 
Rescue Request 
4.5 Maritime Request for 
Assistance 




4.8 Transnational Threat 
Request for Assistance 
4.9 Asset Intelligence 
Request 
4.10 Operational Picture 
Request  
1.5 Develop and Evaluate 
Plans 
1.5.2.1 Prepare for Disaster 
or Environment Response  
1.5.3.1 Develop Engineering 
Assistance and Construction 
Options 
1.5.3.2 Develop Medical and 
Dental Assistance Options 
1.5.3.3 Develop Bulk Aid 
Protection and Delivery 
Options 
1.5.3.4 Evaluate Use of 
Force  
1.5.4.3 Develop Mitigation 
Approaches  
External 








Approved Plan 5.1 Asset Name 
5.2 Asset Sensor Plan 
5.3 Asset Movement 
5.4 Asset Communication 
Plan 
5.5 Asset Task Objective 
5.6 Asset Task 
Restrictions 
5.7 Asset Task Timeline 
1.6.1.1 Develop Tasks 
1.7.2.2 Compare Events to 
Plan  














Input To Function Output From Function Transferred By 
Software Intf 
and Actions  Planning CSCI  
Asset Reports 6.1 Asset Contact Report 
6.2 Asset Incident Report 
6.3 Asset Situation 
Report 
6.4 Intentions and 
Movement Report  
1.5.2.2 Update Disaster or 
Environment Plan 
1.5.3.4 Evaluate Use of 
Force 
1.5.4.1 Evaluate Criminal 
Profile  
1.5.5.1 Assess Situation 
1.6.2.1 Evaluate Asset 
Action Report 
1.7.1.1 Compile Asset 
Action Reports  














7.3 Search  
1.2.2.3 Combine Disparate 
Data Streams 
1.2.2.4 Combine Disparate 
Socio-Political Information 
1.2.2.6 Combine Disparate 
Weather Information 

















8.1 Object Name, Pseudo 
Name, Alias 
8.2 Object Physical 
Characteristics 
8.3 Object Recent History 
8.4 Object Contact Sheet 
8.5 Object Fingerprints 
8.6 Object Image 
8.7 Object Audio 
8.8 Object Video 
8.9 Object Capabilities  
1.3.2.1 Combine Image 
Information 
1.3.2.2 Combine Textual 
Information 
1.3.2.3 Combine Video 
Information 
1.3.2.4 Combine Audio 
Information  
1.4.3.2 Approve 







Intelligence CSCI  
Intelligence 
Reports 
9.1 Law Enforcement 
Blotter 
9.2 PRC Information 
9.3 AIS Information 
9.4 LRIT Information 
9.5 Regional 
Constabulary Information 
9.6 Regional Military 
Information  
1.4.1.2 Evaluate Received 
Intelligence Information 
1.4.2.2 Process Asset 
Provided Information  
External  TSN.CapInstall.3 
Hosted 






10.2 Statement of 
Objectives 
10.3 Restrictions 
10.4 Preferred Methods 
10.5 Rules of 
Engagement 
1.5.1.1 Analyze Objectives External  TSN.CapInstall.6 
Hosted Mission 






Input To Function Output From Function Transferred By 
Software Intf 
10.6 International 
Authority Role  
Navigation 
Information 
11.1 Navigation Message 
11.2 Ephemeris 
11.3 Almanac 
11.4 Time Reference 
11.5 Chart Data 
11.6 Map Data 
11.7 Navigation 
Reference Point  
1.2.1.5 Evaluate Navigation 
and Timing 
1.2.1.4 Evaluate Persistent 
Information  
1.2.2.5 Combine Disparate 
Environment Features  
External  TSN.CapInstall.8 
Hosted Situation 
Awareness CSCI  
Operational 
Picture 
12.1 Weather Overlay 
12.2 Chart Overlay 
12.3 Topographical 
Overlay 
12.4 Vessel Overlay 
12.5 Object of Interest 
Overlay 
12.6 Mission Planning 
Overlay 
12.7 Intelligence Overlay 
12.8 Situation 
Information Request 
12.9 Information Need  
1.2.1.2 Request Information 
1.5.2.2 Update Disaster or 
Environment Plan 
1.5.3.4 Evaluate Use of 
Force 
1.5.4.2 Anticipate Time 
Critical Issues 
1.5.5.1 Assess Situation 
1.5.5.3 Evaluate Criminal 
Capability 
1.6.1.2 Coordinate Mission 
Tasks 
1.7.2.2 Compare Events to 
Plan  
1.2.1.2 Request Information 
1.2.1.3 Evaluate Time 
Varying Information 
1.2.1.4 Evaluate Persistent 
Information 
1.2.1.5 Evaluate Navigation 
and Timing  
1.2.3.2 Approve 
Operational Picture Release 
 TSN.CapInstall.8 
Hosted Situation 














13.4 Hair Color 




13.9 Passport Number 
13.10 National Card 
Identification Number  





14.1 News Brief 
14.2 Situation Report 
14.3 Evidence Package  
External 1.7.3.1 Prepare News Brief 
1.7.3.2 Prepare Situation 
Report 





Release CSCI  
Request 
Intelligence 
15.1 Object of Interest 
15.2 Area of Interest 
15.3 Type of Information 
15.4 Timeframe of 
Interest 
15.5 Needed Date and 
Time 
15.6 Security and 
Confidentiality 
Certification  
1.4.1.1 Request Intelligence 
Information  















16.1 Track Number 
16.2 Track Type 
16.3 Track Status 
16.4 Track Identification 
16.5 Track Location 
16.6 Track Trend 
16.7 Track Associations  
1.2.1.3 Evaluate Time 
Varying Information 
1.2.2.1 Combine Disparate 
Single Sensor Information 
1.2.2.2 Combine Disparate 
Multi-Sensor Information  











17.2 Wave Height 
17.3 Wave Period 
17.4 Wave Direction 
17.5 Sea State 
17.6 Wind Speed 
Sustained 
17.7 Wind Speed Gusts 
17.8 Wind Direction 
17.9 Visibility 
17.10 Cloud Cover 
17.11 Precipitation 
17.12 Humidity 
17.13 Sun Rise and Set 
17.14 Moon Rise and Set 
17.15 Tidal Conditions 




1.2.1.3 Evaluate Time 
Varying Information 
1.2.2.6 Combine Disparate 
Weather Information  
External  TSN.CapInstall.8 
Hosted Situation 











1.2 Develop Situation 
Awareness 
1.3 Develop Object of 
Interest Tracks 
1.4 Obtain Intelligence 
Products 
1.5 Develop and Evaluate 
Plans 
1.6 Coordinate and Monitor 
Operations 
1.7 Generate After Action 
Evaluation 





1.1.3.1 Provide Network 
Communication Services 
1.1.3.2 Provide Network 
Infrastructure Service 
1.1.3.3 Provide COI 
Enterprise Service 
1.1.3.4 Provide System 



































19.3 Participant List 
19.4 RF Spectrum 
Management 
19.5 Message Type and 
Size 




























Awareness CSCI  
Network 
Messages 




20.5 Network Routes 
20.6 Routing Protocol 
20.7 Quality of Service  
1.1.3.1 Provide Network 
Communication Services  
1.1.3.1 Provide Network 















21.1 Asset ID 
21.2 Asset Sensors 
21.3 Asset Weapons 
21.4 Asset Status 




1.2.1.2 Request Information 
1.5.5.2 Evaluate Asset 
Capability 
1.6.1.1 Develop Tasks  
1.2.1.1 Manage Asset List 







Awareness CSCI  
Fused 
Information 
1.2.3.1 Populate Information 
Overlays  
1.2.2.1 Combine Disparate 
Single Sensor Information 
1.2.2.2 Combine Disparate 
Multi-Sensor Information 
1.2.2.3 Combine Disparate 
Data Streams 
1.2.2.4 Combine Disparate 
Socio-Political Information 
1.2.2.5 Combine Disparate 
Environment Features 
1.2.2.6 Combine Disparate 
















23.1 Action Assessments 
23.2 Action Issues 
23.3 Mission Lessons 
Learned 
23.4 Plan Issues 
23.5 Reconstructed 
Action 
23.6 Synthesized Events 
and Results 
23.7 Asset Status Change  
1.5.2.1 Prepare for Disaster 
or Environment Response 
1.5.3.1 Develop Engineering 
Assistance and Construction 
Options 
1.5.3.2 Develop Medical and 
Dental Assistance Options 
1.5.3.3 Develop Bulk Aid 
Protection and Delivery 
Options 
1.5.4.3 Develop Mitigation 
Approaches  
1.6.2.3 Update Asset Status 
1.7.2.1 Reconstruct Action 
Events and Information  
1.7.2.2 Compare Events to 
Plan  
1.7.2.3 Develop Lessons 
Learned  
1.7.3.1 Prepare News Brief 
1.7.3.2 Prepare Situation 
Report 
1.7.3.3 Prepare Evidence 
Package  
1.6.2.2 Release Asset 
1.7.1.1 Compile Asset 
Action Reports 
1.7.1.2 Gather Affected 
Area or Object of Interest 
Status  
1.7.2.1 Reconstruct Action 
Events and Information  
1.7.2.2 Compare Events to 
Plan  








Analysis CSCI  
TSN.CapInstall.6 
Hosted Mission 














24.1 Asset Capability 
24.2 Conflicted 
Objectives 
24.3 Criminal Capability 
24.4 Disaster or 
Environment Response 
Plan 
24.4.1 Disaster or 
Environment Response 
Update 
24.4.2 Disaster or 
Environment Response 
Initial Plan 





24.8 Request Criminal 
Response 





Threat Enforcement Plan 
24.12 Local Assessment  
1.5.2.1 Prepare for Disaster 
or Environment Response  
1.5.3.4 Evaluate Use of 
Force 
1.5.4.3 Develop Mitigation 
Approaches  
1.5.4.4 Rank Mitigation 
Techniques and Plan  
1.5.1.2 Reconcile Objectives 
1.5.2.2 Update Disaster or 
Environment Plan 
1.5.5.4 Predict Plan Success  
1.5.6 Release Plan 




Engineering Assistance and 
Construction Options 
1.5.3.2 Develop Medical 
and Dental Assistance 
Options 
1.5.3.3 Develop Bulk Aid 
Protection and Delivery 
Options 
1.5.3.4 Evaluate Use of 
Force  
1.5.4.1 Evaluate Criminal 
Profile  
1.5.4.2 Anticipate Time 
Critical Issues  
1.5.4.3 Develop Mitigation 
Approaches 
1.5.4.4 Rank Mitigation 
Techniques and Plan  
1.5.5.1 Assess Situation  
1.5.5.2 Evaluate Asset 
Capability  
1.5.5.3 Evaluate Criminal 
Capability 
1.5.5.4 Predict Plan Success 
 TSN.CapInstall.6 
Hosted Mission 






Input To Function Output From Function Transferred By 
Software Intf 
1.5.2.2 Update Disaster or 
Environment Plan  
1.5.2.1 Prepare for Disaster 
or Environment Response  
Mission 
Operations 
25.1 Asset Final Action 
Report 
25.2 Asset Task Order 
25.3 Asset Task Status 
25.4 Coordinated Mission 
Tasks 
25.5 Modified Tasks  
1.6.1.1 Develop Tasks  
1.6.1.2 Coordinate Mission 
Tasks 
1.6.1.3 Status Tasks  
1.7.1.2 Gather Affected Area 
or Object of Interest Status  
1.6.1.1 Develop Tasks 
1.6.1.2 Coordinate Mission 
Tasks  
1.6.1.3 Status Tasks  
1.6.2.1 Evaluate Asset 

























26.1 Classified Object 
26.2 Fused Intelligence 
Information 
26.3 Fused Object 
Information 
26.4 Object Report 
26.5 Object Track File 
26.6 Validated Object  
1.3.1.2 Validate Object 
1.3.1.3 Verify Object  
1.3.2.1 Combine Image 
Information 
1.3.2.2 Combine Textual 
Information 
1.3.2.3 Combine Video 
Information 
1.3.2.4 Combine Audio 
Information 
1.3.3.2 Release Track 
Information   
1.4.3.1 Prepare Intelligence 
Product 
1.3.3.1 Manage Track File   
1.3.1.1 Classify Object 
1.3.1.2 Validate Object  
1.3.1.3 Verify Object  
1.3.2.1 Combine Image 
Information 
1.3.2.2 Combine Textual 
Information 
1.3.2.3 Combine Video 
Information 
1.3.2.4 Combine Audio 
Information  
1.3.3.1 Manage Track File 
1.4.2.1 Process Open 
Source Information 
1.4.2.2 Process Asset 
















27.1 Fuel Oil and 
Lubricants 
27.2 Food and Provisions 
27.3 Repair Parts 
27.4 Medical Supplies 
27.5 Port Visit Services 




27.8 Transfer and 
Ambulatory Service  




Planning CSCI  
Table 36. System Domain Data Item Exchange. 
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Evaluate Asset Action ReportSituation Aw
arene
Request Information
Evaluate Time Varying Information
Evaluate Time Persistent Information
Populate Information Overlays
Evaluate Navigation and Timing Information
Approve Operational Picture ReleaseFusion
Combine Disparate Single Sensor Information
Combine Disparate Multi-Sensor Information
Combine Disparate Data Streams
Combine Disparate Socio-Political Information
Combine Disparate Environment Features
Combine Disparate Weather Information









Evaluate Received Intelligence Information
Process Open Source Information
Process Asset Provided Information
Prepare Intelligence Product
Approve Intelligence Product for Post
Develop Bulk Aid Delivery Options





Prepare for Disaster or Environment Respons
Update Disaster or Environment Response
Develop Engineering Assistance Options
Develop Medical and Dental Assistance Option
Anticipate Time Critical Issues
Develop Mitigation Approaches
















Compile Asset Action Reports
Gather Affected Area or Object of Interest Sta
Characterize End State
Reconstruct Action Events and Information
Compare Events to Plan
Develop Lessons LearnedInform
ati








Provide Communications and Transmission Se
Provide Netw ork Security
Provide LOS/BLOS Radio
Provide Netw ork Communication Services
Provide Netw ork Infrastructure Services
Provide COI Services
Provide System Management Services  
Figure 69. Design Structured Matrix (Lattix) Completed Analysis Worksheet for System Domain. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




4 Update Asset Status
1 D 1 1 1




7 Evaluate Time Varying Information
1 G 1
8 Evaluate Time Persistent Information
1 H
9 Populate Information Overlays
I 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Evaluate Navigation and Timing 
Information 1 J
11 Approve Operational Picture Release
K 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 Combine Disparate Single Sensor 
Information 1 L 1
13 Combine Disparate Multi-Sensor 
Information 1 M 1
14 Combine Disparate Data Streams
1 N
15 Combine Disparate Socio-Political 
Information 1 1 O
16 Combine Disparate Environment 
Features 1 1 P
17 Combine Disparate Weather 
Information 1 1 Q





1 T 1 1
21 Verify Object
1 U 1 1 1 1
22 Combine Image Information
1 V 1 1
23 Combine Textual Information
1 W 1 1
24 Combine Video Information
1 X 1 1
25 Combine Audio Information
1 Y 1 1
26 Manage Track File
1 1 1 1 Z 1
27 Release Track Information
1 1 1 1 AA
28 Request Intelligence Information
1 1 AB
29 Evaluate Received Intelligence 
Information 1 AC
30 Process Open Source Information
1 AD 1
31 Process Asset Provided Information
1 AE 1
32 Prepare Intelligence Product
1 1 AF
33 Approve Intelligence Product for Post




1 AI 1 1 1 1 1 1
36 Prepare for Disaster or Environment 
Response 1 AJ 1 1
37 Update Disaster or Environment 
Response 1 1 1 AK
38 Develop Engineering Assistance 
Options 1 AL 1 1
39 Develop Medical and Dental 
Assistance Options 1 AM 1 1
40 Develop Bulk Aid Delivery Options
1 AN 1 1
41 Evaluate Use of Force
1 1 1 AO 1
42 Evaluate Criminal Profile
1 AP 1
43 Anticipate Time Critical Issues
1 AQ 1 1 1
44 Develop Mitigation Approaches
1 1 AR
45 Rank Mitigation Techniques and Plan
1 1 AS 1
46 Assess Situation
1 AT 1 1
47 Evaluate Asset Capabilities
1 AU 1
48 Evaluate Criminal Capabilities
1 AV 1
49 Predict Plan Success
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 AW
50 Develop Tasks
1 AX 1
51 Coordinate Mission Tasks
1 1 AY 1
52 Status Tasks
1 1 1 1 AZ 1
53 Update Asset Status
1 BA
54 Compile Asset Action Reports
1 BB 1 1
55 Gather Affected Area or Object of 
Interest Status 1 1 BC
56 Characterize End State
BD
57 Reconstruct Action Events and 
Information 1 BE 1 1 1 1
58 Compare Events to Plan
1 BF 1 1 1 1
59 Develop Lessons Learned
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 BG
60 Prepare News Brief
1 1 1 BH
61 Prepare Situation Report
1 1 1 BI
62 Prepare Evidence Package
1 1 1 BJ
63 Provide Physical Security
BK
64 Provide Communications and 
Transmission Security 1 BL
65 Provide Network Security
BM
66 Provide LOS/BLOS Radio
1 1 BN
67 Provide Network Communication 
Services 1 1 BO
68 Provide Network Infrastructure 
Services 1 BP
69 Provide COI Services
1 BQ
70 Provide System Management 
Services 1 BR  
Figure 70. Interpretative Structured Matrix (CADRAT) Complete Analysis Worksheet for System Domain. 

















XI. APPENDIX INFORMATION EXCHANGE STANDARD 
A. SCOPE 
1.1 This standard specifies the information requirements for the TSN 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) information 
network. 
1.2 The TSN C4I information network, herein referred to as the TSN network, 
improves the effectiveness of commercial ship navigational systems such as Automatic 
Identification Systems (AIS) and Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) by 
fusing multiple data sources, previously available only at the regional level. 
1.3 The TSN network expands the coverage of ship navigational systems by 
receiving and transmitting situational awareness from private vessels a minimum of 30 ft 
in length. 
1.4 Furthermore, the TSN network does not degrade the performance of the 
disparate systems providing data to it. It also does not compromise commercial 
competition or broadcast the location of security forces. 
B. VESSEL INFORMATION 
The information transmitted by all non-military vessels across the TSN network is 
divided into four (4) categories and includes: 
2.1 Static information: 
• Static AIS information defined in MSC.74(69) Annex 3, Section 6 
• Static LRIT information defined by the group empowered by 
MSC.264(84)  
• Ship flag 
2.2 Dynamic information: 
• Required and optional dynamic AIS information defined by MSC.74(69) 
Annex 3, Section 6 
• Dynamic LRIT information defined by the group empowered by 
MSC.264(84) 
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• Ship flag  
• Time of last transmission to TSN network 
2.3 Voyage related information: 
• Required and optional voyage related information defined by MSC.74(69) 
Annex 3, Section 6 
2.4 Safety related information: 
• Souls on board 
• Self defense capabilities (water cannon, warning flares, etc.) 
• Type of emergency (natural disaster, piracy, trafficking in humans, etc.) 
C. OTHER INFORMATION INPUTS/OUTPUTS 
3.1 The TSN network must transmit and receive information from the 
following sources:  
• Local constabulary data sources 
• International constabulary data sources 
• Sanitized military intelligence data sources 
• International air traffic 
D. INFORMATION REFRESH RATES 
4.1 Information refresh rates for TSN are defined in Table 37. 
 Threshold 
Data 
Category: Territorial Waters International Waters 
Static As defined by MSC.74(69) Every 2 hours and on request 
Dynamic As defined by MSC.74(69) Every hour and on request 
Voyage As defined by MSC.74(69) On request 
Safety As defined by MSC.74(69) As required 
Table 37. Data Refresh Rates for the TSN Network 
E. INFORMATION ELEMENT 
5.1 TSN-001: Static Vessel Element 
Static vessel information must maintain tactical relevancy and informational truth 
of all anchored and non-moving, network-participant vessels within the evolving TSN 
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mission area for a minimum of 24 hours.  This information element, provided by or 
generated by TSN, contains the vessel’s: 
• Location segment 
• Destination port segment 
• Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) to destination port segment 
• Estimated departure time from anchoring segment 
• Cargo type segment 
• Current voyage port history segment 
• Crew information (date of birth, sex, nationality) segment 
• Type of emergency segment 
5.2 TSN-002: Dynamic Vessel Element 
Dynamic vessel information must maintain tactical relevancy and informational 
truth of all moving network-participant vessels within the evolving TSN mission area for 
a minimum of 24 hours.  This information element, provided by or generated by TSN, 
contains the static vessel element in addition to the vessel’s: 
• Course segment 
• Rate of turn segment 
• Speed segment 
5.3 TSN-003: Event and Request Element 
Event and request information must be gathered, fused, and promulgated to 
disparate assets within the evolving TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time for a 
minimum of 72 hours.  This information element, provided by or generated by, TSN 
contains: 
• Humanitarian aid requesting segment 
• Disaster alerting segment 
• Rescue requesting segment 
• Transnational threat alerting segment 
• Transnational threat pursuit segment 
• Additional asset assistance requesting segment 
• Asset external intelligence requesting segment 
5.4 TSN-004: Planning Element 
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Planning information must be evaluated and promulgated to disparate assets 
within the evolving TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time for a minimum of 3 
hours.  This information element, provided by or generated by TSN, contains: 
• Asset naming segment 
• Asset sensor planning segment 
• Asset movement segment 
• Asset communications and networking planning segment 
• Asset objective tasking segment 
• Asset restrictions tasking segment 
• Timeline and action tasking segment 
5.5 TSN-005: Asset Reporting Element 
Asset reporting information must maintain tactical relevancy and informational 
truth of the evolving TSN mission area for a minimum of 30 minutes.  This information 
element, provided by or generated by TSN, contains: 
• Asset contact reporting segment 
• Asset incident reporting segment 
• Asset situation reporting segment 
• Asset intentions and movement reporting segment 
5.6 TSN-006: Open-Source Element 
Open-source information must maintain tactical relevancy and informational truth 
for a minimum of 7 days.  This information element, provided to TSN, contains: 
• Weather history and forecast segment 
• News segment 
• Search for information segment 
5.7 TSN-007: Object Information Element 
Object information must maintain tactical relevancy and informational truth while 
being gathered, fused, and promulgated to disparate assets in the evolving TSN mission 
area for a minimum of 30 minutes.  This information element, provided by or generated 
TSN, contains: 
• Object naming and pseudo naming segment 
• Object physical characteristic segment 
• Object relevant history segment 
• Object contact list segment 
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• Object image segment 
• Object audio segment 
• Object video segment 
• Object capabilities segment 
5.8 TSN-008: Intelligence Report Element 
Intelligence reporting information must combine disparate, legacy navigation, 
constabulary, and military reporting systems and maintain both informational truth and 
tactical relevance in the evolving TSN mission area for a minimum of 3 hours.  This 
information element, provided to TSN, contains: 
• Law enforcement blotter segment 
• IMB-PRC segment 
• AIS information segment 
• LRIT information segment 
• Navigational segment (ephemeris, navigation messaging) 
• Regional constabulary information segment 
• Regional military information segment 
5.9 TSN-009: International Objectives Element 
International objective information must combine and reconcile disparate mission 
objectives from at least two different national governments, or their agents, within the 
evolving TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time for a minimum of 30 minutes.  
This information, provided to TSN, contains: 
• International authority name segment 
• Objective statement segment 
• Objective restriction segment 
• Preferred methods segment 
• Rules of engagement segment 
• International authority role segment 
5.10 TSN-010: Common Operating Picture Element 
Common Operating Picture information must gather, fuse, filter, and promulgate 
hierarchically supplied information in a tactically relevant time to disparate assets within 
the evolving TSN mission area for a minimum of 7 days.  This information, provided by 
or generated by TSN, contains: 
• Weather overlay segment 
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• Chart overlay segment 
• Topographical overlay segment 
• Vessel overlay segment 
• Object of interest overlay segment 
• Planning overlay segment 
• Intelligence overlay segment 
5.11 TSN-011: Communications Link Element 
Communications link information must provide hierarchical access and 
asymmetric security to all information sent to, from, and across the network within the 
evolving TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time for a minimum of 7 days.  This 
information, provided by or generated by TSN, contains: 
• Bit error rate segment 
• Power level segment 
• Participant segment 
• Outages segment 
• Communication channels segment 
• Message type and size segment 
• RF spectrum segment 
5.12 TSN-012: Network Management Element 
Network management information must provide hierarchical, networked 
computing to all assets with the evolving TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time 
for a minimum of 7 days.  This information, provided by or generated by TSN, contains: 
• Performance segment 
o Packet loss  
o Latency  
o Throughput  
o Quality of service (QOS)  
• Topology segment 
o Routing protocol 
o Network routes 
• Configuration segment 
o Hardware version 
o Software version 
 
5.13 TSN-013: Tracking Element 
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Tracking information must declare, identify, and fuse disparate sensor and 
intelligence information to produce a common object of interest track within the evolving 
TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time for a minimum of 30 minutes.  This 
information, provided by or generated by TSN contains: 
• Track number segment 
• Track type segment 
• Track status segment 
• Track identification segment 
• Track location segment 
• Track trend segment 
• Track association segment 
5.14 TSN-014: Personal Identification Element 
Personal identification information must be gathered and fused from disparate 
open source, constabulary, and military systems; then promulgated to assets with the 
evolving TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time for a minimum of 30 minutes.  
This information, provided to or generated by TSN, contains: 
• Subject name segment 
• Physical characteristic segment (Height, weight, hair color, sex, ethnicity) 
• Nationality and documentation segment 
5.15 TSN-015: Logistics Request Element 
Logistics requesting information must gather, fuse, and promulgate requests by 
assets within the TSN mission area in a tactically relevant time for a minimum of 30 
minutes.  This information, provided by or generated by TSN, contains: 
• Medical segment 
• Bulk aid segment (water, grain) 
• Petroleum segment 
• Repair supplies segment 
• Munitions segment 
• Personnel segment (cultural specialists, linguists, diplomats) 
• Postal service segment 
• Transportation/Evacuation services segment 
• Port services segment 
F. CONFIGURATION ITEMS 
  XI-8
6.1 Computer-Software (CSCI): 
• SW-001 – Distributed Communications and Networking Management 
CSCI 
• SW-002 – Distributed Situational Awareness Development CSCI 
• SW-003 – Information Fusion CSCI 
• SW-004 – Distributed Intelligence Product Acquisition CSCI 
• SW-005 – Distributed Mission Analysis CSCI 
• SW-006 – Distributed Mission Operations CSCI 
• SW-007 – Distributed Mission Planning CSCI 
• SW-008 – Asset Management CSCI 
• SW-009 – Distributed After Action Report Generation CSCI 
 
6.2 Hardware (HWCI) 
• HW-001 – External Communications HWCI 
o SATCOM 
o Marine VHF 
o GPS 
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